人管所

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政雀潘
7 years ago
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1 政治大學企管所 ( 甲 ) 一選擇題 ( 共 30 分, 每題 3 分 ) 1. emand functons are homogeneous of degree zero n all prces and ncome. Ths means (a) a proportonal ncrease n all prces and ncome wll leave quanttes demanded unchanged (b) a doublng of all prces wll not alter consumpton decstons (c) prces drectly enter ndvduals utlty functons (d) an ncrease n ncome wll cause all quanttes demanded to ncrease proportonately. 2. Suppose that the prce elastcty of demand for a product s 1 and that the prce elastcty of supply s +1. Assume also that the ncome elastcty of demand s +2. Then an ncrease n ncome of 10% wll rase equlbrum prce by (a) 0% (b) 5% (c) 20% (d) an annual amount that cannot be determned. 3. One example of Rcardan rent s (a) rent pad to landlords under prce controls (b) the dfference between the prce of a hghly demanded unque pece of artwork and the opportunty cost of mantanng t (c) the amount pad to a seller above the equlbrum prce of tourst class tckets n order to receve hgher qualty seats n frst class (d) the prce rse of wool from a dsease among sheep. 4. Consder three ways of allocatng two goods n a two-person exchange economy. I. Both ndvduals take prces as gven and equlbrum prces are establshed by an mpartal auctoneer

2 II. One ndvdual can act as a perfect prce dscrmnator and force the other ndvdual to pay a dfference prce for each unt of a good that s traded III. One ndvdual s a monopolst and can charge the other ndvdual a sngle, utlty-maxmzng prce Whch of these stuatons s effcent? (a) None of them (b) Only I (c) I and II, but not III (d) I and III, but not II (e) All of them. 5. In free exchange among two ndvduals the poston on the contract curve fnally arrved at wll, among other thngs, depend on: I. The barganng strength of each ndvdual II. The ntal endowments of the ndvduals III. The ndvduals preferences Whch of these correctly completes the statement? (a) Only III (b) Only II (c) I and III, but not II (d) II and III, but not I (e) I, II and III. 6. In a contestable market, frms produce where (a) prce equals margnal cost and long-run average cost (b) prce equals margnal cost above long-run average cost (c) margnal cost equals margnal revenue and long-run average cost (d) margnal cost equals margnal revenue below long-run average cost. 7. The twn nonconfess strategy choce n the Prsoners lemma can be descrbed as (a) nonpareto optmal and unstable (b) Pareto optmal and unstable (c) nonpareto optmal and stable

3 (d) Pareto optmal and stable. 8. Vewed from the perspectve of the Stackelberg model, the Cournot soluton s not a Nash equlbrum because (a) each frm s not maxmzng profts gven the other s output (b) each frm has an ncentve to take advantage of knowledge of ts rval s reacton functon (c) quantty suppled s not equal to quantty demanded at the prevalng prce (d) t s not a perfectly compettve outcome. 9. Consder two stuatons: In stuaton A the producton of wdgets s monopolzed by a sngle frm. In stuaton B the producton of wdgets s perfectly compettve. In both stuatons the supply of labor to wdget makers s nfntely elastc at a wage of w. Whch of the followng statements s true? (a) The margnal value product of labor wll be the same n the two cases (b) The margnal value product of labor s hgher n case B than n case A (c) The margnal value product of labor s hgher n case A than n case B (d) From the nformaton gven t s not possble to make a defnte statement about the margnal value product of labor. 10. Suppose an ndvdual has a fxed amount of wealth to allocate between consumpton n two perods (C 1 and C 2 ). Any funds not spent n perod 1 wll earn nterest (at the rate r), whch wll ncrease purchasng power n perod 2. Consder four possble reactons to an ncrease n r: I. C 1 ncreases II. C 1 decreases III. C 2 ncreases IV. C 2 decreases Whch of these s consstent wth the hypothess that both C 1 and C 2 are normal goods? (a) I, II, III, and IV (b) I, II, and IV, but not III (c) I, III, and IV, but not II (d) II and III, but not I and IV

4 (e) I, II and III, but no IV. 二申論暨計算題 ( 共 70 分 ) 1. 假設某特定財貨之市場需求曲線為 Q=100 P, 其中 Q 為萬箱銷售數量, P 為每箱的價格, 兩家廠商分為及它們具有相同之成本函數: C = 10Q + 1/ 2Q Q= Q + Q 2 (=, ) a. 如兩家廠商沒有互相勾結, 而以短期完全競爭的型態來生產, 則在均衡時, Q, Q 及 P 各為何? 每家廠商利潤為何?(5 分 ) b. 如兩家廠商高級經理互換, 兩位經理均認知寡占市場之特性, 並根據 Cournot 模型行為生產, 試問在 Cournot 均衡下之 Q Q 及 P 各為何? 每家廠商利潤為何?(5 分 ) c. 假設公司經理猜測公司會依 Cournot 模型行為生產, 所以公司依 Stackelberg 模型出產, 則均衡下之 Q Q 及 P 為何? 各家利潤為何?(5 分 ) d. 如兩家廠商高級經理相互勾結, 則在均衡時, Q Q 及 P 各為何? 每家利潤為何?(5 分 ) 2. 試根據下列模型 : () 財貨市場均衡 : y = c(y T, r) + (r) + g, 0< c1 < 1, c2 < 0 () 貨幣市場均衡 : M/P= m(r,y), m r < 0, my > 0 () 勞動市場均衡 : f( n) = g(n), f' < 0, g' > 0 (v) 總產出函數 :y y (N,K), y 0, y 0, y < 0, y 0, y > 0 = n > k > nn 體系中,y( 所得 ),P( 物價 ) 及 N( 就業量 ) 為內生變數,g( 財政支出 ),T( 稅收 ) 及 K( 資本存量 ) 為外生變數, 而 M( 貨幣供給 ) 及 r( 利率 ) 則按下列假設可為內生或外生變數試請分析 (A) 假設 M 為外生, 而 r 為內生下, 採取平衡預算之財政支出增加, 對於 y r N 及 P 之影響 (13 分 ) (B) 假設 r 為外生而 M 為內生 ( 亦即, 假設在 real bll doctrne 下, 政府控制利率水準而貨幣供給由市場決定 ) 則分析上項政策有無困難 (12 分 ) kk < nk 3. 試以新古典成長模型架構, 分析儲蓄率提高, 對於恒態 (Steady State) 之每人資本工資率, 資本財報酬, 每人消費以及所得成長率之影響 (25

5 分 )

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untitled 01 2 1776 (Adam Smith, 1723~1790) (University of Glasgow) (The Wealth of Nations) (Trade-off) (Micro-economics) (Macro- economics) 3 CHAPTER 01 (invisible hand) (equibilium) (market failure) 1. M 2. 3.