2012 9 * 1988 2007 1988 2007 1988 2002 2007 Oaxaca- Blinder 1995 2002 2007 Oaxaca-Blinder Baron 1988 Abbott 1993 Kalleberg 2008 Kunda et al. 2002 20 70 Kalleberg 2008 ILO 2002 2005 85% 2006 * 100872 mr. zhong. zhao @ gmail. com 12BJY044 CHIP - RUMiC CHIP RUMiC IZA ARC / AusAid IZA 85

1988 2007 2009 1949 1978 20 70 1 1978 20 80 1986 10 1991 20 90 1995 1 1 1 2008 1 1 86 1

2012 9 1 1980 1 1978 2008 1997 2 2 1985 100% 2009 30% 40% 2 20 80 2011 1985 6700 2000 1. 5 2010 2. 4 2004 2004 2012 3 1 2 1997 9 12 3 2008 1 1 2008 5 1 2011 7 1 http / / news. xinhuanet. com / politics /2012 02 /07 / c_111495597. htm 87

1 3 Heywood & Green 2008 Kunda et al. 2002 Rich & Tracy 2004 3 Blanchard & Landier 2001 2010 ILO 2002 2006 2002 66 42% 23. 4% 85% 2006 1990 2004 2 1988 1995 2002 2007 1 88 2

2012 9 1988 1995 2002 CHIP 2007 RUMiC 1995 2002 2007 16 60 16 55 1 2 1. 4 1988 3 97. 86% 20 90 1995 2002 2002 2007 4 1988 2007 2. 2009 1 16 60 16 55 2 3 4 1986 2002 89

4 % CHIP RUMiC2007 1a 1995 1995 1a 1995 2002 13 15 2007 10 1995 2002 2007 1b 1995 75. 41% 2007 54. 83% 2007 1a 1988 2007 4 90

2012 9 Logit 1a 0-1 0-1 % % % % % % 10. 93 20. 77 15. 80 39. 83 0. 55 0. 91 5. 25 14. 10 4. 55 23. 03 44. 51 32. 44 3. 02 8. 99 8. 74 9. 03 0. 50 0. 29 3. 06 1. 81 4. 53 6. 55 6. 11 2. 90 9. 96 16. 27 13. 28 35. 52 0. 48 0. 78 5. 45 13. 89 4. 91 22. 40 45. 22 32. 36 1995 2. 62 9. 18 8. 55 9. 27 0. 50 0. 41 2. 93 2. 07 4. 42 6. 48 6. 21 2. 70 9. 53 10. 08 5. 46 31. 86 0. 35 0. 57 7. 32 14. 15 7. 69 19. 26 46. 52 34. 21 2. 93 8. 38 6. 20 10. 64 0. 48 0. 50 3. 12 1. 82 4. 37 6. 37 5. 17 2. 74 12. 04 22. 17 17. 66 41. 86 0. 61 0. 93 10. 60 10. 33 24. 98 15. 66 44. 21 40. 14 2. 87 8. 96 9. 12 8. 40 0. 49 0. 26 8. 56 1. 13 31. 02 5. 79 5. 26 4. 69 10. 93 20. 54 16. 98 40. 13 0. 54 0. 91 11. 39 10. 54 28. 12 14. 89 44. 66 40. 45 2002 2. 75 8. 83 9. 12 8. 39 0. 50 0. 29 8. 81 1. 09 31. 84 5. 81 5. 47 4. 63 11. 03 16. 67 7. 59 36. 94 0. 46 0. 75 15. 66 10. 86 42. 83 12. 95 44. 59 42. 46 2. 82 10. 10 7. 90 9. 74 0. 50 0. 43 10. 30 1. 05 36. 80 5. 97 4. 88 4. 61 10. 34 17. 42 5. 90 38. 12 0. 48 0. 82 11. 98 10. 52 29. 51 15. 33 43. 25 41. 42 2. 88 9. 89 7. 23 9. 25 0. 50 0. 38 9. 39 1. 07 33. 93 6. 16 5. 42 4. 24 12. 39 18. 22 16. 16 40. 67 0. 58 0. 90 12. 92 14. 62 36. 20 11. 53 49. 96 38. 50 3. 34 10. 27 8. 68 9. 23 0. 49 0. 30 9. 14 0. 42 36. 14 4. 89 4. 99 4. 51 11. 87 16. 32 9. 76 38. 21 0. 55 0. 86 15. 39 14. 68 45. 61 10. 35 50. 27 39. 38 2007 3. 47 10. 26 8. 09 9. 11 0. 50 0. 35 9. 74 0. 40 37. 63 4. 96 4. 67 4. 17 11. 31 17. 36 7. 35 38. 70 0. 60 0. 73 17. 65 14. 66 54. 66 9. 26 50. 63 40. 11 3. 64 10. 74 8. 19 9. 55 0. 49 0. 44 9. 73 0. 31 36. 64 4. 65 4. 55 3. 76 10. 81 19. 07 5. 29 39. 68 0. 59 0. 76 16. 32 14. 68 47. 96 10. 07 50. 01 39. 92 3. 38 10. 23 6. 62 9. 87 0. 49 0. 43 10. 00 0. 37 38. 52 4. 90 4. 63 4. 08 1a 1b 1995 1995 1988 1988 1995 2002 2007 CHIP RUMIC Logit Cameron and Trivedi 2006 Logit j Pr y i = j = exp x' i β j j = 1 4 1 1 + 4 exp x' k = 2 iβ k 91

y i = 1 4 x i logit Base Category j Odds Ratio j Odds Ratio = Pr y = j / Pr y = 1 = exp x' i β j 1 1 j 1 j LOR log Odds Ratio = x ' iβ j LOR > 0 j LOR = 0 LOR > 0 j 1b 18. 51% 75. 41% 78. 38% 73. 33% 57. 59% 64. 84% 70. 09% 93. 60% 1995 37. 49% 22. 33% 17. 27% 24. 09% 35. 33% 31. 80% 24. 08% 4. 74% 44. 01% 2. 25% 4. 35% 2. 58% 7. 08% 3. 36% 5. 83% 1. 67% 100% 225 6770 1346 2901 1296 3460 1768 1622 16. 77% 62. 42% 81. 05% 54. 62% 24. 54% 39. 31% 40. 56% 83. 64% 30. 74 % 24. 09% 14. 73% 29. 60% 30. 81% 40. 79% 25. 01% 6. 23% 2002 30. 21% 9. 28% 2. 03% 9. 72% 28. 83% 12. 51% 21. 30% 6. 79% 22. 29% 4. 21% 2. 18% 6. 06% 15. 82% 7. 39% 13. 13% 3. 34% 100% 1183 3986 602 2247 1107 1880 1756 1401 17. 24% 54. 83% 71. 88% 48. 61% 33. 09% 39. 57% 28. 05% 57. 73% 53. 04% 36. 64% 22. 87% 42. 57% 46. 53% 46. 92% 47. 41% 33. 86% 2007 12. 86% 3. 67% 2. 49% 4. 87% 9. 05% 6. 58% 9. 74% 4. 28% 1a 16. 85% 4. 85% 2. 76% 3. 95% 11. 33% 6. 92% 14. 80% 4. 13% 100% 2611 4068 551 1655 3909 1527 3119 1924 Logit 2 2002 2007 1995 2002 2007 92

2012 9 1995 2007 2002 Logit Logit 2002 2007 1995 2 1 Logit / / / 2002-20. 30 *** - 19. 59 *** - 18. 34 *** 2007-19. 89 *** - 18. 84 *** - 19. 18 *** p_r2 0. 24 2 Logit / / 2002-2. 35 *** - 1. 64 *** 2007-1. 45 *** - 0. 41 *** p_r2 0. 29 3 Logit / 2002-1. 08 *** 2007-1. 13 *** p_r2 0. 27 Logit Logit Logit 1995 17687 * ** *** 0. 1 0. 05 0. 01 1995 2002 2007 logit Oaxaca-Blinder 4 2 1995 2002 2007 Logit 93

Oaxaca-Blinder Logit Logit Logit 1 3 1995 2002 2007 2002 2002 2 1995 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 U 3 Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca 1973 Blinder 1973 Y ig = X ig β g + ε ig g = A B Oaxaca & Ransom 1994 Y A - Y B = Δ OLS = X A - X B β * + X A β A - β * + X A β * - β B 2 1 F 2 94 3

2012 9 β * = Ωβ A + I - Ω β B Ω I Ω = 1 Ω = 0 1 Logit 2 Yun 2004 3 Logit / / 1995 2002 2007 1995 2002 2007 0. 14 *** 0. 06 *** 0. 10 *** 0. 09 *** 0. 03 *** 0. 05 *** 1. 10 *** 0. 15 0. 21 1. 16 *** 0. 1 0. 04 1. 60 *** 0. 27 0. 44 ** 1. 55 *** 0. 35 0. 22 1. 87 *** 0. 64 ** - 0. 07 1. 42 *** 0. 55 ** 0. 1 2. 68 *** 0. 93 *** 0. 78 *** 1. 72 *** 0. 59 ** 0. 44 *** 0. 25 2. 41 *** 1. 02 *** 0. 07 1. 34 *** 0. 11 0. 58 ** 1. 20 *** 0. 74 *** 0. 42 * 0. 78 *** 0. 61 *** - 0. 32-0. 40 *** - 0. 37 *** - 0. 65 *** - 0. 91 *** - 0. 29 *** 0. 15 0. 51 *** 0. 80 *** - 1. 55 *** - 1. 74 *** 0. 19 3. 52 *** 2. 29 *** 1. 71 *** 2. 04 *** 1. 29 *** 0. 72 *** 0. 42 * - 0. 02-0. 06 0. 08-0. 04-0. 19 *** - 0. 62 ** - 0. 10 * - 0. 04-0. 13 0. 02-0. 06 ** - 0. 09 0. 03 ** 0. 01-0. 11-0. 01 0. 03 *** 0. 14-0. 60 *** 0. 35 ** - 0. 11-0. 15 0. 86 *** 6727 5077 6419 6727 5077 6419 p_r2 0. 2 0. 24 0. 18 0. 2 0. 24 0. 18 Logit * ** *** 0. 1 0. 05 0. 01 1995 2002 2007 Logit 1995 2002 2002 2007 Oaxaca-Blinder 1 Oaxaca-Blinder 95

1. 1995 2002 1995 2002 4a 1995 2002 2002 2002 1995 4a 1995 2002 / / - 2. 77 2. 37-5. 13-2. 40-0. 07-2. 34-2. 76 0. 18-2. 94-1. 79 0. 20-1. 99 0. 36 0. 02 0. 34 0. 46 0. 07 0. 39-0. 72 0. 00-0. 72-1. 03-0. 37-0. 66-24. 61 2. 16-26. 77-3. 99 0. 04-4. 03 24. 95 0. 00 24. 95 3. 96 0. 00 3. 96 1995 1995 2002 1995 2002 Yun 2004 1995 2002 2002 2. 2002 2007 2002 2007 4b 2007 2002 2002 96 1988 2007

2012 9 1995 2002 2002 2007 4b 2002 2007 / / 0. 07 0. 72-0. 65 4. 81 2. 41 2. 40 0. 42-0. 36 0. 78-0. 37-0. 44 0. 07-0. 33-0. 06-0. 27-0. 19-0. 04-0. 15-1. 21-0. 08-1. 14 0. 78-0. 04 0. 81 3. 38 1. 22 2. 16-0. 13 2. 93-3. 06-2. 18 0. 00-2. 18 4. 73 0. 00 4. 73 2002 2002 2007 2002 2007 1988 2007 1988 2002 2007 1995 2002 2002 2007 2009 30 2010 9 2 2006 1990 2004 2011 1979 2010 No. C2011020 2005 97

2010 36 2 2009 7 2006 2 Abbott A. 1993 The Sociology of Work and Occupations Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 19 187 209. Baron J. N. 1988 The Employment Relation as a Social Relation Journal of Japanese and International Economics Vol. 2. Blanchard O. and A. Landier 2002 The Perverse Effects of Partial Labor Market Reform Fixed Duration Contracts in France Economic Journal Vol. 112 214 244. Cameron A. C. and P. K. Trivedi 2006 Microeconometrics Methods and Applications Cambridge University Press. Ham J. J. Svejnar and K. Terrel 1998 Unemployment and the Social Safety Net during Transitions to a Market Economy Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics American Economic Review Vol. 88 5 1117 1142. Heywood J. S. and C. Green 2007 Are Flexible Contracts Bad for Workers Evidence from Job Satisfaction Data Lancaster University Management School Working Papers http / / papers. ssrn. com / sol3 / papers. cfm abstract_id = 1033436 International Labour Office 2002 Key Indicators of the Labour Market 2001 2002 Geneva ILO. Kalleberg A. L. 2009 Precarious Work Insecure Workers Employment Relations in Transition American Sociological Review Vol. 74 1 1 22. Kunda G. S. R. Barley and J. Evans 2002 Why do Contractors Contract The Experience of Highly Skilled Technical Professionals in a Contingent Labor Market Industrial and Labor Relations Review Vol. 55 2 234 261. Rich R. and J. Tracy 2004 Uncertainty and Labor Contract Durations Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 86 1. Roland B. 2000 Unequal Societies Income Distribution and the Social Contract American Economic Review Vol. 90 1. White G. 1987 The Politics of Economic Reform in Chinese Industry The Introduction of the Labour Contract System China Quarterly Vol. 111 365 389. Yun M. 2004 Decomposing Differences in the First Moment Economics Letters Vol. 82 2 275 280. Evolution of Employment Relations in Urban China Li Xiaoying and Zhao Zhong Sun Yat-sen University Renmin University of China Abstract Using household survey data covering 20 - year period from 1988 to 2007 this paper analyzes the dynamic evolution of employment relations in urban China and investigates the changes of composition of labor contract types the factors contributing to the composition changes and the relative importance of these factors. The analysis shows that the proportion of flexible employment increased since 1988 reached a very high level in 2002 and decreased somewhat after 2007. Extended Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition shows that the rise of flexible employment is mainly resulted from deregulation and marketization of urban labor market in China. But entering 2007 the importance of deregulation and marketization has diminished. The endowments of workers have been becoming more important to obtain a stable employment. Key Words Employment Relations Labor Market Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition JEL Classification C25 J21 J88 98