2018 12 3 QuarterlyJournalofFinance Vol.12 No.3 2018 *,,,, ; GDP( GDP), ; 2000 2015,,,, 1978,, 1997 ( ), ( 1997 26 ), 2005,, (,2007a), 2002,, *, ;, ; :, 135 ;Email:qiuhp@mail2.sysu.edu.cn, :510275 (71774180),
3 : 133, 1,,, (,2008), (,2003),,,, (Yew Zhang,2009;2013),,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,, (Barr,2002;,2004),,,,, ;,,, 2 1,, 2,,
134 12,,,,, 2017 11,,,,,,,,,,,, :1 1997, ;2, ;3 :,,,,,,, (,2010a; 2010b),,,, (,2000;,2005); (,2001;,2004), (,2002;,2003;,2008),,,,
3 : 135,, (Leland, 1968), (Modigliani Taranteli,1975),Feldstein(1974),,,, Feldstein(1974) (Feldstein,1976;Bernheim Levin,1989;Hubbard Judd,1987;Atanasio Rohwedder,2003 ), Feldstein(1974),, (Leimer Richardson,1992;Gale,1998;Atanasio Brugiavini,2003 ),Bloom (2007) DeFreitas Martins(2014),, (2007b) (2008) (2010) (2013) (2013) (2013), (2012),, ; (2013),,, Lucas(1988) Romer (1990),, Becker (1990), ;,, (Cremer,2011 ),, (Zhang,1995)
136 12, (Yew Zhang,2009;2013) (,2007), (,2008;, 2015 ),,, ;,,,,,,,,, 2000 2015,, ( ), ;, ;,,, 1 Kaganovich Zilcha(1999) Omori(2009) (2010a), : 1, 2011,2013 12, 2015 10,
3 : 137 U t =lnc 1t +βlnc 2t+1 +n 1-ε t lnh t+1 (1),c 1t t,c 2t+1 t,n t t,h t+1 t+1, β,,ε >1, : h t+1 =q α th 1-α t, 0<α <1 (2),q t,α (2), : 烄 c 1t +n tq t +s t = ( 1-τ )w t h t 烅烆 c 2t+1 = ( 1+r t+1 )s t +T t+1 (3),s t,t t+1 : 1 c 1t =λ (4) β = λ (5) c 2t+1 1+r t+1 n -ε t α q t =λ (6),λ (4) (5) (6) : [ ] (7) c 1t = ( 1+α n 1-ε t +β ) -1 ( 1-τ )w t h t + T t+1 1+r t+1 [ ] (8) c 2t+1 =β ( 1+r t+1 )1+α n ( 1-ε t +β ) -1 ( 1-τ )w t h t + T t+1 1+r t+1 q t =α n -ε t [ ] (9) ( 1+α n 1-ε t +β ) -1 ( 1-τ )w t h t + T t+1 1+r t+1 ( ),
138 12 (Kaganovich Zilcha,1999;Omori,2009): Y t =A t K θ t ( h t N t ) 1-θ,0<θ <1 (10),Y t t,a t t,k t t,n t t,θ 1 (10), (10) : y t =A t k θ th 1-θ t (11) y t=y t /N t,k t=k t /N t, : w t h t =(1-θ)y t (12) 1+r t =θy t /k t (13) ( ) (11),,,, (7) (8) (9),, ( Wel), : Wel= ( 1-τ )w t h t + T t+1 (14) 1+r t+1 (14), (14) : Wel=w t h t + ( ) (15) T t+1 1+r t+1 -τw t h t (15), 1 Zhang Zhang(2007) Yew Zhang(2009) (2010a),
3 : 139, (Feldstein,1974),, tssw t, : s t = ( 1-τ )w t h t - ( 1+α n 1-ε t )1+α n ( 1-ε t +β ) -1 ( w t h t +tssw t ) (16) (12) t : s t ( = 1-τ )w t h t - ( 1+α n 1-ε t )1+α n ( 1-ε t +β ) -1 ( w t h t +tssw t ) y t y t (17) = ( 1-τ )1-θ ( )- ( 1+α n 1-ε t )1+α n ( 1-ε t +β ) -1 ( 1-θ+ssw t ),ssw t =tssw t /y t,(17), ( s t /y t )/ ssw t < 0 1 1: GDP, (2) (9) (12) : h t+1 = [ α n -ε t ( 1+α n 1-ε t +β ) -1 [( 1-θ )y t +tssw t ] α h 1-α (18) t (18), h t+1 / tssw t >0 2 2:,, (11) 1 2,, ;,, ( ) (17) (18) 1 2,, : sr it =γ 0 +γ 1 ssw it +γ 2fertility it +φ X it +u i +ε it (19)
140 12 huc it =δ 0 +δ 1 tssw it-1 +δ 2 wpopfty it +δ 3parahuc it +ψ Z it +u i +ε it (20), i,t,u i,ε it (19), sr ; sw GDP ; fertility ;X (20), huc ; tsw ; wpopfty ; parahuc ; rgdp GDP;Z,γ 1 <0,δ 1 >0 (2010a) (2013) (2016), (19) (20) GDP GDP ( ) 2000 2015 31 ( ),, 1- (,2010a);, 16 ;, 24, ; GDP GDP 1998 1, 1997, 2005, 2005, 2000 2015 Feldstein(1974) (2007a) (2008) (2010) (2015), 1998 1, 23~25, 24,, 15~49, 20~29, 20~29,,
3 : 141,,, (21) 1: 99 R-1 tssw it = pension t p t δ t - τ w t δ t (21) t=r t=s (21),S,R,δ,pension,w,τ,p, : 4% (,2010;,2008); (2010 2013);, 28%; 5%(,2007a) (21),, (20), GDP, (19) GDP (19) (20) : GDP, GDP 1999, ; ; ; ; (2013),, : T unexp it = Δlne it - Δlne it /T ( ) 2 t=1 T uninc it = Δlninc it - Δlninc it /T ( ) 2 t=1 (22),e,inc, 2 : 1,, 2 2005 38 2005 12 3, 2006, (2013), 1 2006 2000, 2011, 2014,, 1 2014
142 12 烄 reform2005= 0,t <2006 烄烅 ;popreform = 0,t <2014 烅烆 1,t 2006 烆 1,t 2014 (23) 1 1 sr 496 0.474 0.091 0.089 0.659 huc 496 0.085 0.061 0.008 0.423 GDP sw 496 16.680 7.761 6.636 57.680 ( ) tsw 496 3.593 1.955 0.987 10.380 fertility 496 0.012 0.003 0.005 0.021 death 496 0.060 0.007 0.042 0.080 GDP grgdp 496 1.105 0.027 1.026 1.236 GDP rgdp 496 2.019 1.501 0.271 8.820 wpopfty 496 0.019 0.004 0.007 0.030 parahuc 496 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.014 olddpr 496 0.120 0.026 0.063 0.219 penjoinr 496 0.676 0.196 0.119 1.408 unexp 496 0.005 0.023 0.000 0.436 uninc 496 0.003 0.020 0.000 0.405 GDP fisrat 496 0.215 0.167 0.069 1.346 socialfisr 496 0.111 0.040 0.023 0.255 educfisr 496 0.160 0.028 0.056 0.345 urrat 496 2.964 0.632 1.845 5.605 urbliz 496 0.480 0.155 0.191 0.942 1, GDP 1 GDP, 2 1 2, GDP, 1 2, 3 4 GDP GDP,
3 : 143 1~ 4, 1 2 3 GDP
144 12 4 GDP ( ), GDP, GDP, 2 (1) GDP, GDP, 0.13%; 1, 0.75% 2 ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ssw fertility death grgdp -0.0013 ** -0.0024 *** -0.0066 *** -0.0023 *** -0.0021 *** -0.0060 *** (-2.12) (-3.71) (-7.04) (-2.99) (-3.01) (-5.74) -7.5475 *** -7.1753 *** -7.0290 *** -5.5914 ** -6.6548 *** -6.7348 *** (-3.41) (-3.39) (-3.44) (-2.37) (-2.99) (-3.16) 2.3236 *** 0.992 1.1553 * 1.8251 ** 1.5793 ** 1.5129 ** (3.41) (1.47) (1.78) (2.45) (2.28) (2.46) 0.9217 *** 0.7618 *** 0.5659 *** 1.5065 *** 1.2954 *** 1.0975 *** (8.82) (7.44) (4.96) (10.04) (7.58) (4.94)
3 : 145 ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) penjoinr -0.0138-0.0143-0.00740-0.0377 * -0.0252-0.0171 (-0.61) (-0.69) (-0.33) (-1.72) (-1.20) (-0.81) socialfisr(-1) -0.2033* -0.2060 * -0.168-0.3379 *** -0.2958 ** -0.153 (-1.80) (-1.95) (-1.51) (-2.74) (-2.31) (-1.13) reform2005 popreform olddpr unexp uninc fisrat educfisr(-1) urrat urbliz cons 0.0709 *** 0.0728 *** 0.0773 *** 0.0715 *** (11.44) (9.60) (12.32) (7.60) -0.000200-0.0169 ** 0.0142-0.00300 (-0.02) (-2.09) (1.54) (-0.33) 0.7384 *** 0.7460 *** 0.4658 *** 0.5204 *** (4.88) (4.50) (3.09) (3.33) -0.260-0.254 0.848 0.457 (-0.68) (-0.68) (1.39) (0.72) -0.542-0.495-1.5886 ** -1.1818* (-1.28) (-1.20) (-2.35) (-1.68) -0.2812 *** -0.3366 *** -0.2822 *** -0.3379 *** (-5.65) (-6.66) (-3.51) (-3.92) -0.2099 * -0.112-0.124-0.0767 (-1.67) (-0.88) (-0.72) (-0.60) -0.00880 0.00900-0.0136 0.00840 (-0.89) (0.88) (-1.18) (0.64) 0.1209 *** 0.0483 0.2184 *** 0.1813 ** (2.72) (0.97) (3.78) (2.33) -0.5780 *** -0.3296 *** -0.0797 (-4.65) (-2.69) (-0.60) R 2 0.444 0.554 0.615 0.454 0.550 0.609 Hansen p 0.6989 0.3637 0.5547 :*** ** * 1% 5% 10%, t,, (3) (6) ; (4) (5) GDP GMM, GDP, HansenJ p, 2 (1), 2 (2) (3) (1), GDP, GDP,,
146 12 (3),,,, GDP, 2 (4)~(6), GDP GDP 1 2 (1)~ (3),, 2 (1)~(6), GDP, GDP,, 2;,,,, ; GDP,,, ;,,,, (,2013) ( ) (20) 3, GDP,, 3 (1),, 1,16 7.3 ; ;, 1,16 1 (2010a), 16, 2 Hansen p, 2 (4)~(6) 2 (2010)
3 : 147 9.13 3 (2) (3) GDP,,, ;, (1),, (3), GDP,, ;,,, 16, 3,,, 3 ( ) (1) (2) (3) tsw(-1) wpopfty parahuc rgdp(-1) penjoinr educfisr(-1) 0.0073 *** 0.0042 *** 0.0112 *** (5.46) (2.77) (5.40) 0.367 0.239 0.0652 (1.54) (0.99) (0.27) 9.1321 *** 12.2128 *** 10.4138 *** (6.13) (7.54) (6.22) 0.0152 *** 0.0156 *** 0.0083 *** (8.91) (8.78) (4.30) 0.0102 0.00650 0.00730 (1.49) (0.92) (1.00) -0.0415-0.00650-0.00250 (-1.01) (-0.16) (-0.06) reform 2007-0.00450 (-1.46) -0.0120 *** (-3.56)
148 12 ( ) (1) (2) (3) popreform olddpr 0.0085 *** 0.00220 (3.49) (0.82) 0.0158 0.1290 ** (0.32) (2.31) death -0.0109 (-0.05) -0.0265 (-0.13) fisrat socialfisr(-1) urrat urbliz 0.0521 *** 0.0253 (2.84) (1.29) 0.0347 0.0530 (0.97) (1.52) -0.0057 * 0.00220 (-1.71) (0.63) 0.0907 *** 0.0474 ** (4.95) (2.42) unempt -0.112 (-0.59) -0.222 (-1.23) cons 0.00800-0.0227-0.0285 (0.83) (-1.11) (-1.35) R 2 0.838 0.855 0.887 : (3) ( ), :1 Ehrlich Kim(2007) (2007) (2013), ;2, 22 1 4 5 1 22, 22,
3 : 149 4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) penexp fertility death grgdp penjoinr -0.0218 *** -0.0236 *** -0.0274 *** -0.0178 *** -0.0180 *** -0.0210 *** (-4.52) (-5.31) (-5.76) (-3.43) (-3.95) (-4.30) -7.9869 *** -7.4131 *** -8.2690 *** -6.9316 *** -7.0335 *** -8.1147 *** (-3.78) (-3.59) (-4.02) (-3.01) (-3.29) (-3.59) 2.6381 *** 1.4720 ** 1.6319 ** 2.2319 *** 1.7669 *** 1.6926 *** (3.96) (2.27) (2.48) (3.26) (2.76) (2.73) 0.8569 *** 0.6780 *** 0.6065 *** 1.4480 *** 1.1780 *** 1.2834 *** (8.25) (6.63) (5.25) (9.72) (6.77) (5.86) 0 0.000900 0.0142-0.0310-0.0137-0.00610 (0.00) (0.04) (0.61) (-1.37) (-0.64) (-0.27) socialfisr(-1) -0.2851** -0.2628 ** -0.161-0.4358 *** -0.3347 *** -0.172 (-2.54) (-2.50) (-1.43) (-3.71) (-2.78) (-1.25) reform 2005 popreform olddpr unexp uninc fisrat educfisr(-1) urrat urbliz cons 0.0847 *** 0.0826 *** 0.0923 *** 0.0766 *** (13.52) (10.77) (14.54) (8.45) 0.0214 *** 0.00250 0.0350 *** 0.00820 (2.60) (0.29) (3.97) (0.91) 0.8104 *** 0.9661 *** 0.5401 *** 0.6692 *** (5.40) (5.67) (3.66) (4.28) -0.173-0.210 0.917 0.562 (-0.46) (-0.55) (1.61) (0.92) -0.560-0.511-1.5854 ** -1.2750 * (-1.35) (-1.22) (-2.48) (-1.90) -0.2382 *** -0.2654 *** -0.2264 *** -0.2952 *** (-4.95) (-5.32) (-2.64) (-3.38) -0.2040 * -0.192-0.135-0.150 (-1.65) (-1.49) (-0.85) (-1.05) -0.0196 ** -0.00790-0.0241 ** -0.0109 (-2.13) (-0.79) (-2.12) (-0.82) 0.1500 *** 0.0470 0.2553 *** 0.1733 ** (3.44) (0.93) (4.48) (2.34) -0.4937 *** -0.2527 ** -0.177 (-3.98) (-2.07) (-1.33) R 2 0.462 0.567 0.602 0.466 0.571 0.580 Hansen p 0.1975 0.1421 0.5426 : (3) (6) ; (4) (5) GDP GMM, GDP, HansenJ p penexp, GDP (Ehrlich Kim,2007;,2007)
150 12 4, 1,,, 5 (1)~(3),,, (4)~(6) 22,, 5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) tssw(-1) 0.0072 *** 0.0041 *** 0.0098 *** (5.35) (2.84) (5.06) ppenexp(-1) wpopfty 0.0258*** 0.0230 *** 0.0189 *** (8.95) (6.02) (5.63) 0.111 0.143 0.198 (0.49) (0.62) (0.85) wpopfty2 parahuc rgdp(-1) penjoinr 0.106 0.0934-0.0539 (0.38) (0.34) (-0.21) 12.5828 *** 13.2189 *** 12.9221 *** 9.2243 *** 12.1685 *** 11.1449 *** (9.54) (9.52) (9.29) (6.19) (7.71) (7.08) 0.0127 *** 0.0123 *** 0.0116 *** 0.0156 *** 0.0163 *** 0.0079 *** (7.98) (6.88) (6.48) (9.05) (9.21) (4.11) 0.00470 0.00120 0.00330 0.00880 0.00670 0.00750 (0.72) (0.18) (0.48) (1.30) (0.96) (1.04) educfisr(-1) -0.0639-0.0419-0.0670* -0.0463-0.00660-0.0114 (-1.63) (-1.03) (-1.72) (-1.13) (-0.16) (-0.29) reform 2005 popreform cons -0.0051** -0.0089 *** -0.00480-0.0101 *** (-2.04) (-3.15) (-1.48) (-2.92) 0.00420-0.0051 * 0.0086 *** 0.00360 (-1.50) (-1.72) (3.46) (1.31) 0.00940-0.0180-0.0003 0.0146-0.0222-0.0267 (1.02) (-0.95) (-0.02) (1.42) (-1.13) (-1.37) 1,, GDP,,
3 : 151 ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) R 2 0.832 0.852 0.879 0.839 0.851 0.885 : (3) (6),ppenexp, wpopfty2 22,,,,,,,,, 2000 2015 31,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
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