98 Abstract A Reinvestigation on How Wang and Zhang Came Into Conflict (1932) Mei-hwa Chou * In the early August of 1932, Prime Minister Wang Ching-we

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2 98 Abstract A Reinvestigation on How Wang and Zhang Came Into Conflict (1932) Mei-hwa Chou * In the early August of 1932, Prime Minister Wang Ching-wei( ) suddenly telegrammed to request a resignation and also asked Zhang Xue-liang( ) to resign his post too accusing Zhang of "drawing together his crowds in the false name of national defense." Because of this incident, all the administrative officials of the Executive Yuan resigned as Zhang and Wang scolding each other. At that time, the political storm among the military and political circles began to shape. The discussion of this very problem in the past focused on why Wang initiated the political turbulence and why Zhang was selected as the target of attack. The analysis of this problem such way had a clear premise while the focus was on the power struggle between Chiang kai-shek( ) and Wang, taking Zhang as a "bull's eye" of the confrontation between Chiang and Wang. As a matter of fact, "power struggle" is by no means the only criterion to measure the root of this problem. Of recent years, some scholars proposed that we should not ignore Wang's earnest and urgent attitude on "issues toward Japan." This alternative analysis presented another perspective that helped clarify the root of this problem. But this argument still seemed inadequate in explaining how the event went along and what hidden implication the event had. This paper on the one hand discusses the problems presented on the telegrams where Wang and Zhang attacked each other, studies the current research arguments in question, and makes use of the relevant historical documents available in Academia Historica, including "The Chiang Kai-shek Collections" and "The Yen Hsi-shan Collections". By analyzing Wang's ideas and attitudes toward the political situations at that time and by understanding the basic ideology that hid behind the Trio's fighting against the Japanese invasion, we discover that all the three political figures actually stand in the same positions: they hope China could fight against the Japanese imperialism. What makes them different is when and how China should respond with wars since the three individuals have their own * Assistant Researcher, Academia Historica

3 99 base of benefits. Wang, who takes responsibility in politics and has to face pressure from the press, is liable to have "unconditional fighting back": no matter whether China is well prepared or whether the war could be won or lost, the first principle is to fight back the Japanese in no time. Zhang, who stands in the position of the Northeastern army, asks to have a "all set fighting": the Chinese try best to avoid any battles with the Japanese unless the Central Government is well-prepared and highly determined. He does not want the Northeastern army fighting along in the wars. Basically this different viewpoint results in the conflict between Wang and Zhang: one believes that the war is urgent and immediate while the other insists on delaying it. At the same time, Chiang who takes into account the huge gap in national power between China and Japan, and who expresses fear on the fast progress of the Communist Army, believes that the Chinese are "not able to fight against external invasion unless we can have domestic problems settled and the whole nation gets internally united." So the priority for Chiang lies in "having domestic problems settled" and his attitude toward Japan is therefore: "get ourselves prepared and wait." Thus, Chiang's response to the conflict between Wang and Zhang remains to be: "keep the current situations and ensure a stable political environments", in order to complete the sacred mission to eliminate the Communist army and to get prepared for the war by making a request that Zhang drives his force to Rehe( ). This way, the Trio obviously have a conflict of interests and have disharmonious steps in facing the Japanese invasion without being willing to negotiate the related problems openly. Since they are doubtful of each other, the unfortunate event thus happened. Key words: Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei, Zhang Xue-liang, Fighting Against the Japanese Invasion, Defense Issues in Rehe

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202 The Sending Back of The Japanese People in Taiwan in The Beginning Years After the World War II Abstract Su-ying Ou* In August 1945, Japan lost th

201 1945 8 1945 202 The Sending Back of The Japanese People in Taiwan in The Beginning Years After the World War II Abstract Su-ying Ou* In August 1945, Japan lost the war and had to retreat from Taiwan.