《歐美研究》第卷第期 (民國年月)，1-

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1 年 wcfang@sinica.edu.tw John Searle Background 念便了論 realism 類念便 Cartesianism 立說念不理說諸更念不論念論 * 年略立兩見

2 432 Being is that which is not a being and does not belong to beings.what is not accessible to direct representing and meaning: that is genuine background [Hintergrund]. See Martin Heidegger, 1986: 125; translation quoted from Dreyfus, 1991: 343, n3. 葉邏論邏論立 Cartesianism subject 念識 object 立了識識論論便不立 L Wittgenstein 年 Hilary Putnam 了老類 natural kind terms 不 Putnam Donald Davidson 更若 interpretation 度來切更不類 John McDowell 不不靈 mind organ 靈 mental life 1 見參

3 論論 433 an aspect of our life 聯靈來了靈靈立例見數年不了勒 Charles Taylor 陸 Martin Heidegger 洛 Maurice Merleau Ponty Anti Cartesianism Taylor 勒 background 念來說 Taylor Hintergrund 見 Heidegger Hubert Dreyfus 來見 Dreyfus 1991] Index 論 John Searle Searle 1983, chap. 5 兩年兩切流理說 2 不來

4 434 Searle 說說便說了臨了說勒說勒理 modern rationalism 來識論理 Taylor 勒理度來理勒便靈立 form of life 立勒離 disengaged agent Taylor Rene Descartes 易見論 methodological skepticism 不不不靈靈勒離不論來連 Thomas Hobbes 論 Mechanism 離 Taylor 靈靈理 information processing 離 Taylor

5 論論勒說理來靈便理若靈便靈 mind s eye 念念立不不念勒便立說勒來 deconstruct 理離 Taylor 勒說說離不離 embodied embedded in 論說不不不不勒說立易不 Taylor 說類不類

6 436 切勒說說力不說來說力念念理念靈靈 mental representations 說靈靈來靈便不靈 3 論略論論 private language argument 讀論留論論說兩不立不念便不立不不 3 類不 say show 見 Kremer 2001; 2002

7 論論 437 來來 [ 說 ] 說 (Wittgenstein, 1975: 54) 來若不說更來說不說不索力力練例念 Wittgenstein 了不力來力更練更更力若力說兩力不不靈力靈

8 438 說了例令不行令來來 without comparing it to anything 什什了了 Wittgenstein 例行令不不念靈來力不靈見 Wittgenstein 1953: 201 不來 R R R Robert B Brandom R 了 R presupposed 了不 implicit norms 行 practice Brandom 不練 R 不靈 R 行說 R 行 R 行 R normativity R

9 論論 439 行不行行行 R 更說 R 說行 R 切論行 R 理行 R 切切說說行 in the practice of a language word Wittgenstein 什了 Wittgenstein 1953: 432 更來 R R 不來 interpretations 不 determine meaning Wittgenstein 來說不什了若來來 hang in the air Wittgenstein 不行行不量度量便不量度不量度念 Wittgenstein

10 440 說力說了便了靈切說論句 literal meaning metaphor 兩度來說見 Searle 1983, chap. 5 Searle 1992 Searle 1995, chap. 6 句行了不論不論例來說說說不不泥來塞裡不不行說不不

11 論論 441 condition of satisfaction 若句不 truth condition 了狀 intentional states 念什念念見 Searle 什力 capacities 力 nonrepresentational capacities 了 Searle deep Background local Background Searle 力路力車力車 preintentional 度 stance skills 度 assumption presuppositions 行 practices habits Searle 說 realized in Searle 力力來不不不念見 Searle

12 442 理不 Searle 念理 effects Searle 力度不論什說不 brain in the vat Intentional content 念不 Searle 不論說不 could have 力 Background abilities Searle 不念

13 論論 443 不兩不 possible worlds 力說兩不了了了理理論說了句什說句說切不狀句更說來句說易便立

14 444 句念立念 a context free notion Searle 說 background assumptions Searle 說不來說理 understanding Searle 句不立來說說略不立說說了說說不了說說狀 intrinsic intentionality Searle 狀句說 utterances 說狀句說句說 derived intentionality Searle 來了 Searle 念 perception Searle 念說不 Searle 力 capacities of his intentionality 便力 Searle

15 論論靈兩 enriching 年靈 linguistically structured Searle 句說來不論句說說不來不說不說便說說不論論 Searle 1995, chap. 7-8 更來說句了類說什來說說不更切 following a rule 論立兩令不

16 446 裡了說更來了論了來說句說更利了來論 realism Searle 切 Kant a scandal to philosophy Kant 1965 Bxxxivn; 參 Heidegger scandal of philosophy 不 Heidegger 論立更說靈論不念不說論來 realism 論說論車論 exhibited 了論諾 commitment to 諾不不念說論立 demonstrating

17 論論 447 論諾 embodiment Searle 不論論不論不論諾說不力力車滑了論諾說什不車例路不不說不數不不識行了靈念來行來論論了諾力論諾車論說力力 counterfactual

18 448 力不力例說論了諾例了論諾論諾便了論諾理行立立不論諾不說論諾不說立兩諾什諾什不說了說諾諾來便諾不論諾來論論理 condition on the intelligibility of dis-

19 論論 449 course Searle 說論論 Searle 更了例來說說句 presupposition 金 Searle 論諾諾諾不論論諾來不論諾了論諾不不諾說來不論諾力不車論諾了說論來論說立立兩聯來便便 causal effects Searle 了來 Searle

20 450 了行便 4 論了說說靈不靈靈靈不靈不論靈不靈靈不了更靈了靈不說更論拉 Andy Clark 降力例不易來不類來不不不 4 靈論論 methodological solipsism 類

21 論論 451 度不易來不例便塞 Herbert A Simon 例行來行行路塞來行不行 behaving system 行不來說行不泥泥力便 Clark 利來不不不 Clark 不 Clark 不說 5 說 5 類來說例見 Clark 1997

22 452 便來什更來來說來論立不便論類不說了類便了靈便論 second person 見 Davidson 1992 落兩不量念不度念力說類不易說論不不說不索來論諾

23 論論 453 勒說立論論論立立念立

24 454 Brandom, R Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Clark, A Being there. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Davidson, D Knowing one s own mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, LX: Davidson, D The second person. Midwest studies in philosophy, XVII: The Wittgenstein legacy pp Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Dreyfus, H Being-in-the-world: A commentary on Heidegger s Being and Time, division 1. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Heidegger, M Gesamtausgabe 15, Seminare. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M Being and time J. Stambaugh, Trans.. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Original work published 1927 Kant, I Critique of pure reason N. K. Smith, Trans.. New York: St. Martin s Press. Original work published 1781 Kremer, M The purpose of Tractarian nonsense. Nous, 35: Kremer, M Mathematics and meaning in the Tractatus. Philosophical Investigations, 25: McDowell, J Putnam on mind and meaning. In Meaning, knowledge, and reality pp Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Putnam, H The meaning of meaning. In Philosophical papers, Vol. 2: Mind, language and reality pp Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press. Searle, J Literal meaning. In Expression and meaning: Studies in the theory of speech acts pp Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press. Searle, J The Background. In Intentionality: An essay in

25 論論 455 the philosophy of mind pp Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press. Searle, J Response: The background of intentionality and action. In E. Lepore & R. Van Gulick Eds. John Searle and his critics pp Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. Searle, J Consciousness, intentionality, and the background. In The rediscovery of the mind pp Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Searle, J The construction of social reality. New York: The Free Press. Searle, J Mind, language and society. New York: Basic Books. Simon, H. A The sciences of the artificial 2nd ed.. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Taylor, C Engaged agency and background in Heidegger. In C. B. Guignon Ed. The Cambridge companion to Heidegger pp Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press. Wittgenstein, L Philosophical investigations G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L The blue and brown books. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L Philosophical remarks. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L Remarks on the foundations of mathematics 3rd ed. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, & G. E. M. Anscombe, Eds.. G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L Philosophical occasions: J. C. Kalgge & A. Nordman, Eds.. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.

26 456 John Searle on the Background and Realism Wan-Chuan Fang Abstract For John Searle, a famous American philosopher, one of the main purposes for introducing what he calls the Background is to give support to realism, a view which affirms the existence of the external world. But his notion of the Background is vitiated by the fact that it is strangely based on some Cartesian assumptions. In this paper I argue that, because of this, his views face the following difficulties: 1 he cannot successfully explain how the literal meaning of a sentence or an utterance is to be learned; 2 one of his views runs counter to some of the findings in cognitive sciences; 3 the support his notion of the Background gives to realism is less than what he has expected. To see what significance the notion of the Background may have for philosophy in general and for realism in particular, we may need to find a better way of understanding the Background than what Searle has offered. Key Words: John Searle, Background, Realism, Cartesianism

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