2018 9 510275 + 2025 Artificial Intelligence AI 1968 1989 43
2018 9 4 5 6 7 8 9 瑏瑠 1 1785 1781 2 Sachen 3 Mittel 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 瑏瑠 2012 10 25 2 < > 2012 2 1 2016 3 97 2003 45 2017 3 66 2013 4 64 2012 10 28 < > 2002 297 1987 1 < > 2002 31~ 32 44
2018 9 Personen Zwecke an sich selbst 瑏瑡 瑏瑢 瑏瑧 瑏瑣 niemals bloss als Mittel 瑏瑤 瑏瑥 瑏瑦 瑏瑡 瑏瑢 瑏瑣 瑏瑤 瑏瑥 瑏瑦 瑏瑧 2006 83~ 84 4 2005 436 2011 5 4 2005 437 1999 3 103~ 104 1999 73 2 1957 118~ 119 45
2018 9 AlphaGo 瑏瑩 瑐瑠 瑐瑡 瑏瑨 瑏瑨 瑏瑩 瑐瑠 瑐瑡 2016 7 14 2017 5 150 2018 1 131~ 132 2016 4 28 46
2018 9 瑐瑧 瑐瑨 瑐瑢 瑐瑣 瑐瑤 瑐瑩 瑑瑠 1900 瑐瑥 瑐瑦 瑐瑢 瑐瑣 瑐瑤 瑐瑥 瑐瑦 瑐瑧 瑐瑨 瑐瑩 瑑瑠 2017 5 157~ 162 2017 6 56 2017 6 145 2005 3 54 2008 3 14 2010 6 13~ 14 2008 3 11 2002 3 1987 71 47
2018 9 AlphaGo 瑑瑡 瑑瑢 瑑瑣 瑑瑡 瑑瑣 2016 5 28 瑑瑢 2016 4 153 2004 1 96 48
2018 9 瑑瑧 瑑瑤 瑑瑨 瑑瑥 瑑瑩 瑑瑦 瑑瑤 瑑瑥 瑑瑦 瑑瑧 瑑瑨 瑑瑩 2008 5 50 1998 3 73 Ⅱ 2013 92 2016 5 17 2010 6 3 6 2011 4 105 49
2018 9 瑒瑢 瑒瑣 瑒瑠 瑒瑤 1991 Feist 瑒瑥 2 瑒瑡 瑒瑠 2006 6 41 瑒瑡 瑒瑢 瑒瑣 瑒瑤 瑒瑥 2017 5 148 2017 5 137 2016 1 20 2005 83 2016 118~ 121 Feist Publications Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc 499 U.S. 1991. 50
2018 9 瑓瑡 Feist 瑓瑢 瑓瑣 瑒瑦 Bleistein 瑒瑧 1991 瑒瑨 Feist 瑓瑤 瑒瑩 瑓瑠 瑒瑦 瑒瑧 瑒瑨 瑒瑩 瑓瑠 瑓瑡 瑓瑢 瑓瑣 瑓瑤 2005 117 Bleistein v.donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 250 1903 Z. Feist Publications Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc 499 U.S. 1991. 1998 18 2005 83 2009 28 2017 1 2017 6 143 2017 5 151 51
2018 9 瑓瑦 瑓瑧 瑓瑨 Deep Dream 瑓瑩 11 3 瑓瑥 瑓瑥 2001. 瑓瑦 瑓瑧 瑓瑨 瑓瑩 Darin Glasser Copyrights in Computer - generated Works Whom If Anyone Do We Reward Duke L.&Tech. Rev.24 Evan H. Farr Copyrightability of Computer-Created Works 15 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L. J. 63 74 1989. 2017 3 8 Evan H. Farr Copyrightability of Computer-Created Works 15 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L. J. 63 79 1989. 2017 6 144 52
2018 9 2002 12 17 9 3 17 16 17 16 17 16 1 2 2 16 2 2 16 17 53
2018 9 Discussion on the Copyright of Artificial Intelligence Products under the Perspective of Kant s Philosophy Li Yang Li Xiaoyu Abstract From the point of view of Kant s philosophy of unified epistemology of subject and object and man is the purpose artificial intelligence can only be treated as object and tool used by human beings but not as the legal subject in equal status with human beings in any developing stages. On the basis of this artificial intelligence products should be seen as woks which human beings create by using artificial intelligence as a tool and their originality should be judged according to the stipulations of the constitutive requirements of works in existing copyright law. In the case that artificial intelligence products constitute works the ownership of copyright of products should be dealt with in accordance with the stipulations of it in the existing copyright law. Namely the copyright of artificial intelligence products normally belongs to the people who use the artificial intelligence to produce the works natural person or legal person or entity without legal personality and belongs to the employer or the commissioning party in exceptional cases. Keywords Kant s Philosophy artificial intelligence products subject qualification legal attributes right allocation 54