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1 Ultimate Control Ownership Structures Earnings Conservatism and Firm s Credit Ratings 金隆 Chen Lung Chin 立 National Chengchi University 林 Mei-Feng Lin 立 National Taiwan University *Correspondence 林立北羅福路理館 7F d @ntu.edu.tw TEL

2 Ultimate Control Ownership Structures Earnings Conservatism and Firm s Credit Ratings 度不金流量離度數 Beaver and Ryan (2000) Givoly and Hayn (2000) 量 Basu (1997) 度說金流量離度力利弄數不易狀 ( ) ( ) 了力說 ( 列 ) 度理 Abstract The primary objective of this study is to examine the association between the ownership structure of Taiwanese firms, measured by the divergence between the ultimate owner s control and the equity ownership level, and the extent to which firms adopt conservative accounting. Secondly, we also examine whether firms with use of more conservative accounting benefit from higher credit ratings compared to firms with adoption of more aggressive accounting. Following the models by Beaver and Ryan (2000), Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Basu (1997), we document that firms tend to adopt less conservative accounting in the presence of the greater divergence between the ultimate owner s control and the equity ownership level, as predicted. Furthermore, we also find that credit ratings are positively associated with the extent to which firms use conservative accounting. Our findings provide strong support for the notion that ultimate corporate ownership structure is a central factor in determining the quality of Taiwanese forms earnings in term of incorporating bad news on a timely basis, and conservative accounting plays a central role in enhancing higher credit ratings. Keywords Corporate governance, earning conservatism, credit ratings 1

3 (conservatism) 來利益不 (Watts 1993) 例 Ahmed et al. (2002) 利利益降理來利 (Fan and Wong 2002, 2005) 力來 (Leuz et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2005) 理 ( 利益 ) 說 (1) 金流量理 (2) ( ) Claessens et al. (2000) ( 金流量 ) ( ) 離金金流量離 Yeh and Lee (2001) La Porta et al. (1999) 離 (e.g. Claessens et al. 2000, 2002; La Porta et al. 2002; Fan and Wong 2002) 金流量離理年來 1 離度例 Fan and Wong (2002) 離金流量利利益來易匿降露連 Leuz et al. (2003) 理弄匿不利列列降留匿列 (net asset) 1 例 (Claessens et al Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 2002 Lemmon and Lins 2003 Lins 2003) (Joh 2004; Chang 2003 易 ( 葉李 2003) (Fan and Wong 2002 Jung and Kwon 2002) (Leuz et al 2003) 2

4 契理論留 (hidden reserve) 利利益良 (Beekes et al. 2004) ( ) La Porta et al. (1999) Claessens et al. (2000) 念離金流量度來量力金流量離金流量度金流量率來量金流量率力金流量離度利益易狀列量來說 Beaver and Ryan (2000) Givoly and Hayn (2000) 量 Basu (1997) Beaver and Ryan (2000) 了度 Givoly and Hayn (2000) 量不累數金流量金累數零 Basu (1997) ( 率量 ) 列露聯 2 ( 率量 ) 益列聯說金流量 ( 理 ) ( 利 ) 說立 2 立列聯來列聯 (Basu 1997 ) 3

5 列理 ( 金流量離度 ) 理理理理 Beekes et al. (2004) (common law) - 率 (civil law) - 金流量離度列行不不理度了降不率立數 (TEJ) (TCRI) 行 TEJ TCRI 離理說說說論說 Beekes et al. (2004) (timeliness) 率列都 (La Porta et al. 1998) 不理不理 (perquisites) 易 2002 ( ) 立立立數立都不度 ( 2004) 立度年不不 4

6 立度離不理度異說離金流量 (Claessens et al Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003 La Porta et al. 1999) 露 (Fan and Wong 2002; Leuz et al 2003 來律行來 (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Leuz et al. 2003) 行不利利益量來易 (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Fan and Wong 2002; Leuz et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2005) 列 ( 例 ) (Watts, 2003a 金流量離利益列說 H1a 理度 ( 離度 ) 理 Basu (1997) Pope and Walker (1999) Ball et al. (2000) 量列 Beekes et al. (2004) 率理金流量離度利益力離度說 H1b 不離度說了力見 3 Watt (2003a) 念 5

7 理理狀 (FitchRatings 2004) Ashbaugh, Collins, and LaFond (2004) 理 (Corporate Governance Scoring, G-Score) 4 理理理行理行降不理 S&P 說契理論 (contract theory) 例契數數 5 (Leftwich, 1983) (hidden reverse) 不利 ( 利 ) 降 (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts 2003a 契 Watts 2003a Ahmed et al. (2002) 降率契契理論契 (compensation contract) 理行惡降 (political costs ) 例易更降降 (Watts 2003a, 2003b; Watts and Zimmerman 1986 利益都更論立說 H2 不 ( (TCRI) ) 參 4 G-Score 數力 (Ownership Structure and Influence) 利利 (Financial Stakeholder Rights and Relations) 度露 (Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure) (Board Structure and Processes) 5 例 (Leftwich 1983) 6

8 數量數離度量說 ( ) 量益益金流量列 (Beaver and Ryan 2000) (Givoly and Hayn 2000) 量數數 Basu (1997) 來量 (timeliness) 說量 (CONMKT) Beaver and Ryan (2000) 益 (book-to-market ratio) 列列異量數 Beaver and Ryan (2000) Ahmed et al. (2000) BTM it, t i k t ki, ti, k = 0 6 = α + α + α + β RET + ε (1) BTM it = i t 年益 (book-to-market ratio) α = - 年數 α = i 益 α i t = t 年益 RTM it = i t 年 Beaver and Ryan (2000) Ahmed et al. (2000) fixed firm and time effect (1) panel 料六年數 αi 不 CONMKT= α i ( 1) CONMKT 量 (CONACC) Givoly and Hayn (2000) Givoly and Hayn (2000) Ahmed et al. 7

9 (2000) 了數 (TA)=( 利 + - 金流量 )/ 數 CONACC=TA*(-1) CONACC CONACC 流流金利理行量列金例 (Givoly and Hayn 2000) 說 CONACC 數 (conservatism) 率率 (timeliness) 度 (Beekes et al. 2004) 都 (Bushman et al. 2000) Basu (1997) 利領來列不來利列不 Basu (1997) / 量 Et / P = t 1 β + 0 β1ret + β2neg + β3neg RET + ε (2) E t Pt 1 = 益益 RET = 率 (fiscal year returns) 曆年例率 NEG = 數若 RET<0 NEG=1 0 數 (NEG) 數 (RET) (NEG*RET) 量 RET 來 (2) 量 1. β3 度 β 3 2. ( β 1 + β 3 ) β 1 量率 1 3. (2) ( ) ( ) 力 8

10 R 2 R 2 率 1 連連 ( ) 理數離度參理理 (Claessens et al.2002; La Porta et al. 2002) 金力離金流量離度力 (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2002) 利益離行量離 (DEV) 數 6 1. 金流量離度 (DIFF= 金流量 ) 2. 金流量率 (CV= 金流量 ) 金流量金流量金流量率 (CV) 利益力 CV 數離金流量 DIFF 了匿不行利益不 DIFF 數力離金流量度了利行 ( 葉 2002) 率 (CBOARD= ) 7 來量參理度率數 6. 離數離金流量 (DIFF>0 CV<1) DEV=1 0 (Du and Dai. 2005; Fan and Wong 2005) 數來量離離不 7 La Porta et al. (1999) Claessens et al. (2000) 金流量 9

11 益 214 年行數 8 不行 (Yeh et al. 2001) 若 ( ) 降數量若年 5% BLOCK 1 0 ( ) (TCRI) TCRI 料來行料行料不易料料 TCRI ( ) 數 TCRI 年行金行 9 參 TCRI TCRI 量力 (APL) 10 讀年 % 年 5% 數 3% 了見 5% 了列兩 : (1)87-90 年 5% 年 3% (2) 令 90 年年 87~89 年 5% 年 3% 5% 更更 (biased against rejecting the null hypothesis) 更 (biased towards rejecting the null hypothesis) 更 (robustness) 列 9 例來料 Basel 塞行 93 年料 TCRI ( 2004) 10 力 (APL) 力 Assets Management (A): 度金 Profitability (P): 率利 Liquidity (L): 金玲

12 量 TCRI 量理 Ahmed et al. (2002) 降率 H1a 離度來 COV = β + β DEV + β BLOCK + β CBOARD + β LEV + β ROA β SIZE + β SGROWTH + ε 6 7 (3) COV DEV BLOCK CBOARD LEV ROA SIZE SGROWTH = 量 CONMKT 量數 (1) -αi CONACC 量數 (( 利 + - 金流量 )/ ) 1 = 離度 DIFF= 金流量 CV= 金流量來量 = 若年 5% 1 0 = 率 = = 率利 = 數 = 率說 H1a 離度 DIFF 數 CV 數 (3) 數利力 (Ahmed et al. 2000) 利力 (ROA ) (Watts and Zimmerman 1978 ; Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981) 率利益降理 (Watts and Zimmerman 1978) 了利力 (ROA) (SIZE) 率 (LEV) 11

13 數例 CONACC CONMKT 來 (Ahmed et al. 2000; Dechow and Sloan 1997) Basu (1997) 來離 DEV 數 DEV 量 DIFF(CV) ( ) 數 DEV 1 0 數 Basu 數來 H1b 離 Et / Pt 1 = β 0 + β1ret + β2neg + β3neg RET + β4dev + β5neg DEV + β DEV RET + β NEG DEV RET + β CBOARD + β NEG CBOARD β CBOARD RET + β NEG CBOARD RET + β BLOCK β NEG BLOCK + β BLOCK RET + β NEG BLOCK RET + ε (4) Et / Pt 1 = 益益 RET = 率 (fiscal year returns) 曆年例率 NEG = 數若 RET<0 NEG=1 0 DEV = 離度 DIFF ( CV) 數 ( ) 數令 1 0 數來金流量離列 CBOARD = 率數數令 1 0 BLOCK = 若 1 0 離度不度異 DEV 1 金流量離度力度 (timeliness) β 7 數率參理度力便匿不行率列 β 11 數 12

14 β 15 數說異 Order logit 來說 TCRI = β + β COV + β LEV + β ROA + β SIZE + β LOSS + β OI _ INT β FA _ INTEN + ε 7 (5) TCRI = (Taiwan Corporate Credit Risk Index) 度 5 6 度 7 9 度 D D 量 10 D COV = 量 LEV = 率 ROA = 利 SIZE = 數 LOSS = 若利 1 0 OI_INT = 利利 FA_INTEN = Ashbaugh et al. (2004) 了利良 OI_INT FA_INTEN (TCRI) (LOSS) 率 (LEV) 料來 1998 年 2003 年曆年料來 1. La Porta et al. (1999) Claessens et al. (2000) 金流量利說年理料兩易來金流量 13

15 2. 料 (TEJ) 料料 ( ) 料 (TCRI) 料 1998 年 2003 年曆年列 (1) 料 (2) 數年六年料不年 (3) 金數量 CONMKT CONACC 量 CONMKT CONACC 量 (CONMKT) 量 (CONACC) 數離金流量度 (DIFF) 10.34% 數 6.5% 金流量率 (CV) 60.31% 數 67.57% 離度行例 (CBOARD) 35.74%( 數 33.33%) (46.49%) 5% (BLOCK) 率 13.03% 率 % ( 1356 ) 率 14.5% 14.18% 年年度 (55.76%) 數數列數 Pearson 數 Spearman (TCRI) 5.19 度 [ 1] 2 (TEJ) (TCRI) 類 TEJ TCRI 1-4 利金不度 234 (41.05%) 類 TCRI 5-6 利不利不力略度 TEJ 31.4% 類若 TCRI 14

16 7 流益兩度 22.81% 類 TCRI D (Default) ( 玲 2004) 4.74% 類 D 量 10 行 order logit TCRI D [ 2] 3 數數 Spearman 數 Pearson 數 Panel A 說數量離度數 (DIFF CV) 量數 (CONMKT) 數量 (CONACC) 不數 Panel B 說數數數度 (CONMKT CONACC) 數數數 Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 都 2 數不 [ 3] 說 1. 量 4 H1a Panel A 量 (CONMKT) 數 1 3 金流量異 (DIFF) 數數離度利益來不易不金流量異 2 4 金流量率 (CV) 數 CV 離度數 3 4 了率 (CBOARD) 15

17 5% 數 (BLOCK) 理了利行率不數不了益年 5% ( 2001 年 3%) 5% 行 CONMKT 不 Panel B 率 (CBOARD) 量不 Panel A 數率 (LEV) 率利益了降契數數都率不 Ahmed et al. (2002) Panel B 量 (CONACC) 數 H1a 量離度數 (DIFF CV) 都離度 Panel B ROA 利 SIZE 數 SGROWTH 數降 CONACC 4 離度不量 (CONMKT CONACC) 都 [ 4] 2. / (4) 列 5 來 H1b 離 5 1 Basu (1997) 來 RET 數 (NEG *RET) 2 金流量異 (DIFF) 數 DEV=1 0 數數 β 7 數 (NEG* RET 16

18 *DEV) 離金流量度列 2 β 3 β 7 數離金流量度數 [( )/ =2.18] 離金流量度數金流量率 (CV) 數 DEV=1 0 數數 β 7 數 (NEG* RET *DCV) 金流量率離度列 4 β 3 β 7 數金流量率數 [( )/ =6.92] 金流量率數了離度數了率數數數 Basu 數離度 (DEV) 量 3 金流量 (DIFF) 數令 DEV 金流量率 (CV) 數 DEV=1 0 β 7 數 (NEG* RET *DEV) 不量離度離度列離度數 [( )/ =2.87 ( )/0.0624=2.79] 離度數 2.8~2.9 率 β11 5 數率數 (CBOARD=1) 力利益列率數率數 ~ [( )/0.0665=-0.45 ( )/0.0624=-0.50] 5 5% (BLOCK=1) 列 β 15 數 Yeh et al. (2001) 行 5.58 ~ 6.33 [( )/0.0665=5.58 ( )/0.0624=6.33] 17

19 [ 5] 異 Order Logit 行 6 Panel A 數 (TCRI) D TCRI D Panel B TCRI D (Default) 數 (TCRI) TCRI 不 6 量 (CONMKT) 量 (CONACC) 數了度 (FA_INTEN) 率 (LEV) 年度年度 (LOSS) 利力 (ROA) (SIZE) 利利 2 (OI_INT) Likelihood ratio χ % Pseudo-R % 28.34% 力 Panel B CONMKT CONACC 不 [ 6] Panel 料異理量 (CONMKT) 年 panel data 數 Panel 料 (spurious) 例六六 CONMKT 數數不異了 (robustness) year-firm 數數都 (Greene, 2003) 論異年數論 18

20 [ 7] 類 (TEJ) TCRI 1~4 類度 5~6 度 7~9 度數 TCRI (RISK) 來 8 CONMKT CONACC 數度 [ 8] 陸論離行都行理益列量利金流量利益理 ( ) Beaver and Ryan (2000) 量 Givoly and Hayn (2000) 量 Basu (1997) 來離度度 (TCRI) 數不量離度度列度說都 19

21 參 2004 不落立不了 TCRI 玲 2004 TCRI 玲 2004 & TCRI 數量量葉李 2002 理北葉李 2003 理易 Ahmed, A. S., B. K. Billings, R. M. Morton, and M. Stanford-Harris The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing debt costs. The Accounting Review 77 (4): Ashbaugh, H., D. W. Collins, and R. LaFond The effects of corporate governance on firms credit ratings. Working paper. Ball, R., A. Robin and A. Robin The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29: Basu, S. B The conservatism principle and asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24: Beaver, W. H., and S. G. Ryan Biases and lags in book value and their effects on the ability of the book-to-market ratio to predict book return on equity. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (1): Beekes, W., P. Pope, and S. Young The link between earnings timeliness, earnings conservatism and board composition: Evidence from the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review 12 (1): Bushman, R., Q. Chen, E. Engel, and A. Smith The sensitivity of corporate governance systems to the timeliness of accounting earnings. Working paper. University of Chicago. Chang, S. J Ownership structure, expropriation, and performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea, Academy o Management Journal 46 (2): 238 Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. Lang The separation of ownership and control in East Asia corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58: Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57: Cronqvist, H., and M. Nilsson Agency costs of controlling minority shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: Dechow, P. M., and R. M. Sloan Returns to contrarian investment strategies: Test of naïve expectations hypotheses. Journal of Financial Economics 43 (1): Du, J., and Y. Dai Ultimate corporate ownership structures and capital structures: Evidence from East Asian economies. Corporate Governance: An International Review 13 (1):

22 Fan, P. H., and T. J. Wong Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23: Fan, P. H., and T. J. Wong Do External auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (1): FitchRatings Credit policy special report. Evaluating Corporate Governance: The Bondholders Perspective. New York. Givoly, D., and C. Hayn The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals: Has financial reporting become more conservative? Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 (3): Greene, W., Econometric Analysis, 5 rd Prentice-Hall, NJ. Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Mecking Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): Joh, S.W Corporate governance and firm profitability: Evidence from Korea before the economic crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2): Jung, K., and S. Y., Kwon Ownership structure and earnings informativeness: evidence from Korea. The International Journal of Accounting 37: La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54: La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 106: La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance 57: Lee, P. P., K. Gary, and M. F. Lin. Corporate Ownership Structure and Accuracy and Bias of Mandatory Earnings Forecast: Evidence from Taiwan. 11 th Annual International Accounting Section Mid-year Conference and Inaugural Doctoral / New Faculty Consortium, San Antonio, Texas. Lemmon, M. L., and K. V. Lins Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Finance 58: Letwich, R Accounting information in private markets: Evidence from private lending agreements. The Accounting Review 58 (1): Leuz, C., D. Nanda, and P. D. Wysocki Discussion of ADRs, analysts, and accuracy: Does cross-listing in the United States improve a firm s information environment and increase market value? Journal of Accounting Research 41: Lins, K. V., Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: Pope, P. F. and M. Walker International differences in the timeliness, conservatism, and classification of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 37 ( Supplement): Roychowdhury, S., and R. L. Watts Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, market-to-book and conservatism in financial reporting. Working paper. Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics 53:

23 Watts, R A proposal for research on conservatism. Working paper, University of Rochester. Watts, R. L. 2003a. Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and placations. Accounting Horizons 17: Watts, R. L. 2003b. Conservatism in Accounting Part II: Evidences and Research Opportunities. Accounting Horizons 17: Watts R, and J. Zimmerman Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review 53 (1): White, H A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 40: Yeh, Y. H. and T. S. Lee Corporate governance and performance: The case of Taiwan. The Seventh Asia Pacific Finance Association Annual Conference, Shanghai. Yeh, Y. H., T. S. Lee, and T. Woidtke Family control and corporate governance: Evidence form Taiwan. International Review of Finance 2: Zmijewski, M., and R. Hagerman An income strategy approach to the positive theory of accounting standard setting/ choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3 22

24 1 2 1 量 (N=570) 數數 Q1 數 Q3 CONMKT *** CONACC *** DIFF *** CV *** BLOCK *** CBOARD *** LEV *** ROA *** SIZE *** SGROWTH (%) *** EP *** RET *** NEG *** TCRI *** LOSS *** OI_INT *** FA_INTEN *** CONMKT= (2) 數 *(-1) CONACC= 量 *(-1) DIFF= 金流量 CV= 金流量 / BLOCK=1 年 5% 0 CBOARD= 率 LEV= 率 ROA= 利 SGROWTH= 率 EP= RET= 率 NEG=1 RET<0 0 TCRI= 1~9 D D 量 10 LOSS=1 年年度 0 OI_INT= 利利 FA_INTEN= 2. 數異 0 * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 2 度度度 TCRI D 數

25 3 數 (N=570) Panel A 說數數 CONMKT CONACC DIFF CV BLOCK CBOARD LEV ROA SIZE SGROWTH CONMKT * * * CONACC *** *** DIFF * *** ** CV ** *** BLOCK *** * CBOARD * *** LEV ** ** *** ROA ** * ** * *** *** SIZE *** ** * *** *** *** SGROWTH(%) *** * *** Panel B 說數數 TCRI CONMKT CONACC LEV ROA SIZE LOSS OI_INT FA_INTEN TCRI * *** *** *** *** *** CONMKT * * * ** CONACC *** *** *** *** *** LEV ** *** *** *** *** *** ROA ** ** *** *** *** *** SIZE *** *** *** *** ** LOSS *** *** *** *** *** OI_INT * * * *** FA_INTEN *** ** *** spearman 數 Pearson 數 2. * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 3. 數參見 1 24

26 4 (N=570) COV = β + β DEV + β BLOCK + β CBOARD + β LEV + β ROA + β SIZE + β SGROWTH + ε Panel A 數量 (CONMKT) 數 Intercept? (-0.27) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.41) DIFF (-1.77*) (-1.72**) CV (2.01**) (1.92**) BLOCK (0.88) (0.79) CBOARD (-0.22) (-0.20) LEV (2.75***) (2.57**) (2.76***) (2.58**) ROA (0.20) (0.35) (0.12) (0.27) SIZE (0.44) (0.32) (0.49) (0.37) SGROWTH (-0.63) (-0.67) (-0.69) (-0.73) Adj. R F value 2.92** 3.11*** 2.21** 2.32** Panel B 量 (CONACC) Intercept? (2.40) (2.37) (2.55**) (2.53**) DIFF (-2.41**) (-2.46***) CV (2.11**) (2.29**) BLOCK (1.67**) (1.83**) CBOARD (-0.34) (-0.36) LEV (1.40) (1.54) (1.38*) (1.55*) ROA? (10.73***) (10.75***) (10.83***) (10.88***) SIZE (2.39**) (2.54**) (2.43***) (2.59***) SGROWTH (-6.13***) (-6.04***) (-6.20***) (-6.14***) Adj. R F value 37.03*** 36.61*** 26.92*** 26.74*** 1. p * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 2. ( ) White 異 (White 1980) 數參見 1 25

27 5 Et / P = t 1 β + 0 β1ret + β2neg + β3neg RET + β4dev + β5neg DEV + β6dev RET + β NEG DEV RET + β CBOARD + β NEG CBOARD + β CBOARD RET β NEG CBOARD RET + β BLOCK + β NEG BLOCK + β BLOCK RET β NEG BLOCK RET + ε 15 數 Intercept (6.77***) (7.27***) (4.37***) (4.32***) (2.70***) RET (12.20***) (5.77***) (3.10***) (12.07***) (6.90***) NEG? (0.86) (0.00) (-0.55) (0.70) (-0.11) NEG*RET (1.42*) (2.63***) (1.00) (0.62) (1.12) DEV (2.02) (1.96) (2.50) (2.48) NEG*DEV (-0.52) (-0.42) (-0.78) (-0.87) DEV*RET (-3.38) (-2.60) (-2.40) (-1.35) NEG*DEV*RET (2.17**) (2.17**) (3.80***) (3.40***) CBOARD (-1.15) (-1.11) NEG*CBOARD (-0.35) (-0.41) CBOARD*RET (2.84) (2.63) NEG*RED*CBOARD (-2.71***) (-2.66***) BLOCK (0.40) (0.57) NEG*BLOCK (0.99) (0.88) RET*BLOCK (-1.11) (-1.63) NEG*RET*BLOCK (2.11**) (2.31**) Adj. R F value *** 48.36*** 24.31*** 48.23*** 24.23*** 離數 DEV=1 金流量 (DIFF) 數 DEV 金流量率 (CV) 數 DEV=1 0 CBOARD 數率數 CBOARD=1 0 5% BLOCK=1 數 EP RET NEG 數若 RET<0 NEG=1 2. p * ** *** 10% 5% 1% ( ) White 異 (White 1980) 26

28 6 Order Logit regression TCRI = β + β COV + β LEV + β ROA + β SIZE + β LOSS + β OI _ INT β FA _ INTEN + ε 7 Panel A (N=570) 數 Model 1 Model 2 數 Z-value 數 Z-value COVMKT ** COVACC *** LEV *** *** ROA *** *** SIZE *** *** LOSS *** *** OI_INT *** * FA_INTEN LR stat Probability *** *** Pseudo-R Panel B (N=543) COVMKT ** COVACC *** LEV *** *** ROA *** *** SIZE *** *** LOSS *** *** OI_INT *** * FA_INTEN LR stat Probability *** *** Pseudo-R 數見 1 2. LR stat. P 數聯 Pseudo- R 2 McFdden 量度 1-(L u /L c ) L u (full) log-likelihood L c (intercept only) log-likelihood 3. *** ** * p 1% 5% 10% 27

29 7 說 - (N=234) COV = β + β DEV + β BLOCK + β CBOARD + β LEV + β ROA + β SIZE + β SGROWTH + ε Panel A 數量 (CONMKT) 數 Intercept? (-0.39) (-0.46) (-0.57) (-0.63) DIFF (-0.71) (-0.79) CV (2.01**) (2.06**) BLOCK (1.02) (0.94) CBOARD (0.70) (0.91) LEV (1.68*) (1.44) (1.67*) (1.41) ROA (-0.09) (0.17) (-0.15) (0.13) SIZE (0.56) (0.45) (0.61) (0.47) SGROWTH (-1.83*) (-1.83*) (-2.02**) (-2.02**) Adj. R F value * * Panel B 量 (CONACC) Intercept? (1.70) (1.68) (1.85) (1.86) DIFF (-2.43**) \ (-2.33**) CV (2.94***) (2.92***) BLOCK (1.03) (1.24) CBOARD (-0.59) (-0.38) LEV (0.81) (1.20) (0.80) (1.21) ROA? (7.83***) (8.06***) (7.84***) (8.10***) SIZE (1.60) ) (1.89*) (1.65) (1.96*) SGROWTH (1.98**) (1.95*) (2.16**) (-2.18**) Adj. R F value 17.98*** 18.86*** 12.94*** 13.65*** 1. 數參見 1 數都 firm-year 2. p * ** *** 10% 5% 1% ( ) White 異 (White 1980) 28

30 8 Order Logit regression (N=543) RISK = β + βcov + β LEV + β ROA + β SIZE + β LOSS + β OI _ INT β FA _ INTEN + ε 7 數 1 2 數 Z-value 數 Z-value COVMKT ** COVACC *** LEV ** ** ROA *** *** SIZE *** *** LOSS OI_INT FA_INTEN LR stat Probability *** *** Pseudo-R 數見 1 數 RISK TCRI LR stat. P 數聯 Pseudo- R 2 McFdden 量度 1-(L u /L c ) L u (full) log-likelihood L c (intercept only) log-likelihood 3. *** ** * p 1% 5% 10% 29

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