* 1 AIG 2 2008 2009 1 1934 402 S - K Regulation S - K Summary Compensation Table 1 2 * 2009 09YJA820095 2006 9 14 AIG 2009 3 18 117
2012 1 2 1993 162 100 100 3 1980 45 1995 160 2000 458 4 Edward Iacobucci 5 100 162 162 162 29% 14 1994 1995 9. 1% 14 2% 6 Rogers v. Hill 8 222 245. 82 10. 5% 1930 840 000 7 Heller v. Boylan Rogers Heller 8 3 4 5 6 7 8 See Nathan Knutt Executive Compensation Regulation Corporate America Heal Thyself Arizona Law Review Summer 2005 pp. 496-500. 3 507 See Iacobucci supra note 77 at 503-505. 3 506 See U. S. Supreme Court ROGERS v. HILL 289 U. S. at 584-586 1933. Heller v. Boylan 29 N. Y. S. 2d 653 660 Sup. Ct. 1941. Nathan Knutt Executive Compensation Regulation Corporate America Heal Thyself Arizona Law Review Summer 2005 p. 495. 118
9 瑏瑠 瑏瑡 9 瑏瑠 瑏瑡 2009 5 16 1999 201 2009 46 47 51 119
2012 1 瑏瑢 Robert J. Grossman 瑏瑣 2008 2009 瑏瑤 瑏瑥 Robert J. Grossman 瑏瑦 2009 0. 4 瑏瑧 瑏瑢 瑏瑣 瑏瑤 瑏瑥 瑏瑦 瑏瑧 瑏瑡 47-51 J Robert J. Grossman http / / ncm. cjol. com /view. asp InfoID = 31588 2009 1 25 2008 AIG 2008 2009 1 7 2008 2009 2007 3 瑏瑣 2009 5 120
瑏瑨 瑏瑩 瑐瑠 瑐瑡 瑐瑢 瑐瑣 2004 2009 2002 瑏瑨 瑏瑩 瑐瑠 瑐瑡 瑐瑢 瑐瑣 2009 5 2004 16 17 2005 2 2009 18 20 2009 2008 瑏瑨 瑏瑡 184 121
2012 1 29 瑐瑤 1 2 瑐瑥 瑐瑦 瑐瑤 瑐瑥 瑐瑦 2004 415 瑏瑡 189 38 100 122
27 瑐瑧 2002 2002 304 瑐瑨 Clawback Provision CEO CFO 2008 瑐瑩 2009 瑑瑠 瑑瑡 瑐瑧 瑐瑨 瑐瑩 瑑瑠 瑑瑡 2009 5 7 304 a 1 SEC 12 2 12 b SEC SEC a 2008 2002 304 304 Matthew A. Melone Adding Insult To Injury The Federal Income Tax Consequences Of The Clawback Of Executive Compensation Akron Tax Journal Volume 25 2010 pp. 67-68. 2008 20 瑏瑣 2010 1 1 2003 28 28 D E = C - /C 123
2012 1 瑑瑢 1 2008 2009 2 瑑瑣 65% 瑑瑤 Lucian Arye Bebchuk claw - back provision 瑑瑥 瑑瑦 1 瑑瑢 瑑瑣 瑑瑤 瑑瑥 瑑瑦 2009 4 2009 8 瑏瑣 2006 10 瑑瑢 124
瑑瑧 2 瑑瑨 瑑瑩 2009 2 瑒瑠 152 150 150 152 瑑瑧 瑑瑨 瑑瑩 瑒瑠 2009 6 2004 12 17 2008 39 2009 6 125
2012 1 瑒瑡 瑒瑢 100% 1 2 瑒瑡 瑒瑢 2006 1 126
3 瑒瑣 Rogers v. Hill 瑒瑤 瑒瑥 瑒瑦 瑒瑧 瑒瑨 Hall v. Staha 瑒瑩 瑒瑣 瑒瑤 瑒瑥 瑒瑦 瑒瑧 瑒瑨 瑒瑩 Anna Gercas Katie Sykes supra note308 at 504. 2008 1 134-135 Id. at 197. James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen supra note 97 at 231. 148 149 150 148 149 150 The rule is a presumption that in making a business decision the director of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company. Clark supra note221 pp. 123-124. ALI 401 C 1 2 3 瑒瑣 109 141 Michael A. Broyles Hall v. Staha Arkansas Courts Adopt the Business Judgment Rule as a Tool of Judicial Review and Analyze the Issue of Excessive Executive 47 Arkansas Law Review 1994 pp. 961-964. 127
2012 1 瑓瑠 Abstract The object of the legal regulation of senior executive pay in state - owned enterprises is not the pay level itself but the unreasonable pay the essence of which is the fact that it cannot reflect senior executives actual contribution and that the pay is not connected with the performance of enterprises. In China it is more difficult for unreasonable senior executive pay in state - owned enterprises to restore its reasonability through the effect of market per se and thus it is necessary to introduce legal regulation. Moreover the current situation of senior executive pay in state - owned enterprises in China needs immediate legal regulation. In order to safeguard the reasonable design of senior executive pay in state - owned enterprises and the set pay from losing reasonability independent pay committee system pay reviewed and decided by contributor representatives system and pay recovery system should be set up through legislation. Certainly making financial information of enterprises public and setting up scientific pay level formulation procedure are also the necessary contents of the legislation regulation of senior executive pay in state - owned enterprises. In addition another major way of the legal regulation of senior executive pay in state - owned enterprises is the judicial review of pay starting with litigation derived from contributor representatives. 瑓瑠 Henry Campbell Black Black s Law Dictionary 6 th ed. West Publish Co. 1990. p. 847. 128