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1 * : : : ; ; ; ; ; : ( 0009) 97 * ; ; (AsiaFoundation) (PhilanthropyNew York) ; 7 (StephenBosworth) 6 6

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19 0 7 ; (KevinG.Nealer) : : ( 0 )

20 : 008 : (FulbrightProgram) ; (InternationalVisitorsProgram) ; (EisenhowerFelowships) ; 0 0 (J.Adam Ereli)

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22 ABSTRACTS SemirechyewasamedievalTurkicdialectitwastheSyriaclanguagethatwasmainly usedinpreaching.howeversyriacwasnotthe mainstreamlanguageusedinthat region.christianswerewidespreadamonglocalfamilies.inadditiontomissionaries folowersofnestorianchristianityalsoincludedpeoplefromotherwalksoflifesuch as military oficials and teachers. During the Yuan Dynastythere was close communication between Christians at Semirechye and the Chinese hinterland reflectingtheirconnectionsandinteractions.steleinscriptionsfromsemirechyeareof academicsignificanceforthereestablishmentofthelocalhistoryofchristianityfora fulunderstandingof Yuan ChinaandofChristianityin CentralAsiaandforan understandingofculturalexchangesbetweenchinaandothercountries. (9)A Critical Moment:Chinathe United Statesandthe Worldinthe Eyesof AmericanElites Men Honghua 8 TheongoingworldwidetransformationtheefectsofChina sriseandgrowing anxietyoverthedeclineofthe UnitedStateshavebroughtUS-Chinarelationstoa criticalmoment.theorientationofthisrelationshipputstothetestthewisdomofthe elitesofbothcountries.thisstudyisbasedonstrategicconversations with authoritativeamericanfigureswithaviewtoexploringthewayamericanelitesview theunitedstateschinaus-chinarelationsaswelasthefutureoftheworld. ThemajorfindingisthattheUnitedStatesisfacingseverechalengesbothathome andabroad.inorderto maintainitsworldleadershipthecountryismaking major strategicadjustments with high priority given to stable growth at home and dominanceintheasia-pacificregion.itismovingitsstrategicfocusfrom Europeand the Atlantictothe Asia-Pacificandtargetingits Asia-Pacificstrategy on China strengtheningstrategiccontainment.onthebasisofasynthesisoftheproposalsof AmericanelitesourstudyproposesthatChinashouldadoptalong-termviewofUS- Chinarelations.Specificalywesuggest:aclearidentification ofthepowergap betweenchinaandtheunitedstatesandthepursuitofapeacefuldevelopmentpath; promoting mutualstrategictrusttoremove misunderstandingsand miscalculations betweenthetwocountries;acleardelineationofthebotomlineofnationalinterests preservingthestate scoreinterestsandexpandingcommoninterests;adoptingthe principle of seeking common ground while reserving diferences to handle the diferencesbetweenthetwocountries;giving prioritytotheconstruction ofsoft powerandstrengthening mechanismsforculturalexchangeswithforeigncountries; andestablishingascientificandcompletenationalstrategicsystemandstrengthening theconstructionofastrategicmarxisttheoreticalsystem. 07

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