2

3

4 1995. 5

1 1 1 7 15 22 22 28 40 61 61 75 89

2 120 120 132 166 190 190 197 218 258 258

3 270 284 307 308 315 321 330 356 377

institutional arrangement

2 1 city-states 2 3 4 20 2 500

3 Robert Gilpin 5 5 20 20 6 1898 1918 1 IMF ITO GATT

4 1949 NATO 20 90 WTO NAFTA 20 1980

5 7 20 90 APEC APEC 8 APEC 9 APEC APEC APEC APEC APEC

6 institutional choice ASEAN 20

7 international regimes tailor-made 1. 1975 John Ruggie 10 1983 Stephen Krasner 瑏瑡 Robert Keohane neoliberal institutionalism

8 neorealism 瑏瑢 rationalism cognitivism i- dentity 瑏瑣 Andreas Hasenclever Peter Mayer Volker Rittberger approaches 瑏瑤 瑏瑥 0. 1 0. 1 Andreas Hasenclever Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger Theory of International Regimes New York Cambridge U- niversity Press 1997 p. 6.

9 Interest-based Theories of International Regimes 1984 functional theory of international regimes 瑏瑦 瑏瑧 Arthur Stein Duncan Snidal Kenneth Oye

10 Lisa Martin collaboration coordination suasion assurance 瑏瑨 strategic situations situation-structural approach Power -based Theories of International Regimes 瑏瑩 Joseph Grieco positional atomistic

11 relative gains problem 瑐瑠 瑐瑡 power capabilities 瑐瑢 Knowledge -based Theories of International Regimes weak cognitivism strong cognitivism 瑐瑣

12 Alexander Wendt sociological structure 瑐瑤 瑐瑥 瑐瑦 瑐瑧 2. Theory of Alliance Formation

13 capability aggregation model Bruce Russett Harvey Starr 瑐瑨 瑐瑩 M. Barnett J. Levy 瑑瑠 Michael Altfeld 瑑瑡 瑑瑢 Neo-functionalism Theory of Integration 瑑瑣 Ernst Haas Leon Lindberg Joseph Nye David Mitrany spill-over

14 瑑瑤 瑑瑥 Economies-of-scale Theory Richard Bean 瑑瑦 optional scale

15 瑑瑧

16

17 1947 1951 20 80 90 1 1648 1995 56 63

18 2 1960 567 575 3 421 4 371 5 1994 208 6 2001 211 7 WTO 2003 8 APEC APEC APEC APEC APEC APEC APEC 9 2002 337 338 10 John Ruggie International Responses to Technology Concepts and Trends in International Organization Vol. 29 No. 3 Summer 1975 瑏瑡 Stephen Krasner ed. International Regimes Ithaca and London Cornell University Press 1983 瑏瑢 David Baldwin ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate New York Columbia University Press 1993 pp. 4 8 瑏瑣 reflective approaches Robert Keohane International Institutions Two Approaches in Robert Keohane International Institutions and State Pow-

19 er Essays in International Relations Theory Boulder Westview Press 1989 瑏瑤 Andreas Hasenclever Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger Theory of International Regimes New York Cambridge University Press 1997 p. 1. 瑏瑥 2002 瑏瑦 Robert Keohane After Hegemony Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy New Jersey Princeton University Press 1984 瑏瑧 2001 1 143 瑏瑨 2003 108 瑏瑩 John Mearsheimer The False Promise of International Institutions in International Security Vol. 19 No. 3 1994 1995 瑐瑠 Joseph Grieco Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism in David A. Baldwin ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate New York Columbia University Press 1993 pp. 127 128. 瑐瑡 Joseph Grieco Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism in David A. Baldwin ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate p.

20 131. 瑐瑢 Stephen Krasner Global Comunications and National Power Life on the Pareto Frontier in David A. Baldwin ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate pp. 234 249 瑐瑣 瑐瑤 2000 27 瑐瑥 Andreas Hasenclever Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger Theory of International Regimes p. 157. 瑐瑦 Ibid. p. 139. 瑐瑧 2001 瑐瑨 2001 83 瑐瑩 Bruce Russett Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation in Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 12 1968 瑑瑠 M. Barnet and J. Levy Domestic Sources and Alignments The Case of Egypt 1962 1973 in International Organization Vol. 45 No. 3. Summer 1991 瑑瑡 Michael Altfeld The Decision to Ally A Theory and Test in Western Political Quarterly Vol. 37 No. 4 1984 瑑瑢 Arthur Stein Why Nations Cooperate Circumstance and Choice in International Relations Ithaca and London Cornell University Press 1990 p. 153. 瑑瑣

21 2001 27 瑑瑤 2003 553 瑑瑥 political development through interest-politics 2001 62 63 瑑瑦 Richard Bean War and The Birth of Nation State in Journal of Economic History Vol. 33 No. 1 March 1973 p. 204. 瑑瑧 20

Transaction Cost Economics TCE New Institutional Economics NIE Ronald Coase 1937 1960

23 Oliver Williamson Armen Alchian Property Rights Economics Law and Economics New Economic History transaction cost 1 Douglass North 2 20 30 1890

24 3 John Commons 4 1934 5 looking ahead 6 7 Old Institutional Economics OIE anonymous markets 8 1937 problems and puzzles 9

25 10 瑏瑡 20 70 瑏瑢 瑏瑣 tautology Stanley Fischer 瑏瑤

26 operationalization of transaction cost reasoning 1975 瑏瑥 1985 瑏瑦 1996 瑏瑧 瑏瑨 three -level schema 1. 1

27 1. 1 Oliver Williamson Hierarchies Markets and Power in the Economy An Economic Perspective in Claude Menard eds. Transaction Cost Economics Recent Developments Cheltenham Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 1997 p. 8. institutional arrangement governance structure 瑏瑩 瑐瑠 瑐瑡 瑐瑢 瑐瑣 internal organization 1. 1 institutional environment bracket

28 瑐瑤 瑐瑥 shift parameters 瑐瑦 Herbert Simon 瑐瑧 1. 20 70

29 瑐瑨 1998 瑐瑩 瑑瑠 1990 瑑瑡 1996 Avinash Dixit Transaction-Cost Politics TCP 瑑瑢 20 80 1984 Terry Moe

30 瑑瑣 Barry Weingast William Marshall 1988 瑑瑤 rational choice institutionalism Peter Hall Rosemary Taylor tragedy of the commons

31 瑑瑥 Thráinn Eggertsson 瑑瑦 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 瑑瑧 public choice theory 瑑瑨 2. 1990 瑑瑩 Mill-

32 er 瑒瑠 瑒瑡 瑒瑢 1977 Todd Sandler Jon Cauley 瑒瑣

33 瑒瑤 1987 Beth Yarbrough Robert Yarbrough 瑒瑥 瑒瑦 1992 the strategic organizational approach 瑒瑧 Jeffry Frieden 1994 瑒瑨 home country host country 瑒瑩

34 David Lake 1996 theories of relational contracting 瑓瑠 1999 20 a general theory of security relationships 20 瑓瑡 1997 Katja Weber

35 1. 2 / 瑓瑢 2000 瑓瑣 1. 2 Katja Weber Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy A Transaction Costs Approach to International Security Cooperation in International Studies Quarterly 41 2 June 1997 p. 330.

36 瑓瑤 瑓瑥 fragmented nature

37 3. 20 80 1985 1987 1990 1990 1993 20 90 瑓瑦 1996 1999 2001 2002 瑓瑧 20 90

38 瑓瑨 1994 瑓瑩 1985 瑔瑠 1994 瑔瑡 瑔瑢

39 1971 瑔瑣 1997 瑔瑤 瑔瑥 2000 瑔瑦 瑔瑧 瑔瑨

40 1. 瑔瑩 Karl Popper falsification 瑖瑠

41 Gary King Sidney Verba 瑖瑡 瑖瑢 hypothesis assumption Michael Nicholson 瑖瑣

42 case -study 1. 3 1. 3 Michael Nicholson Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1992 p. 31. 瑖瑤 R. C. O. Matthews

43 瑖瑥 瑖瑦 瑖瑧 1999 10 瑖瑨 Lijphart 瑖瑩 comparative case studies Alexander George structured focused comparison 瑘瑠

44 / generalisability of findings 瑘瑡 pattern matching looking across time longitudinal comparision 瑘瑢 2.

45 瑘瑣 1 瑘瑤 Anthony Downs 瑘瑥 20 30 Charles Merriam Harold Lasswell Quincy Wright Hans Morgenthau rational reconstruction 瑘瑦

46 瑘瑧 瑘瑨 Kenneth Waltz structural realism 瑘瑩

47 瑝瑠 cognitive psychology prospect theory social constructivism 瑝瑡 瑝瑢 goal-oriented

48 A B B C A C sensitive to costs 瑝瑣 2 瑝瑤 瑝瑥 bounded rationality 1 2 瑝瑦 瑝瑧

49 complete contract 瑝瑨 瑝瑩 Miles Kahler incomplete information 3

50 opportunism Niccol Machiavelli stato

51 1 transaction cost 2 1996 24 3 2000 4 4 Thorstein Veblen Wesley Mitchell 5 1962 73 6 Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten eds. The Economics of Transaction Costs Cheltenham Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 1999 Introduction x.

52 7 Karl Llewellyn 1931 Karl Llewellyn What Price Contract An Essay in Perspective in Yale Law Journal 40 May 1931 pp. 736 737 Chester Barnard 1938 Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten eds. The E- conomics of Transaction Costs Introduction ix Oliver Williamson The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties an Introduction in Masahiko Aoki Bo Gustafsson and Oliver Williamson eds. The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties London Sage Publication 1990 p. 9 8 Ronald Coase The New Institutional Economics in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Vol. 140 March 1984 pp. 229 230. 9 Oliver Williamson Reflections on the New Institutional Economics in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Vol. 141 March 1985 p. 188. 10 Ronald Coase The Nature of the Firm in Economica Vol. 4

53 No. 16 November 1937 p. 394. 瑏瑡 1996 16 瑏瑢 1990 201 瑏瑣 2001 7 5 瑏瑤 Stanley Fischer Long-Term Contracting Sticky Prices and Monetary Policy Comment in Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 3 1977 p. 322. 瑏瑥 Oliver Williamson Markets and Hierarchies Analysis and Antitrust Implication New York Free Press 1975 瑏瑦 Oliver Williamson The Economic Institutions of Capitalism New York Free Press 1985 瑏瑧 Oliver Williamson The Mechanisms of Governance New York Oxford University Press 1996 瑏瑨 Oliver Williamson Hierarchies Markets and Power in the Economy An Economic Perspective in Claude Menard ed. Transaction Cost Economics Recent Developments Cheltenham Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 1997 pp. 6 7. 瑏瑩 Oliver Williamson The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties an Introduction in Masahiko Aoki Bo Gustafsson and Oliver Williamson eds. The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties p. 9. 瑐瑠 R. A. D.

54 1994 377 瑐瑡 L. E. D. C. 271 瑐瑢 C. 1994 5 瑐瑣 V. W. 329 瑐瑤 L. E. D. C. 270 瑐瑥 Oliver Williamson The New Institutional Economics Taking Stock Looking Ahead in Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 38 No. 3 2000 瑐瑦 Oliver Williamson Hierarchies Markets and Power in the Economy An Economic Perspective in Claude Menard ed. Transaction Cost Economics Recent Developments p. 7. 瑐瑧 1999 28 瑐瑨 Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten eds. The Economics of Transaction Costs Introduction ix. 瑐瑩 2003 12 瑑瑠 1998 301 瑑瑡 Douglass North A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics in Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol. 2 1990 瑑瑢 Avinash Dixit The Making of Economic Policy A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective Cambridge MIT Press 1996 瑑瑣 Terry Moe The New Economics of Organization in American

55 Journal of Political Science Vol. 28 No. 4 Nov. 1984 p. 739. 瑑瑤 Barry Weingast and William Marshall The Industrial Organization of Congress or Why Legislatures Like Firms Are not Organized as Markets in Journal of Political Economy Vol. 96 No. 1 1988 p. 132. 瑑瑥 Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms in Political Studies Vol. XLIV No. 5 Deceber 1996 pp. 944 945. 瑑瑦 28 瑑瑧 20 2003 1 瑑瑨 1999 2000 瑑瑩 Oliver Williamson The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties an Introduction in Masahiko Aoki Bo Gustafsson and Oliver Williamson eds. The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties pp. 6 7. 瑒瑠 2001 21 瑒瑡 110 瑒瑢 111 瑒瑣 Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley Design of Supranational Structures An Economic Perspective in International Studies Quarterly Vol. 21 No. 2 June 1977 p. 273. 瑒瑤 Ibid. p. 251. 瑒瑥 Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough Cooperation in Liberation

56 of International Trade After Hegemony What in International Organization Vol. 41 No. 1 Winter 1987 p. 3. 瑒瑦 Ibid. p. 4. 瑒瑧 Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough Cooperation and Governance in International Trade the Strategic Organizational Approach Princeton N. J. Princeton University Press 1992 瑒瑨 contractual monitoring and enforcement costs Jeffry Frieden International Investment and Colonial Control A New Interpretation in International Organization Vol. 48 No. 4 Autumn 1994 p. 568 瑒瑩 Jeffry Frieden International Investment and Colonial Control A New Interpretation p. 559. 瑓瑠 David Lake Anarchy Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations in International Organization Vol. 50 No. 1 Winter 1996 p. 2. 瑓瑡 David Lake Entangling Relations American Foreign Policy in Its Century Princeton N. J. Princeton University Press 1999 瑓瑢 Katja Weber Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy A Transaction Costs Approach to International Security Cooperation pp. 331 333 瑓瑣 Katja Weber Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice Albany State University of New York 2000 瑓瑤 133 瑓瑥 22 瑓瑦 2003 瑓瑧 瑓瑨

57 1994 瑓瑩 2002 2002 瑔瑠 1 瑔瑡 1994 170 瑔瑢 174 瑔瑣 175 瑔瑤 1997 236 瑔瑥 237 瑔瑦 2000 104 111 瑔瑧 129 瑔瑨 瑔瑩 2001 3 瑖瑠 2001 52 瑖瑡 Gary King Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba Designing Social Inquiry Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research New Jersey Princeton U- niversity Press 1994 p. 101. 瑖瑢 Ibid. p. 103. 瑖瑣 Michael Nicholson Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1992 p. 31. 瑖瑤 2001 83

58 瑖瑥 29 瑖瑦 1999 26 瑖瑧 11 瑖瑨 Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten eds. The Economics of Transaction Costs 瑖瑩 2001 90 瑘瑠 Gary King Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba Designing Social Inquiry Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research p. 45. 瑘瑡 Gary King Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba Designing Social Inquiry Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research p. 45. 瑘瑢 congruence method Jack Levy Qualitative Methods in International Relations in Frank Harvey and Michael Brecher eds. Evaluting Methodology in International Studies Ann Arbor The University of Michigan Press 2002 p. 141 瑘瑣 Alastair Iain Johnston contractual institutionalism Alastair Iain Johnston Treating International Institutions as Social Environments in International Studies Quarterly Vol. 45 2001 p. 488 瑘瑤 1992 66 瑘瑥 A. C. 1987 283 瑘瑦 1946

59 1948 Miles Kahler Rationality in International Relations in International Organizations Vol. 52 No. 4 Autumn 1998 p. 920 瑘瑧 1990 5 瑘瑨 195 196 瑘瑩 2002 154 瑝瑠 34 瑝瑡 43 45 瑝瑢 8 瑝瑣 Joseph Grieco Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics in Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry eds. New Thinking in International Relations Theory Boulder Westview Press 1997 p. 165 瑝瑤 1989 122 瑝瑥 1994 37

60 瑝瑦 3 瑝瑧 2002 69 瑝瑨 9 瑝瑩 134 941. Miles Kahler Rationality in International Rations pp. 940 72 1985 85 17 2003 166 2000 100

transaction 1 Karl Deutsch analysis of transactions

62 inter-society contacts intergovernmental contracts 2 factor analysis 3 4 Adam Smith 5

63 6 7 8 9 10

64 瑏瑡 瑏瑢 Robert Axelrod 瑏瑣 瑏瑤 瑏瑥 international society 瑏瑦 Hedley Bull 瑏瑧

65 瑏瑨 瑏瑩 瑐瑠 瑐瑡 common government sovereign statehood is an institution 瑐瑢 瑐瑣 1648

66 瑐瑤 瑐瑥 瑐瑦 Anthony Giddens 瑐瑧 瑐瑨 Jean Bodin Hugo Grotius

67 jus necessarium 瑐瑩 minimum order David Easton 瑑瑠 failed states

69 瑑瑨 瑑瑩 Hans-Henrik Holm Geoge Sorensen operational sovereignty 瑒瑠

70 negative sovereignty positive sovereignty 瑒瑡 瑒瑢 瑒瑣 瑒瑤

71 19 瑒瑥 costly effects 1941 瑒瑦

72 瑒瑧 瑒瑨 瑒瑩 瑓瑠

73 / domestic-international dichotomy private ordering 瑓瑡 瑓瑢

74 瑓瑣 瑓瑤 瑓瑥

75 1937 瑓瑦 瑓瑧 瑓瑨 Dahlman

76 瑓瑩 Kenneth Arrow 瑔瑠 瑔瑡 瑔瑢 1 2 3 4 瑔瑣 瑔瑤 瑔瑥

77 瑔瑦

78 瑔瑧 private information asymmetric information outsider insider George Aker-

79 lof market for lemons 瑔瑨 瑔瑩

80 James Fearon 瑖瑠 瑖瑡

81 瑖瑢 17 Thomas Hobbes Michael Williams 瑖瑣 瑖瑤

82 credible commitment Charles Lipson 瑖瑥 abandonment entrapment exploitation 瑖瑦 adverse selection

83 瑖瑧 Glenn Snyder alliance politics 瑖瑨

84 瑖瑩 18 瑘瑠 1856 瑘瑡 arms control theory 瑘瑢 瑘瑣

85 瑘瑤 moral hazard 瑘瑥 瑘瑦 瑘瑧

86 1912 1914 瑘瑨 Henry Kissinger 瑘瑩 Rudolf Richter 1987 2 1987 10 瑝瑠 free riding public goods

87 collective goods X 1 X i X n X i 瑝瑡 瑝瑢 Mancur Olson logic of collective action 瑝瑣 瑝瑤

88 瑝瑥 the exploitation of the great by the small 瑝瑦 Richard Zeckhauser 瑝瑧 2. 1

89 Aaron Hoffman 瑝瑨 John Mearsheimer 瑝瑩

90 1. Gordon Craig

91 interstate contracting cost 1 2 3 2. 2 2. 2 issue-area

92 high politics low politics 1 2 3

93 Economic and Monetary Union EMU homogeneity of states

94 pluralistic security community Suzanne Werner Douglas Lemke 1816 1986

95 autocracies transparency Bernard Finel Kristin Lord black-room deals credibility of signals Peter Cowhey 1945

96 audience cost 2.

97 interstate governance cost 1 2 3 2. 3 asset specificity

98 sunk cost site specificity exit cost Soviet-European gas pipeline physical asset specificity

99 human asset specificity learning-by-doing fashion Michael Polanyi

100 Richard Fuerle Tjalling Koopmans primacy uncertainty secondary uncertainty

101 1919 1939 Edward Karl The Twenty Years Crisis Michael Taylor Charles Kindleberger

102 hege- monic stability theory 19 1945 1968 1929 1939 alliance security dilemma signals James

103 Morrow 1 2 3 costly signaling exogenous shock Robert Jervis system effects

104 A B C A B A C B C A B A B C

105 19 2. 1 2. 1 1950 1970 1950 1960 1970 81 90 134 2 140 3 566 5 388 26 40 40 70 80 115 70 75 117 67 80 115 2001 76

106 1 2000 96 2 communications theory Karl Deutsch Tides among Nations New York Free Press 1979 3 Peter Willetts Transactions Networks and Systems in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor eds. Frameworks for International Cooperation London Pinter 1990 p. 258. 4 Peter Willetts Transactions Networks and Systems in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor eds. Frameworks for International Cooperation p. 258 5 1972 13 6 14 7 1962 73 8 R. R. A. D. 1994 51 9 14 10 73 瑏瑡 1992 3 瑏瑢 1994 7 瑏瑣 1996 3

107 瑏瑤 Robert Keohane International Institutions and State Power Essays in International Relations Theory Boulder Westview Press 1989 p. 7. 瑏瑥 Helen Milner The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory in David A. Baldwin ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate p. 145 147 瑏瑦 瑏瑧 Hedley Bull and Adam Waston eds The Expansion of International Society Oxford Clarendon Press 1984 p. 1. 瑏瑨 Axelord Robert and Robert Keohane Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy Strategies and Institutions in Kenneth Oye ed. Cooperation under Anarchy Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1986 瑏瑩 136 瑐瑠 28 35 瑐瑡 Robert Keohane International Institutions and State Power Essays in International Relations Theory p. 1. 瑐瑢 Robert Keohane Hobbess Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics Sovereignty in International Society in Hans-Henrik Holm and Geoge Sorensen eds. Whose World Order Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War Boulder Westview Press 1995 p. 173. 瑐瑣 Joseph Strayer 1996

108 Joseph Strayer On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State New Jersey Princeton University Press 1970. 瑐瑤 Andreas Osiander 19 20 fixation Andreas Osiander Sovereignty International Relations and Westphalian Myth in International Organization Vol. 55 No. 2 Spring 2001 瑐瑥 386 瑐瑦 Lynn Miller Global Order Values and Power in International Politics Boulder Westview Press 1990 p. 24. 瑐瑧 1998 331 瑐瑨 345 瑐瑩 387 瑑瑠 1999 576 瑑瑡 1981 92 94 瑑瑢 37 瑑瑣 Jack Donnelly Realism and International Relations Cambridge

109 Cambridge University Press 2000 p. 140. 瑑瑤 R. A. D. 6 瑑瑥 H. R. A. D. 189 瑑瑦 97 瑑瑧 R. R. A. D. 11 瑑瑨 162 瑑瑩 163 瑒瑠 formal sovereignty Hans-Henrik Holm and Geoge Sorensen International Relations Theory in a World of Variation in Hans-Henrik Holm and Geoge Sorensen eds. Whose World Order Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War p. 196

110 瑒瑡 Hans-Henrik Holm and Geoge Sorensen International Relations Theory in a World of Variation in Hans-Henrik Holm and Geoge Sorensen eds. Whose World Order Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War p. 197. 瑒瑢 Robert Keohane Hobbess Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics Sovereignty in International Society in Hans-Henrik Holm and Geoge Sorensen eds. Whose World Order Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War p. 177. 瑒瑣 2002 瑒瑤 9 10 瑒瑥 1 1972 254 255 瑒瑦 1995 79 瑒瑧 81 瑒瑨 61 66 瑒瑩 64 65 瑓瑠 瑓瑡 34 瑓瑢 Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough International Institutions

111 and the New Economics of Organization in International Organization Vol. 44 No. 2 Spring 1990 p. 257. 瑓瑣 Ibid. p. 251. 瑓瑤 6 7 瑓瑥 3 4 瑓瑦 203 瑓瑧 Ronald Coase The Nature of the Firm p. 390. 瑓瑨 1996 7 瑓瑩 1998 9 瑔瑠 31 瑔瑡 contract contract 瑔瑢 33 瑔瑣 35 瑔瑤 203 瑔瑥 65 瑔瑦 J. Hicks A Theory of Economic History Oxford Oxford University Press 1969 p. 34 2001 62

112 瑔瑧 Xinyuan Dai Information Systems in Treaty Regimes in World Politics Vol. 54 July 2002 p. 409. 瑔瑨 1997 421 瑔瑩 瑖瑠 James Fearon Rationalist Explanations for War in International Organization Vol. 49 No. 3 Summer 1995 p. 398. 瑖瑡 C. 1994 24 25 瑖瑢 瑖瑣 Michael Williams Hobbes and International Relations A Reconsideration in International Organization Vol. 50 No. 2 Spring 1996 p. 213. 瑖瑤 1985 103 104 瑖瑥 Charles Lipson International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs in World Politics Vol. 37 No. 1 October 1984 p. 4. 瑖瑦 David Lake Entangling Relations American Foreign Policy in Its Century pp. 52 53. 瑖瑧 128 129 瑖瑨 Glenn Snyder The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics in World Politics Vol. 36 No. 4 1984 p. 466. 瑖瑩 Avery Goldstein Discounting the Free Ride Alliance and Security in the Postwar World in International Organization Vol. 49 No. 1

113 Winter 1995 p. 47. 瑘瑠 215 219 瑘瑡 1995 169 189 瑘瑢 Charles Glaser Realists as Optimists Cooperation as Selphelp in International Security Vol. 19 No. 3 Winter 1994 /1995 p. 80. 瑘瑣 117 瑘瑤 129 瑘瑥 moral hazard 瑘瑦 R. A. D. 405 p. 467. 瑘瑧 Glenn Snyder The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics 瑘瑨 1997 192 瑘瑩 176 瑝瑠 325 343 瑝瑡 1995 13 瑝瑢 32 瑝瑣 4 5 瑝瑤

114 47 瑝瑥 19 30 瑝瑦 Mancur Olson Increasing the Incentive for International Cooperation in International Organization 25 4 Autumn 1971 p. 870. 瑝瑧 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser An Economic Theory of Alliance in Francis Beer ed. Alliance Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World New York Holt Rinehart and Winston Inc 1970 p. 138 139. 瑝瑨 Aaron Hoffman A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations in European Journal of International Relations Vol. 8 No. 3 2002 p. 395. 瑝瑩 2003 43 44 4 5 > < 2001 19 20

115 36 2004 235 238 Harrison Wagner Economic Interdependence Bargaining Power and Political Influence in International Organization Vol. 42 No. 3 Summer 1988 Gary Libecap 2001 25 30 Matthew Evangelista William Zimmerman Matthew Evangelista Issue-area and Foreign Policy Revisited in International Organization Vol. 43 No. 1 Winter 1989 p. 147 William Zimmerman Issue Area and Foreign-policy Process A Research Note in Search of a General Theo-

116 ry in American Political Science Review Vol. 67 December 1973 p. 1212 issue-area 73 Charles Lipson International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs p. 12. Karl Deutsch et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area New Jersey Princeton University Press 1957. 558 561 27 Suzanne Werner and Douglas Lemke Opposites Do not Attract The Impact of Domestic Institutions Power Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices in International Studies Quarterly Vol. 41 1997 p. 543 544. Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord The Surprising Logic of Transparency in International Studies Quarterly Vol. 43 1999 p. 2. James Fearon Rationalist Explanations for War pp. 395 401 Peter Cowhey Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments Japan and the United States in International Organization Vol. 47 No. 2 Spring 1993 p. 307. James Fearon Demestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes in American Political Science Review Vol.

117 88 No. 3 1994 Lawrence Broz Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes in International Organization Vol. 56 No. 4 Autumn 2002 p. 866. 14 70 80 81 James Alt Fredrik Carlsen Per Heum and Kare Johansen Asset Specificity and Political Behavior of Firms Lobbying for Subsidies in Norway in International Organization 53 1 Winter 1999 Nikolaos Zahariadis Asset Specificity and State Subsidies in Industrialized Countries in International Studies Quarterly Vol. 45 2001 Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough Cooperation in Liberation of International Trade After Hegemony What p. 11. 2003

118 2003 9 11 9 190 126 33 34 Katja Weber Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice p. 24. 94 76 77 86 87 Edward Karl The Twenty Years Crisis 1919 1939 An Introduction to the History of International Relations New York Harper Collins 1981 29 Michael Taylor Community Anarchy and Liberty Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1982 p. 22. Charles Kindleberger Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy in International Studies Quarterly 25 2 1981 p. 247. 1929 1939 1986 365 Katja Weber Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy A Transaction Costs Approach to International Security Cooperation p. 332. p. 494. Glenn Snyder The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics Katja Weber Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy Transaction Costs and In-

119 stitutional Choice p. 21. James Morrow The Strategic Setting of Choices Signaling Commitment and Negotiation in International Politics in David Lake and Robert Powell eds. Strategic Choice and International Relations Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1999 p. 86. Robert Jervis Systems and Interaction Effects in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis eds. Coping with Complexity in the International System Boulder Westview Press 1993 p. 33. Robert Jervis System Efects Complexity in Political and Social Life New Jersey Princeton University Press 1997 p. 177. 144 16 78 37 96

Susan Strange a passing fad 1 international regimes / international institutions 2 20 80 3

121 formal /legal institutionalism 20 60 4 Hayward Alker 5 6 20 70

122 Beth Simmons 1971 7 1975 8 9 10 /

123 / Donald Puchala Raymond Hopkins formal regimes informal regimes 瑏瑡 specific regimes diffuse regimes 瑏瑢 formal intergovernmental or cross-national nongovernmental organizations international regimes international convention

124 1944 20 70 20 60 瑏瑣 20 90 multilateralism 瑏瑤 bilateralism Christian Reus-Smit

125 constitutional structures fundamental institutions 瑏瑥 issue-specific regimes 瑏瑦 瑏瑧

126 瑏瑨 Daniel Diermeier k k + 1 瑏瑩 international institutional environments international institutional arrangements k + 1 k moral purpose of the state organizing principle of sovereignty norm of procedural justice 瑐瑠

127 瑐瑡 degree of institutionalization dimension 瑐瑢 瑐瑣 formalization tacit agreement oral agreement executive agreements nonbinding treaties joint declarations final communiqués agreed minutes memoranda of understanding agreements pursuant to legislation 瑐瑤

128 international publication or registration informal agreement centralization Kenneth Abbott 瑐瑥 Barbara Koremenos centralized activities 瑐瑦 瑐瑧 free trade agreements FTAs self-enforcing formal agreement formal

129 international organization International Labor Organization ILO delegation make further rules 瑐瑨 Daniel Nielson Michael Tierney 瑐瑩 European Court of Justice ECJ European Court of Human Rights ECHR EU Commission 瑑瑠

130 supranational organization 瑑瑡 3. 1 3. 1 3. 1 3. 1

131 3. 2 瑑瑢 3. 2 forum 瑑瑣 continuum

132 瑑瑤 institu- tions matter 瑑瑥 comparative institutional analysis cost and competence

133 1. 瑑瑦 unspoken rule 1 2 3 4 瑑瑧

134 瑑瑨 瑑瑩

135 瑒瑠 1925 1975 hidden agreement 瑒瑡 20 80 瑒瑢

136 瑒瑣 1990 1 18 2 12 瑒瑤 瑒瑥 1972

137 瑒瑦 1904 1907 瑒瑧 瑒瑨 瑒瑩

138 瑓瑠 2. 1969 5 瑓瑡 Abram Chayes Antonia Handler Chayes 瑓瑢

139 瑓瑣 E c p E v 1 - p E n E c E v E v E n E c > p E v + 1 - p E n hostage 瑓瑤 reciprocity issue-linkage 瑓瑥

140 瑓瑦 瑓瑧

141 A X B A B Y A B 瑓瑨 瑓瑩 titfor-tat prisoners dilemma

142 瑔瑠 瑔瑡 瑔瑢 瑔瑣 issue 瑔瑤

143 瑔瑥 瑔瑦 Michael McGinnis 瑔瑧 瑔瑨 瑔瑩 tactical linkage

144 瑖瑠 瑖瑡 negative linkage positive linkage X S X S 瑖瑢 S X X

145 X R X R 瑖瑣 side payment X 3. 2 3. 2 A B B X B X A X SQ - Cx + Bx A SQ A R SQ - Cx + R A SQ A SQ - Cx A S SQ - S = = SQ = B Cx = B X Bx = B A X R = A B S = A B Ronald Mitchell and Patricia Keilbach Situation Structure and Institutional Design Reciprocity Coercion and Exchange International Organization Vol. 55 No. 4 Autumn 2001 p. 900.

146 瑖瑤 瑖瑥

147 A B A myopic self-interest 瑖瑦 B A B 瑖瑧 reputational effect

148 瑖瑨 瑖瑩 verification treaty-relevant behavior Nancy Gallagher

149 瑘瑠 瑘瑡 3. international administrative union 19 1874 22 瑘瑢

150 coordination game 瑘瑣 collaboration game 瑘瑤 瑘瑥

151 information collection pooling joint production dispute resolution rule making and implementation 瑘瑦 International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA Bonald Mitchell compliance-oriented information 瑘瑧

152 瑘瑨 law merchant Paul Milgrom

153 private judge 瑘瑩 瑝瑠 瑝瑡

154 World Health Organization WHO 瑝瑢 Harold Demsetz team production

155 瑝瑣 1 2 3 瑝瑤 瑝瑥 瑝瑦

156 Alan Schwartz 瑝瑧 incomplete contract

157 1 2 3 瑝瑨 Andrew Moravcsik 1 2 3 4 5 瑝瑩 1899 1982 International Court of Justice ICJ

158 1 binding regulations 2 binding internal policies 3 coordination standards 4 conventions 5 recommenda- tions de facto coordination equilibrium

159 UN Environment Program UNEP 20 90

160 4. 20 1945 1985 1985 378 1995 Lloyd Gruber 20 70

161 open-ended fixed filling in escape clauses Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC

162

163 Yoram Barzel public domain

164 European Coal and Steel Community 1952

165 1958 1967 20 80 / 1986 1992 / John Pinder

166 20 90 1998 1995 1648 Westphalian model

167 ideal type

168 hierarchy

169 sovereignty costs

170

171 X X 3. 3 GC CC TC GC CC GC CC E 3. 3

172 3. 4 GC CC GC' CC' E 4 E 1 3. 4

173 1 3. 4 CC CC' GC E 1 E 2 E 2 E 1 2 3. 4 CC CC' GC E 1 E 2 E 2 E 1 3

174 3. 4 CC CC' GC E 1 E 2 E 2 E 1 4 3. 4 GC GC' CC E 1 E 3 E 3 E 1 5 3. 4 GC GC' CC E 1 E 3 E 3 E 1

175 6 3. 4 GC GC' CC E 1 E 3 E 3 E 1 1 Susan Strange Cave hic dragones A Critic of Regime Analysis in Stephen Krasner ed. International Regimes p. 338. 2 78 82 20 80 international regimes 3 Stephan Haggard and Beth Sim-

176 mons Theories of International Regimes in International Organization Vol. 41 No. 3 Summer 1987 Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions in International Organization Vol. 52 No. 4 Autumn 1998. 4 Oran Young Oran Young ed. The International Political Economy and International Institutions Cheltenham E. Elgar Pub. Co. 1996. Part I 5 Hayward Alker and Bruce Russett World Politics in General Assembly New Haven Yale University Press 1965. Quoted in Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions p. 734. 6 Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons Theories of International Regimes p. 491. 7 Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions p. 736. 8 John Ruggie International Responses to Technology Concepts and Trends p. 570. 9 Stephen Krasner Structural Causes and Regime Consequences Regimes as Intervening Variables in Stephen Krasner ed. International Regimes p. 2. 10 Robert Keohane International Institutions and State Power Essays in International Relations Theory Boulder Westview Press 1989 p. 3. 瑏瑡 Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins International Regimes Lessons from Inductive Analysis in Stephen Krasner ed. International Regimes p. 65. 瑏瑢 Ibid. p. 64. 瑏瑣 Robert Keohane International Institutions and State Power Essays in International Relations Theory pp. 3 4. 瑏瑤

177 2003 12 瑏瑥 Christian Reus-Smit The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions in International Organization Vol. 51 No. 4 Autumn 1997 p. 557. 瑏瑦 2002 39 44 瑏瑧 208 瑏瑨 Russican doll approach 瑏瑩 2004 127 瑐瑠 Christian Reus-Smit The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions p. 567. 瑐瑡 Hendrik Sprupt 14 city-leagues city-states sovereign territorial states

178 Hendrik Sprupt Institutional Selection in International Relations State Anarchy as Order in International Organization Vol. 48 No. 4 Autumn 1994 瑐瑢 international legalization obligation precision delegation Kenneth Abbott Robert Keohane Andrew Moravcsik Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal The Concept of Legalization in International Organization Vol. 54 No. 3 Summer 2000 p. 401 瑐瑣 1989 commonality specificity antonomy Robert Keohane International Institutions and State Power Essays in International Relations Theory pp. 5 6 瑐瑤 Charles Lipson Why Are Some International Agreements Informal in International Organization Vol. 45 No. 4 Autumn 1991 p. 502. 瑐瑥 Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal Why States Act through Formal International Organizations in Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 42 No. 1 1998 p. 9. 瑐瑦 Barbara Koremenos Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal The Rational Design of International Institutions in International Organization Vol. 55 No. 4 Autumn 2001 p. 771. 瑐瑧

179 1993 5 瑐瑨 Kenneth Abbott Robert Keohane Andrew Moravcsik Anne - Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal The Concept of Legalization p. 401. 瑐瑩 Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney Delegation to International Organizations Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform in International Organization Vol. 57 No. 2 Spring 2003 p. 247. 瑑瑠 Kenneth Abbott Robert Keohane Andrew Moravcsik Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal The Concept of Legalization p. 416 瑑瑡 瑑瑢 1998 13 瑑瑣 1 G Group 2 instant international organizations 9

180 3 treaty organization treaty body 2005 36 90 瑑瑤 90 92 瑑瑥 Christian Reus-Smit The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions p. 557. 瑑瑦 Charles Lipson Why Are Some International Agreements Informal p. 533. 瑑瑧 Ibid. p. 501. 瑑瑨 361 瑑瑩 2003 734 瑒瑠 1993 1164 瑒瑡 1995 408 411 瑒瑢 Raymond Garthoff Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis Wachington D. C. Brookings Institution 1989 pp. 86 95 Catherine Langlois and Jean-Pierre Langlois Tacit Bargaining in International Rela-

181 tions A Game Model and A Case Study in Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 40 No. 4 1996 瑒瑣 Charles Lipson Why Are Some International Agreements Informal p. 501. 瑒瑤 2003 328 332 瑒瑥 696 瑒瑦 Charles Lipson Why Are Some International Agreements Informal pp. 523 527 瑒瑧 1995 402 瑒瑨 190 瑒瑩 瑓瑠 George Downs David Rocke George Downs and David Rocke Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control in World Politics 39 3 1987 p. 325 瑓瑡 1986 744 瑓瑢 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes On Compliance in International Organization Vol. 47 No. 2 Spring 1993 p. 175. 瑓瑣

182 Robert Yarbrough and Beth Yarbrough Reciprocity Bilateralism and Economic Hostages Self-enforcing Agreements in International Trade in International Studies Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 1 March 1986 pp. 13 14 瑓瑤 hostage hostage hostage 瑓瑥 235 瑓瑦 瑓瑧 Robert Yarbrough and Beth Yarbrough Reciprocity Bilateralism and Economic Hostages Self-enforcing Agreements in International Trade pp. 10 11. 瑓瑨 153 瑓瑩 Robert Keohane Reciprocity in International Relations in International Organization Vol. 40 No. 1 Winter 1986 p. 8. 瑔瑠 1996 瑔瑡 Robert Axelord and Robert Keohane Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy Strategy and Institutions in Kenneth Oye ed. Cooperation under Anarchy p. 244. 瑔瑢 Robert Keohane Reciprocity in International Relations p. 27. 瑔瑣 Joshua Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse Reciprocity Bullying and International Cooperation Time-series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict in American Political Science Review Vol. 91 No. 3 September 1997 p. 515. 瑔瑤

183 瑔瑥 Michael McGinnis Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation in Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 30 No. 1 March 1986 瑔瑦 2004 419 瑔瑧 Michael McGinnis Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation p. 149. 瑔瑨 1980 171 瑔瑩 172 瑖瑠 Ernst Hass Why Collaborate Issue-linkage and International Regimes in World Politics Vol. 32 No. 3 April 1980 p. 372. 瑖瑡 126 127 瑖瑢 Ronald Mitchell and Patricia Keilbach Situation Structure and Institutional Design Reciprocity Coercion and Exchange in International Organization Vol. 55 No. 4 Autumn 2001 p. 898. 瑖瑣 Ronald Mitchell and Patricia Keilbach Situation Structure and Institutional Design Reciprocity Coercion and Exchange p. 899. 瑖瑤 2001 73 瑖瑥 38 1 1998 56 57 瑖瑦

184 121 瑖瑧 2000 88 瑖瑨 Charles Lipson Why Are Some International Agreements Informal pp. 508 509. 瑖瑩 Anne Sartori The Might of the Pen A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes in International Organization Vol. 56 No. 1 Winter 2002 p. 122. 瑘瑠 Nancy Gallagher The Politics of Verification Baltimore and London The Johns Hopkins University Press 1999 p. 10. 189. 瑘瑡 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes On Compliance p. 瑘瑢 1993 18 瑘瑣 117 瑘瑤 dominant strategy

185 109 110 Arthur Stein Why Nations Cooperate Circumstance and Choice in International Relations pp. 32 33. 瑘瑥 224 202. 瑘瑦 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes On Compliance p. 瑘瑧 effectiveness-oriented information Ronald Mitchell Sources of Transparency Information System in International Regimes in International Studies Quarterly Vol. 42 1998 p. 109 瑘瑨 Barbara Koremenos Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal The Rational Design of International Institutions p. 788. 瑘瑩 Paul Milgrom Douglass North and Barry Weingast The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade The Law Merchant Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs in Economics and Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 1990 pp. 1 23 瑝瑠 84 瑝瑡 Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal Why States Act through Formal International Organizations p. 13. 瑝瑢 Ibid. p. 14. 瑝瑣 59 瑝瑤 A. H. R. A. D. 63 瑝瑥 77 瑝瑦 Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal Why States Act through For-

186 mal International Organizations pp. 14 15. 瑝瑧 102 103 瑝瑨 Robert Keohane Andrew Moravcsik and Anne-Marie Slaughter Legalized Dispute Resolution Interstate and Transnational in International Organization Vol. 54 No. 3 Summer 2000 p. 459. 瑝瑩 Kenneth Abbott Robert Keohane Andrew Moravcsik Anne- Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal The Concept of Legalization p. 416. William Dixon transnational or subnational organizations ad hoc commissions William Dixon Third-party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Peaceful Settlement in International Organization Vol. 50 No. 4 Autumn 1996 p. 653 95 96 1994 58 101 Kenneth Abbott Robert Keohane Andrew Moravcsik Anne- Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal The Concept of Legalization p. 416. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal Why States Act through Formal International Organizations p. 15. Barbara Koremenos Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal The Rational Design of International Institutions p. 772. Gayl Ness and Steven Brechin Bridging the Gap International Organizations as Organizations in International Organization Vol. 42 No. 2

187 Spring 1988 p. 252 Barbara Koremenos Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal The Rational Design of International Institutions p. 787. 60 62 Lloyd Gruber Ruling the World Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions New Jersey Princeton 2000 p. 62. Ibid. p. 61. University Press Charles Lipson Why Are Some International Agreements Informal pp. 518 519. B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen Milner The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions Uncertainty and Escape in International Organization Vol. 55 No. 4 Autumn 2001 Lloyd Gruber Ruling the World Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions p. 73. Ibid. pp. 73 74. 1997 159 89 94 95 1998 24 Karen Alter The European Unions Legal System and Domestic Policy Spillover or Backlash in International Organization Vol. 54 No. 3 Summer 2000 p. 491. 1996 70 74

188 Alec Sweet and Thomas Brunell Constructing a Supranational Constitution Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community in American Political Science Review Vol. 92 No. 1 March 1998 39 2001 66 214 Stephen Krasner Compromising Westphalia in International Security Vol. 20 No. 3 Winter 1995 /1996 p. 115. 104 138 Stephen Krasner Compromising Westphalia p. 147. hierarchy bureaucracy hierarchy 2001 17 David Lake Anarchy Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations p. 14

189 Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal Hard and Soft Law in International Governance in International Organization Vol. 54 No. 3 Summer 2000 pp. 436 437. Ibid. p. 435. Robert Keohane International Institutions and State Power Essays in International Relations Theory p. 118. joint production economies David Lake Entangling Relations American Foreign Policy in its Century pp. 44 51 3. 3 1998 9 29 David Lake Anarchy Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations p. 16 539

1796 9 19

191 1 2 1801 1823

192 1898 entangling alliance 20 3 1945 1945 5 350 1946 3 40 4 1949 4 4 North Atlantic Treaty NAT Armin Rappaport 1949 American Revolution of 1949 5 1949 1952

193 6 1950 6 1951 4 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SHAPE 1951 5 12 1952 1952 2 Atlantic Alliance formal alliance 7 20 40 8 orthodox traditionalists

194 1947 1948 1949 9 revisionism Gabriel Kolko Joyce William Williams 10 John Lewis Gaddis post-revisionism

195 瑏瑡 瑏瑢 瑏瑣

196 50 60 70 瑏瑤 瑏瑥 瑏瑦 150 incomplete explanation 瑏瑧

197 瑏瑨 20

198 1939 1945 瑏瑩 Alexis de Tocqueville 瑐瑠 Paul Kennedy 19 20 瑐瑡

199 瑐瑢 1.

200 瑐瑣 1954 4 150 100 瑐瑤 1946 1954 瑐瑥 瑐瑦

201 1949 12 瑐瑧 50 1955 1961 / 35. 6: 33. 0: 31. 3 51. 5: 31. 2: 17. 2 76. 9: 11. 5: 11. 5 4. 1 4. 1 1955 1961 David Lake Entangling Relations American Foreign Policy in its Century Princeton New Jersey Princeton University Press 1999 p. 165. 4. 1

202 Malcolm Hoag 瑐瑨 4 1 4. 2 B-29 B -29 1 500 瑐瑩 B-29

203 4. 2 1977 9

204 stepping stones 瑑瑠 4 2 2. Ernest Bevin 1945

205 瑑瑡 瑑瑢

206 瑑瑣 瑑瑤 瑑瑥 瑑瑦 1946 350 40 1951 22 4. 3 瑑瑧

207 4. 3 1950 Ronald Powaski The Entangling Alliance The United States and European Security 1950 1993 Westport Greenwood Press 1994 p. 1. Arthur Vandenberg Robert Taft 瑑瑨 1949 China lobby

208 瑑瑩 瑒瑠 瑒瑡 1947 3 4 瑒瑢 瑒瑣 1947 12 spiritual federation of the West

209 John Hicherson 瑒瑤 1948 3 17 Western Union 51 瑒瑥 John Baylis 瑒瑦 5 3 1

210 Tom Connally 瑒瑧 time horizon 瑒瑨 1940 瑒瑩

211 Peter Calvocoressi 瑓瑠 5 4 5 3. 瑓瑡 瑓瑢

212 瑓瑣 Jan Honig 瑓瑤 1949 1778 瑓瑥 1796 瑓瑦

213 20 30 瑓瑧 Lawrence Kaplan 40 1919

214 瑓瑨 1947 82% 1948 72% 瑓瑩 瑔瑠

215 William Olson 瑔瑡 1944 瑔瑢 1 6 1 3 4. 瑔瑣

216 4. 4 1946 11 1986 82 1947 2 1 /3 瑔瑤 1947 4

217 1947 5 1948 4 1948 瑔瑥 47. 9% 31% 1948 Timothy Smith 1948 瑔瑦 瑔瑧

218 瑔瑨 2 7 8 1947 1951

219 1. 1946 George Kennan Long Telegram 4 1947 2 21 1947 24 28 3 31 4 1 瑔瑩

220 瑖瑠 1947 3 12 瑖瑡 瑖瑢 瑖瑣

221 瑖瑤 1948 6 30 瑖瑥 1947 6 5 瑖瑦 瑖瑧

222 瑖瑨 1947 6 6 1947 12 瑖瑩 12 17 瑘瑠

223 瑘瑡 Robert Lovett unwritten and informal understandings 1948 1 13 瑘瑢 creating some form of union

224 Theodore Achiles Charles Bohlen unilateral guarantee 瑘瑣 1 20 瑘瑤

225 3 17 1948 瑘瑥 瑘瑦 瑘瑧 James Reston 瑘瑨 Lucius Clay Forrestal 瑘瑩 3 9 4 6

226 瑝瑠 3 11 Halvard Lange 3 11 瑝瑡

227 Don Cook 1948 瑝瑢 瑝瑣 3 12 3 11 瑝瑤 1948 3 22 3 17 瑝瑥 1 13 collective defense agreement 2

228 3 4 5 瑝瑦 1920 瑝瑧 2. 1948 4 11

229 6 11 64 4 瑝瑨 瑝瑩 treaty alliance collective arrangements

230 5 19 Hume Wrong 4 17 4 23

231 1940 5 20 6 19 6 24

232 1948 7 6 1 2 3 4 7 9 van Kleffens North Atlantic Pact Oliver Franks

233 7 14 two-pillar concept North Atlantic guarantee 9 2

234 1948 9 9 North Atlantic Treaty 10 13 10 25 11 12 10

235 1 commitment clause 2 3 4 1948 3 9 9

236 1949 1 20 1948

237

238 1949 3 18 5 4 4 12 5 3 6 7 7 25 8 24 3.

239 1952 2 1949 9 17 12 12 11 5 1949 10 5 1949 11 18

240 1776 5 3 consulting member participation as appropriate 4. 1

241 4. 1 / Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years Lexington Kentucky The University Press of Kentucky 1984 p. 140 1949 1950 1991 183 1950 14 1 000 25 6 000

242 1950 6 15 1950 8 11 1949 9 1950 6 25

243 30 perception 6 27 6 30 /

244 1950 7 8 4 6 9 9 9 16 1950 12 18

245 Great Debate 12 20 1951 1 5 2 14 118

246 4 4 69 21 1 S. F. 1985 119 2 Ronald Powaski The Entangling Alliance The United States and European Security 1950 1993 Westport Greenwood Press 1994 p. vi. 3 associate informal collaborator Lawrence Kaplan The Long Entanglement NATOs First Fifty Years Westport Praeger 1999 p. 1 4 J. 1992 33 5 Armin Rappaport The American Revolution of 1949 in NATO Letter 12 1964 Quoted in Lawrence Kaplan The Long Entanglement NATOs First Fifty Years p. 1. 6 Ronald Powaski The Entangling Alliance The United States and

247 European Security 1950 1993 p. 1. 7 1988 182 8 1998 1 9 2002 168 169 10 169 170 瑏瑡 170 172 瑏瑢 Robert McCalla NATOS Persistence after the Cold War in International Organization Vol. 50 No. 3 Summer 1996 p. 450. 瑏瑣 142 瑏瑤 207 瑏瑥 瑏瑦 204 瑏瑧 David Lake Entangling Relations American Foreign Policy in Its Century p. 151. 瑏瑨 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser An Economic Theory of Alliance in Francis Beer ed. Alliance Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World New York Holt Rinehart and Winston Inc 1970 John R. Oneal The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO In International Organization Vol. 44 No. 3 Summer 1990 Alan Tonelson The Economics of NATO in Ted Galen Carpenter ed. NATO at 40 Confronting a Changing World Washington D. C. Cato Institute

248 1990 Todd Sander and Keith Hartley The Political Economy of NATO Past Present and into the 21 st Century Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1999 瑏瑩 2000 87 瑐瑠 1835 1988 480 481 瑐瑡 1989 445 446 瑐瑢 瑐瑣 1994 22 瑐瑤 Hastings Ismay NATO The First Five Years 1949 1954 Utrecht Bosch 1954 p. 136. 瑐瑥 W. F. G. P. 1989 135 瑐瑦 1952 10 1960 2 瑐瑧 1949 1980 147 瑐瑨 Malcolm Hoag What Interdependence for NATO in World Politics Vol. 12 No. 3 1960 p. 372. 瑐瑩

249 1986 445 瑑瑠 1949 103 瑑瑡 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 New York Arbor House /William Morrow 1989 pp. 22 23. 瑑瑢 1945 1988 1999 3 瑑瑣 C. M. Woodhouse Attitudes of NATO Countries Toward the United States in World Politics Vol. 10 No. 2 1958 p. 208. 瑑瑤 Celeste Wallander Institutional Assets and Adaptability NATO After the Cold War in International Organization Vol. 54 No. 4 Autumn 2000 p. 715. 瑑瑥 John Duffield International Regimes and Alliance Behavior Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels in International Organization Vol. 46 No. 4 Autumn 1992 p. 843. 瑑瑦 111 瑑瑧 Ronald Powaski The Entangling Alliance The United States and European Security 1950 1993 p. 1. 瑑瑨 Lynn Hinds and Theodore Windt The Cold War as Rhetoric The Beginnings 1945 1950 New York Praeger 1991 p. 224. 瑑瑩 1974 83 瑒瑠 1959 113 瑒瑡 83 瑒瑢 1945 1947 1959 437

250 瑒瑣 1994 103 瑒瑤 John Baylis Britain The Brussels Pact and the Continent Commitment in International Affairs Vol. 60 No. 4 Autumn 1984 p. 622. 瑒瑥 1948 1949 1959 50 瑒瑦 John Baylis Britain The Brussels Pact and the Continent Commitment p. 627. 瑒瑧 1949 38 39 41 瑒瑨 1951 1 30 4 000 1987 68 瑒瑩 1949 57 58 瑓瑠 1947 1948 1990 138 瑓瑡 1949 1954 Emil Kirchner and James Sperling eds. The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO 40 Years After New York St. Press 1992 p. 4 Martins

251 瑓瑢 1951 81 瑓瑣 瑓瑤 Jan Honig NATO An Institution under Threat New York Institute for East-West Security Studies 1991 p. 20. 瑓瑥 1648 1871 1984 222 瑓瑦 1796 S. F. 117 118 瑓瑧 Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years Lexington Kentucky The University Press of Kentucky 1984 p. 30. 瑓瑨 Ibid. p. 30. 瑓瑩 Ibid. p. 31. 瑔瑠 Lynn Hinds and Theodore Windt The Cold War as Rhetoric The Beginnings 1945 1950 p. 222. 瑔瑡 1987 299 瑔瑢 1958 瑔瑣 1945 10 26. 2% 1946 11 28. 2% 1946 6 19% 1946 2 12% 1945 10 11% 1986

252 82 瑔瑤 1944 1992 1993 33 瑔瑥 E. Timothy Smith The United States Italy and NATO 1947 1952 New York St. Martins Press 1991 p. 55. 瑔瑦 Ibid. p. 36. 瑔瑧 1948 瑔瑨 E. Timothy Smith The United States Italy and NATO 1947 1952 p. 91. 瑔瑩 56 57 瑖瑠 1947 1948 18 瑖瑡 60 瑖瑢 1974 121 瑖瑣 1947 1948 瑖瑤 Lawrence Kaplan NATO and the United States The Enduring Alliance Boston Twayne Publishers 1988 p. 16. 瑖瑥 5 15 5 22 瑖瑦 1945 1959 1991 221 瑖瑧 1947 1948 27 瑖瑨 Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years p. 49. 瑖瑩 Ibid. p. 50.

253 p. 110. 瑘瑠 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 瑘瑡 Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years p. 51. p. 114. 瑘瑢 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 瑘瑣 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 p. 115. p. 116. 瑘瑤 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 瑘瑥 Lawrence Kaplan NATO and the United States The Enduring Alliance p. 20. 瑘瑦 1945 1980 1986 78 瑘瑧 153 157 瑘瑨 Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years p. 61. p. 121. 瑘瑩 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 瑝瑠 1947 1948 213 p. 125. 瑝瑡 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 瑝瑢 Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years p. 62. p. 126. 瑝瑣 419 瑝瑤 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 瑝瑥

254 1995 149 150 p. 131. p. 163. 瑝瑦 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 瑝瑧 289 瑝瑨 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 瑝瑩 Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years p. 77. p. 167. p. 155. Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 Ibid. p. 144. 291 45 293 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 6 p. 175. Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 David Lake Entangling Relations American Foreign Policy in Its Century p. 156. p. 193. Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 1949 75 82 p. 194. Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 1948 11 1949 1 20

255 Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years p. 84. 1947 9 2 1945 1947 437 p. 207. Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 1978 150 151 p. 208. Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 1948 1949 193 152 153 1989 46 1948 1949 Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 pp. 220 221. 1949 1950 1991 182 183 256 257

256 Todd Sander and Keith Hartley The Political Economy of NATO Past Present and into the 21 st Century p. 240. Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years p. 140. 1949 155 156 1949 1950 195 Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years p. 153. 1941 1950 1997 482 2003 277 2005 114 114 Ronald Powaski The Entangling Alliance The United States and European Security 1950 1993 p. 4. Lawrence Kaplan NATO and the United States The Enduring Alliance p. 44. 1976 398 468 Ronald Powaski The Entangling Alliance The United States and European Security 1950 1993 p. 4. 489 Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years p. 150. 1949 157 158 301

257 Ronald Powaski The Entangling Alliance The United States and European Security 1950 1993 p. 13. Lawrence Kaplan The United States and NATO The Formative Years p. 164. 1949 162 164 Ronald Powaski The Entangling Alliance The United States and European Security 1950 1993 p. 17. Don Cook Forging the Alliance NATO 1945 1950 p. 250.

H. 20 30 Great Depression

259 1 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act 2 3 1944 4 1944 7

260 1945 12 1946 2 International Trade Organization ITO 1946 10 1947 4 11 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT 5 6 8 1948 7 Protocol of Provisional Application PPA 1948 1 1 PPA 1949

261 1950 William Diebold 8 1955 Organization for Trade Cooperation OTC 9

262 5. 1 birth defects 10 瑏瑡 5. 1 1947 23 100 1949 33 1950 34 1956 22 25 1960 1961 45 49 1962 1967 48 400 1973 1979 99 1 550 1986 1994 117 5 000 2002

263 20 70 80 1986 The Uruguay Round 1990 4 1993 12 1994 4 World Trade Organization WTO 1995 1 1 WTO WTO H. John H. Jackson non-binding 瑏瑢 grandfather rights

264 single package 瑏瑣 Renato Ruggiero 1996 12 瑏瑤 瑏瑥 1947 dispute settlement procedure DSP / panels block Standing Appellate Body SAB

265 瑏瑦 瑏瑧 Giovanni Maggi Ⅹ A A A 瑏瑨

266 G. R. Shell 5. 2 5. 2 G. R. Shell Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory An Analysis of the World Trade Organization in Robert Howse ed. The World Trading System Critical Perspective on the World Economy Vol. Ⅱ London and New York Routledge 1998 p. 374.

267 regime management model

268 瑏瑩 efficient market model losers rent

269 瑐瑠 trade stakeholder model 瑐瑡

270 20 40 90 瑐瑢

271 20 70 / John Odell Barry Eichengreen 20 80 瑐瑣 /

272 20 80 90 瑐瑤 1. 19 1939 1944 69% 40% 1943 1938 19. 3% 69. 7% 1947 0. 7% 1. 7% 200% 20% 1945 32. 5% 4% 1944 20% 1937 1947 10 9 20 70 瑐瑥

273 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD 瑐瑦 1950 50. 2% 1970 17. 3% 1980 17. 8% 1990 16. 1% 5. 1 瑐瑧 1950 1. 4% 3. 3% 1980 9. 8% 11. 1% 70 瑐瑨 5. 1 1950 1990 Judith Goldstein Ideas Interests and American Trade Policy Ithaca and London Cornell University Press 1993 p. 168. 20 70

274 / 70 70 瑐瑩 1975 1984 256% 14% 80 瑑瑠 瑑瑡 瑑瑢

275 瑑瑣 20 80 90 5 瑑瑤 1 20 80 90 2. 瑑瑥 1780 1830 1. 37% 1830 1840 2. 81% 1840 1860 4. 84% 1860 1870 5. 53% 1870 1900 3. 24% 1900 1913 3. 75% 1913 1938 0. 5% 瑑瑦 1950 1982 11. 2% 603 18 539 30 20 80

276 1975 1979 317 1985 1989 2629 1993 21% 瑑瑧 1980 1993 1970 566 425 142 1980 2 718 2 243 476 1993 6 417 4 569 1 848 瑑瑨 1980 1993 1 3 5. 2 20 80 90

277 5. 2 1980 1993 Stephen D. Cohen Joel R. Paul Robert A. Blecker Fundamentals of U. S. Foreign Trade Policy Economics Politics Laws and Issues Boulder Westview Press 1996 p. 297. 20 80 90 6 2 20 80 90 1 3. 1945 1950

278 1946 瑑瑩 瑒瑠 瑒瑡

279 瑒瑢 20 80 90 瑒瑣 1982 瑒瑤 10 20 70 80 80 瑒瑥 20 80 90

280 Judith Goldstein 瑒瑦 20 80 90 2 3 20 80 90 1 2 4. 瑒瑧 1934 1930 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act RTAA 瑒瑨

281 瑒瑩 1944 1945 1946 20 50 Wilbur Mills STR 1962 1963 1 11075 1974

282 1979 USTR 瑓瑠 I. M. Destler 瑓瑡

283 1974 fast-track procedure 90 60 瑓瑢 瑓瑣 瑓瑤 20 70 3 4 20 80 90

284 1 2 3 20 80 90 1. 1934 1934 1945 32 1945 12 1946

285 1946 10 1947 1948 瑓瑥 1945 瑓瑦 瑓瑧

286 1947 瑓瑨 1948 1949 4 瑓瑩 1948 1950

287 1947 瑔瑠 1945 瑔瑡 瑔瑢 23 8 1948 1 1

288 瑔瑣 1948 contrcting parties 1960 council 瑔瑤

289 1989 瑔瑥 瑔瑦 1973 1979

290 瑔瑧 2. 20 70 1971 8 15 80 80 70 80 瑔瑨 bicycle theory 瑔瑩 20 80

291 Lomè Convention 瑖瑠 1981 6 William Brock 瑖瑡 1981 7 18 Consultative Group of Eighteen 瑖瑢 1981 11

292 瑖瑣 1983 5 瑖瑤 1984 2 3 5 11 1985 瑖瑥 1986 1985 3 5 1986 瑖瑦 1986 9 13 9 14 Punta del Este

293 9 20 Punta del Este Declara- tion 3. Julio Lacarte -Muro 1947 Functioning of the GATT System FOGS Julius Katz 20 瑖瑧 20 70 80

294 瑖瑨 conciliation 瑖瑩

295 瑘瑠 1989 瑘瑡 1990 4 瑘瑢 1990 1990 1 H. GATT

296 瑘瑣 1990 4 WTO Multilateral Trade Organization MTO Jagdish Bhagwati 瑘瑤 Ernest H. Preeg 瑘瑥

297 John Croome 瑘瑦 1991 12 1993 Mickey Kantor 瑘瑧 1993 12 15 4 瑘瑨

298 瑘瑩 1994 瑝瑠 瑝瑡 H. 瑝瑢 1995 1 1 81 1 A. G. A. L.

299 1820 1990 1996 221 229 2 Alfred E. Eckes JR. Opening Americas Market U. S. Foreign Trade Policy since 1776 Chapel Hill and London The University of North Carolina Press 1995 pp. 100 109 3 Peter Molyneaux American Trade Policy and World Peace in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 192 July 1937 p. 123. 4 H. 2001 15 5 40 41 6 7 H. 43 8 William Diebold Jr From the ITO to GATT and Back in Orin Kirshner ed. The Bretton Woods-GATT System Retrospect and Prospect after Fifty Years Armonk and London M. E. Sharpe 1996 p. 167. 9 Contracting Parties 10 1999 Ⅺ 瑏瑡 2004 93 瑏瑢 John H. Jackson The World Trade Organization Constitution and Jurisprudence London Royal Institute of International Affairs 1998 pp. 36 37.

300 瑏瑣 John H. Jackson The World Trade Organization Constitution and Jurisprudence p. 37. 瑏瑤 Ibid p. 59. 瑏瑥 Ibid p. 61. 瑏瑦 H. 140 141 瑏瑧 WTO 2001 83 87 瑏瑨 Giovanni Maggi The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation in The American Economic Review Vol. 89 No. 1 March 1999 p. 191. 瑏瑩 G. R. Shell Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory An Analysis of the World Trade Organization in Robert Howse ed. The World Trading System Critical Perspective on the World Economy Vol. Ⅱ London and New York Routledge 1998 pp. 347 355 瑐瑠 Ibid. pp. 355 392. 瑐瑡 Ibid. pp. 370 379. 瑐瑢 David Lake The State and American Trade Strategy in the Pre- Hegemonic Era in International Organization Vol. 42 No. 1 Winter 1988 p. 56. 瑐瑣 ITO WTO O. WTO 2002 253 瑐瑤 瑐瑥 25 28 瑐瑦 1948 Organization for European Economic Cooperation OEEC 1961

301 50 1973 24 1994 24 G. J. Lanjouw International Trade Institutions London and New York Longman 1995 pp. 39 45 瑐瑧 Judith Goldstein Ideas Interests and American Trade Policy Ithaca and London Cornell University Press 1993 p. 168. 瑐瑨 5 6 瑐瑩 1989 222 瑑瑠 96 瑑瑡 1500 1990 2003 321 瑑瑢 322 瑑瑣 2002 84 瑑瑤 20 70 1 2 3 1 2 1929

302 1933 3 30 1929 1939 368 369 瑑瑥 瑑瑦 1994 352 205 240 瑑瑧 Ernest H. Preeg Traders in a Brave New World The Uruguay Round and the Future of The International Trading System Chicago and London The University of Chicago Press 1995 p. 13. 瑑瑨 Stephen D. Cohen Joel R. Paul Robert A. Blecker Fundamentals of U. S. Foreign Trade Policy Economics Politics Laws and Issues Boulder Westview Press 1996 p. 297. 瑑瑩 35 36 瑒瑠 ITO WTO O. WTO 287 瑒瑡 50 51 瑒瑢 2003 167 190 瑒瑣 166 瑒瑤 1 2 3 4

303 1999 575 瑒瑥 Ernest H. Preeg Traders in a Brave New World The Uruguay Round and the Future of The International Trading System p. 18. 瑒瑦 WTO O. WTO 201 瑒瑧 1161 瑒瑨 2000 2 瑒瑩 ITO WTO O. WTO 272 瑓瑠 I. M. Destler United States Trade Policymaking in the Uruguay Round in Henry R. Nau ed. Domestic Trade Politics and The Uruguay Round New York Columbia University Press 1989 p. 194 瑓瑡 I. M. Destler American Trade Politics System under Stress Washington DC Institute For International Economics 1986 p. 19. 170 69. 瑓瑢 Judith Goldstein Ideas Interests and American Trade Policy p. 瑓瑣 I. M. Destler American Trade Politics System Under Stress p. 瑓瑤 61 瑓瑥 Simon Reisman The Birth of a World Trading System ITO and GATT in Orin Kirshner ed. The Bretton Woods-GATT System Retrospect and Prospect After Fifty Years p. 84. 瑓瑦 Helen Milner Interests Institutions and Information Domestic Politics and International Relations New Jersey Princeton University Press 1997 p. 143 瑓瑧 ITO WTO O. WTO 258

304 瑓瑨 Helen Milner Interests Institutions and Information Domestic Politics and International Relations p. 145. 瑓瑩 ITO WTO O. WTO 276 瑔瑠 Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer Ambivalent Multilateralism and the Emerging Backlash The IMF and WTO in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman eds. Multilateralism and U. S. Foreign Policy Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers 2002 p. 399. 瑔瑡 John H. Jackson The World Trade Organization Constitution and Jurisprudence pp. 16 17. 瑔瑢 William Diebold Jr From the ITO to GATT and Back in Orin Kirshner ed. The Bretton Woods-GATT System Retrospect and Prospect After Fifty Years p. 159. 瑔瑣 H. 43 45 瑔瑤 70 80 瑔瑥 瑔瑦 Lloyd Gruber Ruling the World Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions p. 75. 瑔瑧 Ernest H. Preeg Traders in a Brave New World The Uruguay Round and the Future of The International Trading System p. 27. 瑔瑨 21 2001 95 96 瑔瑩 Ernest H. Preeg Traders in a Brave New World The Uruguay Round and the Future of the International Trading System p. 29. 瑖瑠 John Croome Reshaping the World Trading System A History of the Uruguay Round World Trade Organization 1995 p. 11. 瑖瑡 Ernest H. Preeg Traders in a Brave New World The Uruguay

305 Round and the Future of The International Trading System p. 30. 瑖瑢 John Croome Reshaping the World Trading System A History of the Uruguay Round p. 12. 瑖瑣 Ibid. p. 14. 瑖瑤 Ernest H. Preeg Traders in a Brave New World The Uruguay Round and the Future of The International Trading System p. 53. 瑖瑥 Ibid. 瑖瑦 John Croome Reshaping the World Trading System A History of the Uruguay Round p. 25. 瑖瑧 Ernest H. Preeg Traders in a Brave New World The Uruguay Round and the Future of the International Trading System pp. 74 75. 瑖瑨 John Croome Reshaping the World Trading System A History of the Uruguay Round p. 144. 瑖瑩 Ibid. p. 149. 瑘瑠 Ernest H. Preeg Traders in a Brave New World The Uruguay Round and the Future of the International Trading System p. 103. 瑘瑡 John Croome Reshaping the World Trading System A History of the Uruguay Round p. 264. 瑘瑢 Ibid. pp. 265 266. 瑘瑣 John H. Jackson Restructuring the GATT System London Royal Institute of International Affairs 1990 瑘瑤 1996 77 瑘瑥 Ernest H. Preeg Traders in a Brave New World The Uruguay Round and the Future of the International Trading System p. 124. 瑘瑦 John Croome Reshaping the World Trading System A History of the Uruguay Round p. 322. 瑘瑧 Ernest H. Preeg Traders in a Brave New World The Uruguay

306 Round and the Future of the International Trading System p. 125. 瑘瑨 Ibid. p. 173. 瑘瑩 John Croome Reshaping the World Trading System A History of the Uruguay Round p. 380. 瑝瑠 H. 1994 GATT/WTO 2002 419 448 瑝瑡 Stephen D. Cohen Joel R. Paul Robert A. Blecker Fundamentals of U. S. Foreign Trade Policy Economics Politics Laws and Issues p. 272. 瑝瑢 John H. Jackson The World Trade Organization Constitution and Jurisprudence pp. 76 77.

1

308 research questions 2

309 20 3 4 20 70 5 6 7

310 1984 8 9 G = G 1 C 1 < C 2 = G 2 C 1 C 2 G 1 G 2 G C 1 C 2 10 C 1 C 2 G 1 G 2

311 瑏瑡 瑏瑢 瑏瑣

312 瑏瑤 瑏瑥

313 John Groenewegen Jack Vromen 瑏瑦 deductive rigor X X Scott Masten 1 2

314 C 1 = β 1 X + e 1 C 2 = β 2 X + e 2 X β 1 β 2 e 1 e 2 β 1 β 2 G 1 Pr C 1 < C 2 = Pr e 1 - e 2 < β 2 - β 1 X X β 2 - β 1 瑏瑧 X X β 2 - β 1 20 80 90

315 empirical theory International Criminal Court ICC

316 瑏瑨 瑏瑩 1971 26 Samuel Kim 瑐瑠

317 瑐瑡 International Political Economy IPE Security Studies 瑐瑢 瑐瑣 20 90 1973

318 1979 瑐瑤 Helga Haftendorn Celeste Wallander 瑐瑥 inter-paradigm debate quasi-contractual issues relational contract 瑐瑦

319 瑐瑧 瑐瑨 1945 British Empire British Commonwealth 瑐瑩 3. 3

320 1787 John Jay 瑑瑠 瑑瑡 瑑瑢

321 瑑瑣 瑑瑤 John Ikenberry

322 瑑瑥 two-level network manager 瑑瑦

323 path dependence 瑑瑧 historical institutionalism 瑑瑨 瑑瑩 瑒瑠 paradigm Thomas Kuhn

324 瑒瑡 瑒瑢 1 26 2 Gary King Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba Designing Social Inquiry Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research p. 15. 3 2002 179 4 5 137 136 6

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332 1999 2001 1996 2002 2001 1974 1999 2004 C. 1994 C. 1994 1999 1978 2000 1998 1996 1945 1959 1991 2004

333 1974 1980 1990 1945 1980 1986 1989 1980 1997 1985 2001 1996 2000 2 1998 13 2001 1976 1962 2000 2003 1992

334 1986 1999 2003 1999 WTO 2001 2001 1993 2003 1997 1994 1949 1980 2001 1996 1996 2001 2002 2002 1989

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336 1994 1994 2003 1988 2000 1996 1997 1999 2000 1994 2000 2001 1 1988 2003 2002 1995 1981 1986 1998 1995 2003 1987 2001

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A 1949 American Revolution of 1949 192 212 Konrad Adenauer 243 Dwight Eisenhower 256 244 ~ 246 Hayward Alker 121 Armen Alchian 23 53 68 106 109 113 154 155 Mancur Olson 185 George Akerlof 78 Kenneth Arrow 76 312 Thráinn Eggertsson Michael Altfeld 13 31 53 55 58 60 74 111 Kenneth Abbott 128 129 153 155 157 169 178 Robert Axelrod 64 106 141 182 271 300 302 ~ 304 Dean Acheson 216 217 221 236 237 239 240 245 255 John Odell 271 300 302 ~ 304 87 113 247 William Olson 215 251 Andreas Osiander Barry Eichengreen Jagdish Bhagwati 108 Kenneth Oye 9 B

357 296 305 Yoram Barzel 163 187 hegemony 9 19 32 33 Charles Bohlen 224 39 46 55 ~ 57 59 60 102 Karl Popper 1 40 41 110 113 116 179 183 184 198 215 249 271 289 290 Jean Bodin 66 301 310 322 325 hegemonic stability theory 102 322 confederation 12 15 21 34 35 131 180 211 319 320 protectorate 3 34 214 278 North Atlantic Treaty NAT 4 17 44 128 uncertainty 9 26 31 190 192 195 203 206 217 218 228 234 ~ 238 240 242 255 314 NATO 244 248 272 ~ 275 300 301 4 44 190 NAFTA 4 John Baylis 209 Ernest Bevin 204 205 208 210 222 ~ 224 226 227 Brussels Treaty 230 231 comparative institutional analysis 26 111 132 William Brock 291 292 185 311 318 ~ 320 327 marginal cost 25 Richard Bean 3 14 15 245 Abram Chayes 279 Michael Polanyi 99 118 57 game theory 10 39 311 324 coordination game 150 collaboration game 150 184 side payment 32 145 170 35 36 38 48 49 73 97 100 ~ 104 117 156 173 174 178 204 206 208 209 211 314 315 322 Hedley Bull 64 Bretton Woods Agreement 278 284 209 210 217 225 227 228 230 232 ~ 235 238 242 C

358 138 151 Antonia Handler Chayes 138 property rights 23 27 28 unilateralism 4 5 53 54 68 69 71 74 76 106 unilateral guarantee 108 109 113 115 149 153 163 164 185 187 264 292 moral hazard 82 296 297 322 Standing Appellate Body SAB 264 supranational organi- zation 2 12 14 17 32 35 hierarchy 26 34 35 36 130 132 133 159 ~ 162 164 168 169 179 212 308 311 318 sunk cost 98 commitment 2 47 51 60 William Dixon 186 76 82 83 85 96 103 111 William Diebold 127 133 137 139 141 147 148 151 154 158 161 162 Daniel Diermeier 168 185 206 209 210 216 223 ~ 225 233 235 237 244 Avinash Dixit 29 255 282 283 286 287 312 credible commitment 82 96 147 D free riding Atlantic Alliance 190 193 211 218 223 230 240 246 Great Depression 258 277 284 298 224 84 ~ 86 88 311 Harold Demsetz 154 185 I. M. Destler 282 52 73 74 131 150 168 188 189 309 311 318 low politics 92 93 133 317 261 287 126 177 283 299 303 312 325 hostage 139 ~ 141 146 182 empire 2 3 29 34 47 85 86 107 124 166 177 205 215 219 259 285 318 319 326 327 imperialism 326

359 327 informal empire Harry Truman 17 193 34 contracting 5 16 23 34 49 77 78 81 82 84 85 90 91 93 94 96 114 115 128 132 136 ~ 140 142 144 146 ~ 149 151 ~ 153 156 ~ 188 199 202 209 212 215 218 226 236 238 239 248 Dunkirk Treaty 255 260 ~ 263 267 275 277 Multilateral Trade 280 283 287 ~ 289 292 294 295 299 300 308 313 314 318 319 321 interstate contracting cost 16 77 90 91 93 94 96 137 146 169 170 ~ 175 199 248 300 314 82 85 146 260 287 288 294 Michael Tierney 129 310 stepping stones state 252 283 285 298 Tokyo Round 262 Bernard Finel 95 289 290 317 ASEAN 6 128 129 243 249 194 197 207 208 213 218 ~ 221 228 229 231 236 237 242 ~ 245 250 252 254 ~ 256 260 261 286 287 Truman Doctrine 195 218 219 221 158 161 162 164 168 ~ 175 myopic self-interest 147 183 184 Organization MTO 296 John Foster Dulles 208 paradigm 11 15 19 20 297 multilateralism 3 4 19 124 125 176 177 184 185 Karl Deutsch 61 62 93 106 116 contracting parties pluralistic security community 94 F Act 17 136 177 200 Arthur Vandenberg 207 210 218 219 228 ~ 232 236

360 317 318 323 324 non-tariff barrier 282 283 289 290 informal agreement 7 17 128 130 ~ 138 146 ~ 148 168 169 181 184 308 311 315 318 James Fearon 80 96 116 Stanley Fischer 25 veto 135 234 288 289 294 302 Jeffry Frieden 33 319 Jack Vromen 313 325 trade in service 264 271 276 277 296 297 Richard Fuerle 100 G high politics 92 93 133 317 Judith Goldstein 280 economies-of-scale 303 delay 288 Hugo Grotius 66 Joseph Grieco 10 11 19 59 317 Lloyd Gruber 160 ~ 162 289 public domain 163 international law 66 164 public goods 32 86 87 102 113 114 153 154 public choice theory 31 35 45 55 86 113 pooling 151 153 ~ 155 159 common government 65 82 isolationism 3 4 191 192 202 206 ~ 208 211 213 242 245 246 tariffs 3 5 92 93 125 160 161 166 259 260 274 278 280 ~ 287 289 290 301 tariffs reduction 286 Tariffs Union 93 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT 3 160 theory 7 12 14 324 rule 27 28 41 63 ~ 68 74 90 122 124 125 127 ~ 129 133 144 151 158 159 161 163 165 258 260 ~ 265 269 275 280 281 283 285 288 ~ 290 294 298 307 67 73 108 121 125 127

361 134 138 146 157 178 ~ 181 League of Nations 3 183 186 213 263 266 267 269 International Court of Justice ICJ 183 international convention 123 124 127 international cooperation 1 4 6 8 10 11 39 international society 57 59 88 94 102 116 142 143 151 153 158 175 177 185 211 291 IMF 3 ~ 5 128 151 158 167 261 278 international system 279 284 292 international regimes 7 ~ 12 19 20 32 36 120 ~ 185 267 310 324 325 theory of international regimes 9 formal regimes International 123 127 325 informal regimes 123 127 325 specific regimes 123 ~ 126 diffuse regimes international 123 5 160 228 international trade system 270 ~ 273 275 International Trade Organization ITO 3 260 261 263 266 271 281 284 ~ 288 296 4 5 12 20 64 66 67 72 73 103 107 126 133 140 146 152 156 159 178 ~ 180 266 316 9 11 46 64 65 68 69 79 80 95 108 138 166 197 211 308 315 125 127 132 144 175 177 International Criminal Court ICC 315 functional international administrative 150 160 union 149 Atomic Energy Agency IAEA 151 International Political Economy IPE 120 317 318 326 institutions 4 ~ 7 9 10 12 15

362 17 36 38 ~ 40 74 116 120 homogeneity of states 122 ~ 128 131 ~ 133 138 148 150 159 160 168 175 ~ 177 189 279 285 301 303 308 ~ 311 316 ~ 319 321 ~ 327 329 international organization 2 3 6 17 18 20 33 34 62 72 88 121 ~ 123 127 ~ 133 138 149 ~ 155 Helga Haftendorn 157 ~ 161 164 165 168 169 175 176 178 ~ 180 184 186 Andreas Hasenclever 188 196 238 239 259 261 263 264 266 270 288 296 Ernst Haas 13 14 21 300 302 ~ 304 308 311 315 318 326 formal interna- tional organization 17 121 Carl Hempel 307 122 127 ~ 133 138 149 ~ 153 155 157 ~ 160 164 168 169 179 186 188 196 238 239 261 263 270 304 308 311 315 318 280 284 179 national security 200 204 205 210 229 231 trade in goods 153 234 244 256 national interests 1 Thomas Hobbes 81 12 20 70 85 270 308 316 91 93 ~ 95 172 173 215 218 248 277 280 300 314 315 domestic society 64 67 73 nationalization 277 278 318 H 8 10 11 19 143 Keith Hartley 247 verification 148 149 167 reciprocity 5 132 139 141 ~ 143 145 146 163 260 280 284 298 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act RTAA Washington Paper 234 235 254 276 282 297 112

363 Peter Hall 30 69 Hans-Henrik Holm 70 Anthony Giddens 66 71 Aaron Hoffman 89 Malcolm Hoag 202 Jan Honig 212 Raymond Hopkins collective security 3 123 127 J opportunism 16 28 31 33 34 49 ~ 51 73 78 centralization 17 128 ~ 80 ~ 86 88 89 96 ~ 98 100 ~ 102 105 112 138 ~ 140 146 ~ 148 150 ~ 152 156 John Lewis Gaddis 194 159 162 168 ~ 170 188 189 202 210 262 289 308 311 Nancy Gallagher 148 320 327 regime management model 266 267 269 270 Robert Keohane 7 9 hypothesis 17 40 41 43 18 19 32 35 36 40 41 46 49 55 56 58 ~ 60 64 65 69 ~ 72 84 91 110 113 116 122 123 125 127 132 141 Alastair Iain Johnston 142 144 157 175 178 183 184 310 311 323 325 329 Henry Kissinger 86 113 118 136 143 181 183 190 206 249 108 Robert Gilpin 3 18 64 65 106 ~ 108 278 290 301 302 304 326 19 213 215 232 collective action 9 10 18 30 87 113 114 118 128 153 185 131 153 154 158 159 267 320 243 256 assumption 7 16 24 30 40 41 44 ~ 51 55 58 59 64 77 78 80 87 97 102 169 195 227 311 ~ 313 320 327 44 46 172 ~ 175 202 204 209 211 215 218 275 277 280 283 284 307 313 ~ 316 58 transaction 9 15 16 22 ~ 40 42 43 45 47 48 50 ~ 57 61 ~ 64 68 ~ 83 87 ~ 91 93

364 95 ~ 106 109 ~ 115 117 ~ 120 125 126 132 133 140 ~ 142 149 152 153 156 163 169 171 ~ 173 178 182 185 189 197 199 204 ~ 206 209 transaction frequency 247 266 ~ 268 270 272 275 277 282 284 299 300 302 303 309 ~ 315 321 322 324 transaction 325 329 transaction cost 16 John H. Jackson 17 22 25 26 28 ~ 36 38 ~ 40 42 43 47 48 50 54 56 73 ~ 81 89 ~ 91 114 115 Robert Jervis 103 104 125 171 185 189 199 267 270 284 309 ~ 311 313 314 John Jay 320 327 322 324 325 329 structured fo- interstate cused comparison 43 44 transaction cost 16 17 75 77 78 89 ~ 91 97 171 172 structural realism 189 199 311 ~ 314 321 322 in- Gary King trastate or transnational transaction cost 322 Charles Samuel Kim Kindleberg- Transaction er 101 102 118 274 Cost Economics TCE 23 26 28 36 37 43 47 313 325 Transaction- Cost Politics TCP ex ante transaction cost 76 77 90 114 115 ex post transaction cost 76 77 90 114 115 97 104 105 173 175 199 275 277 300 302 314 benefit 32 79 113 171 189 247 313 136 143 263 264 295 298 ~ 300 304 306 256 58 323 46 47 59 195 ~ 197 309 301 302 Kyoto Protocol KP 4 180 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

365 OECD 273 291 292 300 301 economic man 45 47 Economic and Jon Cauley 32 35 Monetary Union EMU 93 entangling alli- bureaucracy 26 123 ance 192 212 ~ 214 221 Old Institutional E- conomics OIE 24 47 51 63 313 absolute gain 8 11 balance of power 195 ~ 197 213 214 219 224 K Edward Karl 1 40 52 57 61 93 101 106 116 211 Gordon Craig 90 115 241 250 307 Peter Calvocoressi 211 241 250 252 John Croome 297 253 255 Miles Kahler 49 59 Lawrence Kap- oral agreement 2 127 lan 128 133 135 136 146 147 Peter Katzenstein Thomas Kuhn 323 329 328 George Kennan 219 221 Tjalling Koopmans 224 230 233 235 243 253 Mickey Kantor 297 John Commons 24 51 53 63 106 313 Tom Connally 210 236 237 245 246 Peter Cowhey 95 96 124 156 188 Ronald Coase 22 24 25 29 35 37 53 54 63 68 75 106 109 113 185 310 ~ 313 Coase theorem 35 310 Stephen Krasner 7 11 19 122 167 John Groenewegen 313 325 Barbara Koremenos 128 152 159 Paul Kennedy 198 248 262 281 Don Cook 227 238 100 fast-track procedure 283

366 L Armin Rappaport 192 Harold Lasswell 45 Bruce Russett 13 20 62 160 187 David Lake 34 82 107 Lijphart 43 188 189 196 201 270 Douglas Lemke 94 Quincy Wright 43 45 interests group 14 217 Christian Reus-Smit 124 ~ 126 132 Volker Rittberger 8 19 islands of theory 15 21 rationality 8 9 11 12 19 UN Environment 20 28 30 ~ 32 40 45 ~ 51 58 59 73 77 78 80 85 87 joint production 34 89 96 116 117 144 146 150 171 184 195 311 312 joint declarations 323 rational choice 30 alliance 3 5 ~ 7 12 13 32 rational 100 102 128 129 149 150 choice institutionalism 30 rationalism 11 12 complete rationality 28 48 49 59 312 bounded rationality 28 48 ~ 51 59 73 77 78 80 89 96 117 150 311 historical institutionalism 323 324 328 Gary Libecap 115 Charles Lipson 82 93 133 135 147 161 21 55 92 115 170 263 268 ~ 270 281 282 continuum 15 34 131 168 179 319 federation 12 15 21 86 132 166 211 243 250 251 285 302 319 320 327 Program UNEP 159 151 154 155 159 189 127 34 35 70 83 ~ 85 88 93 159 160 165 166 187 188 190 ~ 193 196 208 ~ 215 217 218 221 ~ 224 226 ~

367 230 240 246 250 259 276 281 286 301 324 alliance security dilemma 102 theory of alliance formation 7 12 13 324 formal alliance R. C. O. Matthews 42 13 193 222 memoranda 17 127 Scott Masten 313 325 133 224 226 ~ 228 230 234 Leon Lindberg 13 Protocol of Provisional 260 287 John Ruggie 7 12 19 122 124 176 184 185 264 Renato Ruggiero 264 path dependence 323 328 forum 2 5 131 179 238 interstate fo- 261 rum organization 179 Kristin Lord 95 David Rocke 181 Robert Lovett 223 228 229 232 233 254 255 M 149 150 184 311 Niccol Machiavelli 50 60 Giovanni Maggi 265 Marshall Plan 194 195 221 222 225 236 286 Lisa Martin 10 19 122 Paul Milgrom 152 301 76 Peter Mayer 8 19 Michael McGinnis 143 183 Application PPA trade protection- ism 259 262 263 271 274 286 Trade Stakeholder 269 270 Model 266 Organization for Trade Cooperation OTC STR 281 trade liberalization 18 33 36 262 265 271 274 278 281 285 286 288 289 291 301 303 Charles Merriam 45 USTR 282

368 John Mearsheimer 19 89 114 Bonald Mitchell 151 185 David Mitrany 13 nation-state 14 21 65 79 107 108 126 127 EU Commission 129 186 315 pattern matching 44 323 Final Act of the Conference Hans Morgenthau 45 58 59 66 73 108 326 327 Terry Moe 29 30 32 Andrew Moravcsik 157 322 James Morrow 102 tacit agreement 2 101 127 128 131 133 135 136 146 181 N Joseph Nye 13 247 327 Daniel Nielson 129 310 Michael Nicholson 41 adverse selection European Central 82 ~ 84 88 311 market for lemons 79 31 37 50 53 54 60 106 109 112 113 152 185 321 Douglass North 23 27 29 Pareto Optimal 39 327 North Paradox 112 129 165 O on Security and Cooperation in Europe 134 European Court of Justice ECJ 129 158 165 187 European Coal and Steel Community 164 165 251 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SHAPE 17 193 218 246 European Court of Human Rights ECHR 129 158 Bank ECB 70 166 315 P

369 88 abandonment 82 ~ 84 102 136 140 144 192 193 Alexander 202 205 ~ 207 212 214 237 312 322 Paul Pierson 328 preference 6 11 20 30 prisoners dilemma 48 50 72 78 90 100 156 power 3 8 ~ 11 14 36 170 198 218 268 269 281 308 John Pinder 165 187 188 301 Donald Puchala 123 125 127 Ernest H. Preeg 296 Q William Zimmerman 115 contract 17 25 26 29 cognitivism 8 11 12 30 33 34 43 49 ~ 52 54 56 58 74 77 81 ~ 83 90 91 93 Rudolf Richter 86 111 96 97 111 117 ~ 119 148 153 156 158 161 163 170 186 267 288 289 313 318 319 complete contract 49 incomplete contract law merchant 152 153 156 158 161 186 289 quasi-contractual issues 33 318 319 George 43 58 90 115 Masahiko Aoki 111 153 185 321 327 46 58 59 63 ~ 66 81 92 108 110 115 121 155 159 165 166 168 195 212 214 215 218 222 238 250 261 267 269 280 302 320 ~ 322 324 327 328 transferring rights 63 64 68 71 72 77 ~ 80 89 ~ 92 96 20 R 113 118 119 S Todd Sandler 32 35 247 agreed minutes 127 reputation 147 148 152 ~

370 154 156 163 reputational effect 147 152 156 reputational cost private information 148 Alan Schwartz 156 186 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Adam Smith 23 62 104 OPEC 6 122 161 217 World Trade Or- ganization WTO 4 17 44 70 129 157 160 Duncan Snidal 9 166 258 263 ~ 266 269 ~ 271 284 293 296 ~ 299 Harvey Starr 13 20 301 315 318 322 179 World Bank 3 5 20 ownership 63 189 153 154 158 179 261 278 Geoge Sorensen 69 ~ 284 world government 64 73 81 delegation 17 129 ~ 131 159 178 179 bilateralism 124 judicial procedure 266 288 294 judgement 157 267 294 private ordering 73 78 80 83 Joseph Stalin 193 194 215 225 226 243 106 119 World Health Or- ganization WHO 154 159 Susan Strange 120 Timothy Smith Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act Glenn Snyder 21 83 ~ 85 102 128 153 155 169 160 187 Arthur Stein 9 13 150 Joseph Strayer 107 71 T Robert Taft 207 214 Rosemary Taylor 30 Michael Taylor

371 101 Jack Donnelly 68 Anthony Downs 45 George Downs 181 Delian League 2 treaty 2 4 6 17 18 62 66 82 94 125 127 128 spill-over 13 14 32 40 133 ~ 135 137 138 146 ~ 149 151 152 162 164 ~ 166 Oliver Williamson 180 181 183 192 193 195 208 ~ 210 212 214 217 224 ~ 230 232 ~ 238 240 242 249 ~ 251 255 258 260 263 267 ~ 269 287 289 298 299 304 308 311 315 318 nonbinding treaties 127 treaty-relevant behavior 148 149 152 treaty organization Katja Weber 34 180 304 audience cost 96 transparency 91 95 96 173 174 199 280 281 283 Sidney Verba 41 300 314 315 322 team production 154 ~ 156 exit cost 98 escape clauses 161 187 Alexis de Tocqueville 198 248 W exogenous 103 104 204 211 319 shock 23 26 ~ 29 31 35 ~ 37 42 43 47 ~ 51 57 59 ~ 61 63 73 74 76 ~ 78 89 90 97 98 100 104 106 110 111 114 115 117 ~ 120 132 139 140 172 182 185 189 310 ~ 313 325 Michael Williams 81 Westphalian model 166 167 100 102 Steven Weber 328 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 105 principal-agent 30 85

372 Barry Weingast 30 31 50 60 152 321 Alexander Wendt 12 20 94 116 issue-linkage 139 142 ~ 147 170 183 positive linkage 144 145 negative linkage 144 145 issue-area 5 6 91 ~ 93 115 116 121 123 ~ 126 150 158 170 172 173 177 system effects 103 184 211 215 248 272 314 315 326 sensitivity for issue-area 91 92 172 173 entrapment 82 85 102 211 215 248 272 314 Kenneth Waltz 46 64 relative gain 8 11 168 188 195 196 247 309 324 325 Celeste Wallander 318 Suzanne Werner 94 The Uruguay Round 166 262 ~ 264 271 290 293 ~ 298 306 anarchy 8 64 65 neo-functionalism 67 73 81 82 121 125 131 266 309 324 137 142 167 168 183 186 New Classical Eco- X spiritual federation of the West 208 Western Union 209 210 217 224 226 240 250 Herbert Simon 28 48 59 60 Beth Simmons 122 John Hicherson 209 224 229 231 233 104 211 constitutionalism 50 80 92 112 134 191 202 211 295 65 99 106 107 118 167 pact of mutual guarantee 193 interdependence 6 9 14 21 32 70 71 99 105 110 115 297 322 complex interdependence 70 110 G. R. Shell 266 267 13 14 21

373 nomics 23 ~ 25 28 45 47 48 55 76 312 313 neorealism 8 10 19 46 58 59 64 65 310 317 318 New Institutional E- conomics NIE 22 23 25 27 28 31 32 35 37 38 40 formal / 45 47 53 ~ 55 57 58 63 69 74 75 111 113 118 119 Thucydides 2 3 18 163 175 182 247 321 323 327 neoliberal institutionalism 7 ~ 11 19 20 32 40 46 47 58 64 122 123 Robert 132 175 317 318 signals 95 102 103 137 APEC 5 179 204 206 208 209 273 275 credibility of signals 95 signaling information 9 16 25 28 31 36 49 ~ 51 75 ~ 80 82 ~ 85 89 ~ 91 95 100 102 103 112 115 ~ 117 128 136 148 ~ 153 155 156 159 162 163 170 184 185 226 267 276 282 311 322 324 326 102 117 156 311 information cost 76 77 80 112 170 322 incomplete information 49 executive agreements 127 131 133 287 299 legal institutionalism 121 asymmetric infor- mation 16 78 ~ 80 83 89 Matthew Evangelis- Y Beth Yarbrough 33 73 98 140 181 Yarbrough 73 98 140 181 Oran Young 176 325 329 single package 244 264 297 integration 7 12 ~ 14 20 21 34 43 62 92 ~ 94 121 132 156 158 164 166 180 187 188 211 239 240 246 251 266 274 276 290 291 297 315 316 322 324 326 John Ikenberry 321 David Easton 67 108

374 ta 115 hidden agreement 135 137 181 Efficient Market Model 266 268 ~ 270 expected benefits 78 139 142 145 146 159 Z Steven N. S. Cheung 23 76 111 dispute resolution 261 ~ 267 269 ~ 271 288 289 291 293 ~ 298 300 Dispute Settlement Procedure DSP 157 263 ~ 265 270 288 291 294 298 formalization 17 127 128 130 131 colonialism 33 34 36 278 318 319 327 institutional arrangement 1 ~ 7 11 12 15 ~ 17 institutional choice 27 ~ 29 39 49 57 74 105 125 ~ 128 130 ~ 133 159 177 179 189 197 198 261 310 313 315 321 328 international institutional arrangement 4 ~ 7 17 57 126 ~ 128 130 ~ 133 189 institutional change 11 15 23 37 53 54 106 109 113 185 323 degree of institutionalization 5 13 17 127 ~ 131 168 169 171 ~ 175 178 179 181 202 204 209 211 215 218 275 277 280 283 284 308 319 129 151 156 ~ 159 162 166 institutional environment 16 26 ~ 29 74 125 126 168 177 318 321 international institutional environment 126 168 institutional form 2 5 6 9 ~ 11 15 17 33 116 123 ~ 125 127 129 ~ 133 178 179 196 197 218 233 234 247 264 270 271 308 ~ 316 318 319 321 324 ~ 327 6 7 9 10 12 15 ~ 17 22 35 36 39 42 44 57 58 74 75 118 120 125 ~ 127 133 166 177 197 ~ 199 212 270 271 308 ~ 311 313 ~ 316 318 ~

375 324 327 check and balance 195 196 214 governance cost 16 17 26 34 77 90 96 ~ 98 105 114 138 148 150 151 169 171 ~ 175 189 199 248 300 310 314 319 interstate governance cost 16 17 77 90 96 97 105 138 148 169 171 ~ 175 199 248 300 314 governance structure 26 ~ 29 73 74 76 120 132 133 137 149 155 161 163 166 ~ 175 188 199 202 204 panels 166 264 ~ 266 209 211 215 218 248 275 277 280 283 284 313 314 agreements pursuant 319 international governance structure 149 166 168 ~ 175 188 199 202 204 209 211 215 218 248 275 277 280 283 284 313 neutrality 2 92 137 152 157 204 242 320 arbitration 70 117 129 149 153 157 163 186 320 Julius Katz 293 297 sovereignty 5 6 65 ~ 74 80 81 91 ~ 93 108 109 124 126 127 148 152 159 161 165 ~ 171 177 178 211 212 250 267 278 285 298 301 306 308 315 318 319 321 327 sovereignty costs 169 ~ 171 308 operational sovereignty 69 ~ 71 109 negative sovereignty 69 70 109 positive sovereignty 69 70 109 271 288 289 293 ~ 295 to legislation 127 asset specificity 26 35 97 ~ 100 117 173 174 199 200 202 248 271 314 319 322 site specificity 98 117 199 202 204 physical asset specificity 98 199 202 human asset specificity 98 ~ 100 199 200 202

376 state of nature 81 100 self-enfor- 195 229 cing formal agreement 17 longitudinal compari- 128 130 ~ 133 138 168 169 181 238 239 free trade 4 93 128 266 ~ 271 280 284 ~ 286 290 free trade agreements FTAs 128 self-help 80 81 95 137 sion 44 58 323 final communiqués 127 coordinate 171 319

378

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380! Asia-Link Programme 2003 University of Durham Dr. William Callahan University of Warwick Jonathan Goodwill Old Dominion University 2005 05JCGJW012 1994

381 2006 2 9