* 1 2 1 2 * 2009 5 2014 162 226
3 A 2015 000002 000048 600785 600749 ST 600732 A 000651 1993 9 A A 4 3 4 2008 438 2016 7 6 227
2017 3 5 6 7 8 1962 1985 663 9 5 6 7 8 9 2015 1 1998 437 2001 171 2 171 2013 524 228
瑏瑠 20 80 瑏瑡 瑏瑢 瑏瑣 瑏瑤 1914 1968 The Williams Act 1968 5 35 1982 20 80 1985 瑏瑠 瑏瑡 瑏瑢 瑏瑣 瑏瑤 1996 4 2001 2 See Ramseyer Takeovers in Japan Opportunism Ideology and Corporate Control 35 UCLA law Rev. 1 38-39 1987. 125 2005 10 2006 136 229
2017 3 1990 20% 18 1 26 瑏瑥 35 瑏瑦 2004 2004 /25 /EC 2004 2016 瑏瑧 2005 Livedoor 2005 NBS Unocal 瑏瑥 瑏瑦 瑏瑧 35 2000 3 1999 60-62 2012 280-281 230
2005 瑏瑨 5% 10% 瑏瑩 2006 瑏瑨 瑏瑩 2010 17-20 2015 1 2015 01 20 231
2017 3 瑐瑠 瑐瑡 6 瑐瑢 600749 ST 600732 000048 002628 86 75 75 000915 瑐瑠 瑐瑡 瑐瑢 5 2009 680 2016 237 232
2015 3 12 29 5% 2 96 瑐瑣 瑐瑤 2016 12 14 000048 86 75 瑐瑥 瑐瑣 瑐瑤 瑐瑥 2015 66 2000 295 2016 03 13834 233
2017 3 1986 13 D 5% 10 13 D 1975 Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 13 D 2009 145-147 145 147 445 20 147 1 3 4 2006 瑐瑦 2015 7 27 2 178 1 16 10% 瑐瑦 86 2016 9 234
瑐瑧 瑐瑨 瑐瑩 瑑瑠 瑐瑧 瑐瑨 瑐瑩 瑑瑠 2013 2 2005 14 1997 202 21 2005 131 235
2017 3 21 29 瑑瑡 瑑瑢 2004 瑑瑣 Unocal Revlon Blasius Unitrin 1985 30 瑑瑤 33 瑑瑡 瑑瑢 瑑瑣 瑑瑤 13 2004 296-298 2006 1 See Klaus J. Hopt Takeover Defenses in Europe A Comparative Theoretical and Policy Analysis 20 Columbia Journal of European Law 249 278 2014. 5 236
瑑瑥 8 1 8 2 2016 A 1 /3 2 /3 瑑瑦 1994 1 1 1997 7 1 310 IPO 40% 6% 24% 21% 瑑瑧 Listokin 瑑瑥 瑑瑦 瑑瑧 2010 286 See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner Do IPO Charters Maximize From Value Antitakeover Protection in IPOs 17 Journal of Law Economics and Organization 83 85 2001. 9 607-608 237
2017 3 瑑瑨 瑑瑩 瑒瑠 A 瑒瑡 瑒瑢 瑒瑣 瑑瑨 瑑瑩 瑒瑠 瑒瑡 瑒瑢 瑒瑣 See Yair Listokin What Do Corporate Default Rules and Memos Do An Empirical Examination 6 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 279 296-298 2009. 2007 301-302 See Luca Enriques Ronald J. Gilson & Alessio M. Pacces The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law with an Application to the European Union 4 Harvard Business Law Rev. 85 105 2014. 2016 8 27 2006 3 29 0132 143 2015 12 238
1. poison pill 1970 12 Martin Lipton 1 El Paso preferred shares 2 El Paso 3 4 Lipton 瑒瑤 2014 瑒瑤 71 2009 9 239
2017 3 瑒瑥 瑒瑦 瑒瑧 瑒瑨 2. 2 /3 600887 000998 603003 600038 270 10% 3. 53 77 96 瑒瑩 瑒瑥 瑒瑦 瑒瑧 瑒瑨 瑒瑩 2011 134 2015 122 2005 49-52 2013 9 53 15% 77 3 /4 96 240
瑓瑠 1998 3% 002407 101 97 09702112950 209 4. 1984 瑓瑡 瑓瑠 瑓瑡 2009 1 2007 2 3 411 241
2017 3 1993 9 20 2016 1. 2. 3. 瑓瑢 21 瑓瑣 瑓瑤 瑓瑢 瑓瑣 瑓瑤 瑏瑥 2016 479 2016 1 242
20% 瑓瑥 瑓瑦 瑓瑧 Abstract Hostile takeover for the control of a listed company can become a means of enhancing corporate governance or may serves as a tool to plunder the company s wealth. One of the key to avoiding disadvantages is that legislators provide fair rules of the game for the parties to follow and safeguard the rights and interests of stakeholders to ensure that listed companies continue to bear social liability. The regulation on the takeover of listed companies in China is relatively loose to hostile takeover which limits the development of activities against the takeover. The supervision of the disclosure of the rights and interests of the hostile takeovers should be strict rather than relaxed. In the future Chinese Corporate Law should consider the introduction of the authorized capital system and the category shares system the corporate governance will turn to the centralism of board of directors from the shareholder meeting centralism thus provides the legal space for the anti-takeover activity. Listed companies may provide a list of anti-takeover provisions to reduce the contract costs which aid to solve the legality problem of the judicial judgment anti-takeover provisions. 瑓瑥 瑓瑦 瑓瑧 2007 31 2016 12 12 18 瑏瑥 243