Schumpeter 1991 Brautigam 2008 Moore 2004 governance dividend J A A 2005b Bates & Lien 1985 Levi

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1 J A * A A A A A A A D625 A * /

2 Schumpeter 1991 Brautigam 2008 Moore 2004 governance dividend J A A 2005b Bates & Lien 1985 Levi

3 Moore 2004 Herb North & Weingast 1989 Brewer 1988 Wong Bernstein & Lv

4 2005a A A J P A 1 A J A GDP A H K A A A A 1 A A A

5 1983 A J 1971 A H H A 1979 H 1. 3 A H % A % 1. 6% 19. 8% 78. 3% 2000 A 2008 A A A A A A A 2005 A 75

6 A A H A A K H A A A A A A A A A A 76

7 1. A 1 A A A 1 A

8 220 6 542 2000 9 138 9 486 7 134 2001 10 299 10 886 7 604 2002 11 120 14 558 7 151 2003 14 230 17 978 9 084 2004 18 641 22 199 10 901 2005 24

8 1986 A P A A A A A A A A A A A 1 A A A % A A H H YCW H H Wang A A 1 A A A A A WCH A

7% A A H 1990 1996 1996 1997 H YCW H H Wang 2002 1994 A A 1

9 A 75% A GDP GDP A A A A 70% % % % % % % % 79

10 8. 8% 6% 2. 8% 5% 4% H JPD HLY K YHH A 2 3 A H 2 A A A H H LRZ YCW 2002 A 2008 A A 80

15 31 45 81 91 A 1971 2002 3 A H 20 80 2010 80 90 90 2002 2008

11 2010 H JPD A A A A A H H 70 A A YCX P 1996 P P A YCX A 2000 A A

12 A A A A patron - client A 1993 A A WCH A A 3 H J H 74 A A A A A A YJG 197 FGX HHY 1 2 A A 82

H 74 A A A A A 10 3 197 50 35 96 16 58 2 1 53 2 19

13 exit 1997 A A Frant A A FGX A 24 TXJ 15 H THY 22 P A 10 1 A 2005 A DWM 1 P A 83

14 A XBP 2006 A A 53 A YJG A 2000 A A P Y L 50 30% 70% XA 1700 Y AY YA

15 A 2000 A A P P Y A 2000 A A A 2006 A YC J A A A A J P A A A A A A A A 70% 2009 A 85

16 1 A Levi 1988 A 2 A A A GDP A A GDP A A A 1 A A Katznelson & Weingast 2005 A A 86

17 Fagre & Wells 1982 Janeba 2000 A A 2000 A A A A Krugman 1999 centripetal force A A 73% % 1 A P A A P Y A A P A P P P L P 96 A A 15 Y A 20 S L 50 A P A Y A A A P A A YCW A H P P 1 A A 87

2005 55% 1 A P A A P Y A A P A P P 3 802 P L P 96 A

18 A 2% P P ZJH ZJ P A K FHY P S L 400 A A A A A YC A A A A 88

19 2005 K YFH K K 180 K A A A A 67% 80. 5% 89

20 A A CR 2 A A CR A 2 90

21 A 2007 A A A 75% 80% A = / A A YFH A A A 91

22 A A A A A LJ WCH A 8 10 / 3 4 A A HB P P 7% P P H P LDF A A A A A GDP A 2002 A 92

23 500 A A A 2006 A A 1 A A A 3 A 4 HB A A A A 93

24 A A ZFY A WSD H 3000 D A A A 2003 Dellarocas 2005 / 61. 5% 94

25 / 2005 Henisz & Delios A A A A A A A A A A A A A 2008 J 2009 A J 61 A A A J A A A 95

26 A A 5 A A P A A A A A A A A 96

27 A A A a b

28 Bates H. R. & Lien D. D A Note on Taxation Development and Representative Government. Politics and Society Bernstein P. T. & Lu X Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China. Cambridge Cambridge University Press. Brautigam A. D Introduction. In Brautigam D. A. Fjeldstad O. H. & Moore M. Eds. Taxation and State - building in Developing Countries. Cambridge Cambridge University Press. Brewer J The English State and Fiscal Appropriation Politics & Society Dellarocas C Reputation Mechanism. Available on line www. rhsmith. umd. edu / faculty / cdell / papers / elsevierchapter. pdf. Fagre N. & Wells T. L Bargaining Power of Multinational and Host Governments. Journal of International Business Studies Frant H High - Powered and Low - Powered Incentives in the Public Sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Henisz W. J. & Delios A Uncertainty Imitation and Plant Location Japanese Multinational Corporations Administrative Science Quarterly Herb M Taxation and Representation. Studies in Comparative International Development Janeba E Tax Competition When Governments Lack Commitment Excess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat. The American Economic Review Katzenelson I. & Weingast B Intersections between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism. In Katzenelson I. & Weingast B. Eds. Preferences and Situations. Points of Intersection Betweeen Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalists. New York Russell Sage Foundation. 98

29 Krugman P The Role of Geography in Development. International Regional Science Review Levi M Of Rule and Revenue. Berkley & London University of California Press. Moore M Revenues State Formation and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries. International Political Science Review North C. D. & Weingast B Constitutions and Commitment The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth - Century England. Journal of Economic History Schumpeter J. A The Crisis of Tax State. In Swedberg R. Ed. The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton Princeton University Press. Wang S Defective Institutions and their Consequences Lesson from China Communist and Post - communist Studies Wong R. B Tax Resistance Economy and State Transformation in China and Europe. Economics of Governance

30 social welfare organizations in Hong Kong this paper examines and compares the traditional - type and new - type social welfare organizations regarding their supplementary complementary and adversarial relations with governments. We find that in recent years the new - type social welfare nonprofits have been involved in new services like community development and supplemented the new demands that the governments fail to meet. Meanwhile traditional nonprofits are still the preferred partners of governments play an important complementary role and can more easily get government subsidies. A further examination of the interaction between governments and these two types of nonprofits shows that traditional nonprofits are more active in building government - nonprofit collaboration and over half of them are working with the governments. Although both types of nonprofits are not deeply involved in advocacy activities traditional nonprofits have a higher inclination to be adversarial. We also find that even the government can introduce competitive contracting and other new manners to promote participation the traditional nonprofits still have a leading role in this area. Governments should offer more support to the new nonprofits to improve the channels of social welfare delivery. Key Words Social Welfare Nonprofits Government - nonprofit Relation Hong Kong ARTICLE The Politics of Taxation for the County - level Government a Case Study Based in District A Province J Xiaocong Guo & Tanjun Li 71 Abstract Taxation played a significant role in the shaping of representative institution in the fiscal history of European countries. In contemporary China what is the consequence of taxation upon the private sector The case study in District A Province J shows that fiscal stress is closely related to central - local relations and forces District A to grab the enterprises. The analysis of the three constraints demonstrates that discounting rate of the leaders in District A is very high the successful transformation of the taxation system decreased the transaction cost greatly the relative bargaining power between District A government and taxpayers is comparatively complicated. It is the complicated relative 179

31 bargaining power between the district A government and the taxpayers that leads it to take a selective protection strategy to maximize revenue for District A government which protects the big enterprises with higher relative bargaining power. On the whole taxation upon the private sector brings a rather limited governance dividend. Key Words Taxation Fiscal Stress Selective Protection The Institution Choice Logic of Reversion of Contracting Out in Public Service Delivery The Case of Garbage Collection Service in Guangzhou China Jinrong Huang & Lin Ye 100 Abstract The reversion of contracting out or de - privatization has been a staggering new phenomenon in public service delivery reform in China and other countries. Such decision - making can be explained by the theory of transaction costs and the Chinese governments' unique promotion and incentive mechanism. In contrast with the hierarchical system the market system may be able to reduce the organization cost and decrease the production cost but it would possibly increase the transaction cost which is partially due to the political - administrative dichotomy in China. If street - level officials could not effectively decrease the transaction cost of contracting - out they are likely to stop marketization and go back to government - run public services. Moreover when marketization confines street - level officials' ability to effectively respond to political requirements from the supervising government and thus reduces their chance of promotion they will choose to reverse contracting out in order to win in the political competition. Key Words Reversion of Contracting out Garbage Collection Service Institution Choice Promotion and Incentive Mechanism Is there any Cross - Sector Governance Network During the Relief Operation for Typhoon Morak in Liukuei Tribal José Chiu - C. Chen 121 Abstract This article discusses whether there was so - called Cross - Sector Governance Network formed during the relief operation for typhoon Morak in Liukuei 180

0 6 996 00 006 J P A 3 A J P 853 0 A 008 66 008 A GDP 80. 7 5 530 9 375 7 8 053. 8 7. 008 A 3 000 008 A 5 79. 8 A 53. 8% 30. 7% A A A A A A A 38 007 8

0 6 996 00 006 J P A 3 A J P 853 0 A 008 66 008 A GDP 80. 7 5 530 9 375 7 8 053. 8 7. 008 A 3 000 008 A 5 79. 8 A 53. 8% 30. 7% A A A A A A A 38 007 8 0 6 No. 6 0 5 JOURNAL OF SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY Vol. 5 3 SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION General No. 3 * J A A A A A D035 A 000-9639 0 06-037 - 00 005 007 80% 7% 8% 006 3 % 507. 8 6. 9% 99 978 986 986 995 978 995