32 ( 196 ) Japanese Research Vol.32No.3 Jun.2018 ( 100007) :20 90 ( ) : ; ; :D5 :A :1004-2458(2018)03-0010-15 DOI:10.14156/j.cnki.rbwtyj.2018.03.002 2012 9 ; 1996 1 (2006 2007 ) ( ) ( ) 1955 (1955 1993 ) 1994 :2018-02-01 : (17AGJ008) : (1970 ) 10
: [1] [2] 1955 20 80 90 20 90 1994 : 1999 2001 ( ) 2012 9 2 3 ( ) 1994 1988 6 1994 1994 3 [3] ; ; 11
1996 ( ) 2000 ( ) 1998 7 20 90 2001 1 1955 ( ) 2001 4 ( ) ( ) : 1994 [4] : ( 2012 12 ) 2009 8 ; 2 3 ; ; [5] 12
: 2015 : ( ) ; 2012 : ( ) 2015 9 7 402 287 30 ( ) : 20 [7] ( ) ( ) ( ) [6] [8] 20 60 2014 7 1 [9] ( 13
) ( ) 14 20 80 1986 ( ) 2012 [10] 11 8 6 1962 1962 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 14
: 187 [11] 4 ( ) 8 2001 5 31 ( ) 20 90 2003 ( ) 2004 2005 [12] ( ) 2001 1 79 4 2017 2 21 15
1987 TPP (36.8%) (25.7%) (22.2%);2002 (36.5%) (25.3%) (20.2%) 1987 (50.0%) (30.7%) (14.3%) (5.0%);2002 (34.3%) (23.0%) (21.9%) 1987 (43.3%) (24.8%) (16.3%);2002 (36.7%) (30.5%) (17.5%) (13.0%) ( ) (1987 1987 2002 ) (51.1%) (22.1%) (21.4%) 5.3% 2002 (29.8%) (24.2%) 5% 20% 50% (22.5%) [13] 30% (1986 2002 ) 52.1% (1987 ) : ( ) 52.8% (2002 ) 1987 1986 1 (21.3%) (45%) (32%) (15.1%);2002 (30%) / (16.3%) 2002 1 (60%) (15.7%) ( ) (32%) (28%) (22%) / 16
: 1 1. 500 300 200 20 2000 20 90 465 289 176 ; ( ) ( ) ( ) 1983 1998 ( ) ( ) 2001 ; ( ) [14] 1994 ( ) 1 : 38 2006 19 2 17
( ) 3 5 ( ) 5 16.7% 2. 1994 20.3% 25.0% 250 250 [15] ( ) ( 1999 ) 50 100 5 5 100 20 1995 1995 20 1995 5 2010 1990 [16] 18
: [17] ; 3. 1996 2001 1 ( ) : 22 12 ( ) ( ) 1955 1994 6 2009 2009 : 1993 7 ; 1993 ; 223 ( ) ( ) 70 ; (55 ) (51 ) (35 ) (15 ) (13 ) 19
(4 ) ( ) 2009 2009 300 1994 119 1955 1996 ; 115 308 2009 [18] [19] 2009 8 47.43% 2012 73.7% 38.68% 21.3% 42.41% 48.3% ( ) ; 26.73% 30.6% 2009 2012 2012 12 43.01% 79.0% 22.81% 2012 9.0% 118 294 ( ) ; 231 57 27.62% 31.7% ; 16.0% 16.7% ( ) ( ) ( ) 2014 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 70 20
: 2003 73 2003 3 31 73 [20] 80 2012 12 140 2017 10 2 1999 13 20 90 2005 ( 2005 11 ) ( ) ( ) 2005 11 22 1989 2009 10 73 ( ) 2015 2 ( ) 242 121 73 48 2016 1 ( 21
) 32 4 ; 5 ; 3 ; 1 36 250 [21] 41 2008 3 19 1983 1998 2001 61 ( ) ( ) 48 ( ) ( ) 22
: ( ) 1999 10 2016 7 27 [22] ( ) 56 65 122 ( ) 1989 1999 10 (36 ) (72 ) 1990 ( ) 1993 2007 2009 2010 2012 [ ] [1]. [M]. : 2017:43. [2]. [M].. : 2017:155. 1989 [3]. [M]. : 1997:20-21. 1990 3 [4]. 20 90 [J]. 2014:(2):33. [5]. [J]. 2015(10):98. [6]. [J]. 2015(10):99. 1998 [7]. [J]. 2006(38):29. [8]. [M]. : 2017:116-118. [9]. [M]. : 1986:90-91. [10]. [J]. 2006(38): 19-29. 23
[11]. [M]. : 1986:93. [12]. [J]. 2006(38):18. [13]. 30 [M]. : 2006:67-93. [14]W.. : 2016:671. [M]... 3. : [20] E.. ( )[M]. 2015:39.. : 2016:561. [15]. [J]. 2006(38): 12-13. [16]. [M]. : 2017:32-35. [17]. [J]. 2017(11):102. [18]. [M]. : 2016:29. [19] E.. [M]. [21]. [M]. : 2014:78. [22]. [M]. : 2017:79-80. [ ] OntheCentralizationofLiberalDemocraticPartyofJapan ZHANGBo-yu (InstituteofJapaneseStudiesChineseAcademyofSocialSciencesBeijing100007China) Abstract:Sincethe1990sJapan stwomajorpoliticalsystemreformswhichhavecontinuedintermitent- lyandarestilonitsextendedlinehavepromotedthetransformationofjapan spoliticalsystemandchan- gesinthepoliticalenvironmentandalsopromotedthecentralizationoftheliberaldemocraticparty.in theliberaldemocraticpartythefunctionoftheinformalorganizationsrepresentedbyfactionalism has weakenedtheimportanceoftheexecutivedepartmentcenteredonthepresidenthasincreasedandthe powerhasconcentratedontheexecutivedepartmentcenteredonthepresident.intheactualpoliticalopera- tionthetwomajorinstitutionalefectsofthepoliticalsystemreformsnamelytheexpansionofthepower oftheprimeministerandtheconcentrationoftheliberaldemocraticpartypresident spowerinteracted andinfluencedeachotherleadingtothephenomenonof primeministerialdominance.theemergenceof AbeStrongOne isasymbolofthematurityoftheliberaldemocraticparty scentralization.thepower ofthepowerfulprimeminister(president)stilhasnoefectivecontroloverthesenate.diferentinstitu- tionalarrangementssuchastheelectionsystem ofthe HouseofRepresentativestheterm ofoficeof parliamentariansandthelegalauthorityconferredonitbytheconstitutionmakethesenatehighlyinde- pendent.atthesametimethe LiberalDemocraticPartyisindispensableforthejointcontrolofthe KomeitoPartyintheSenateaslongasitdoesnotcontrolthemajorityofseatsintheSenatealone.The primeministerisrequiredtocooperatewiththeliberaldemocraticpartywhich mustjointtopassbil withthekomeitopartyinthesenate.thesenatehasbecomethe Achiles heel oftheliberaldemo- craticparty. Keywords:Japanesepolitics;politicalsystemreform;LiberalDemocraticParty;centralization 24