Disney R Emmerson C 4 Fehr H Habermann C OECD 5 Fehr H Habermann C Kifmann M 9 Leroux ML Pestieau P 49

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "Disney R Emmerson C 4 Fehr H Habermann C OECD 5 Fehr H Habermann C Kifmann M 9 Leroux ML Pestieau P 49"

羊刑
7 years ago
Views:

1 Social Security Studies No * 工资异质性的视角郭磊苏涛永 ( 同济大学经济与管理学院, 上海,200092) 引入工资差异对企业职工企业年金缴费意愿的影响, 采用仿真方法测量企业年金对企业与机关事业单位职工养老金差距的影响首先, 根据我国养老制度安排, 构建了企业年金基金基本养老金退休金预测模型和养老金差距测量指标 ; 其次, 选取工资水平从社平工资的 0. 5 倍 ~ 5. 0 倍的 14 类代表性职工, 模拟了基准情境和提高企业年金税收优惠的四种情境提高雇主缴费的企业所得税免税上限降低雇主缴费计入个人账户部分的个人所得税税率降低领取阶段的个人所得税税率免征个人缴费的个人所得税, 并进行了敏感性分析仿真结果表明, 企业年金及其税收优惠政策能够有效缩小企业与机关事业单位职工养老金差距, 提高雇主缴费的企业所得税免税上限的作用最显著企业年金投资收益率提高企业年金管理费率降低余寿减少社平工资增长率提高和工作年限增加都会放大这种作用, 反之亦然工资越高企业职工从企业年金中获益越大, 可能扩大企业职工内部养老金差距养老金差距 ; 工资异质性 ; 仿真 ; 企业年金 ; 税收优惠 % % % % 20% % * IICKT JJD840009

2 Disney R Emmerson C 4 Fehr H Habermann C OECD 5 Fehr H Habermann C Kifmann M 9 Leroux ML Pestieau P 49

3 10 Brunner J K Pech S % 100% 300% Markov 首先, 国外文献较少考虑我国国情其次, 国内文献较少考虑企业年金缩小企业与机关事业单位职工养老金差距的作用第三, 较少考虑工资差异对职工缴费意愿的影响 50

4 t w t gw t h i w t h i pc rpc te h i w t te tc te l i l i h i h i l i h i l i = 0 t h i w t te 1 - tc + l i tm rea t = R tb lt t = R jgr lt 1. 退休时点养老金账户现值 1 EA i EA i = R t = 1 h i w 1 te 1 - tc + l i 1 + gw t tm R - t 1 + rea R - t 1 - tb = + 1% 2 = / R PB i PB i = h i w gw R - 1 R% lt 51

5 PC i PC i = R t = 1 h i w 1 pc 1 + gw t rpc R - t h i > 3 h i = 3 h i < 0. 6 h i = 0. 6 PP i = PC i + PB i TP i = EA i + PC i + PB i 2 h i DB i 2. 养老金差距指数 DB i = h i w gw R - 1 jgr lt IDBPP i = DB i /PP i IDBTP i = DB i /TP i > 1 3. 养老金差距缩小指数 IEATP i = IDBPP i - IDBTP i / IDBPP i = EA i / TP i 4. 政策变动指数 α β IEATP i Pαβ i = IEATP i β - IEATP i α / IEATP i α IEATP i β IEATP i α β α h i ~ 5 h i 1 l i 0. 6 h i = 0. 5 l i = 0 h i ~ l i 1 l i 2 l i 3 l i 4 l i 5 l i 6 l i 1 52 w t w 1 = 1 w t + 1 = w t 1 + gw te

6 % te = te h i l i 1 l i 2 l i 3 l i 4 l i 5 l i 6 h i l i 1 l i 2 l i 3 l i 4 l i 5 l i tc % % tc = tc gw 30 gw = gw tm 0. 2% 1. 2% tm = rpc % rpc = rea rea = 2 rpc tb tb = 0 tb pc % pc = R = lt = 25 jgr % % % R = 30 jgr =

7 1. 基准情境 DB i PP i EA i TP i IDBPP i IDBTP i IEATP i 2 2 h i DB i PP i EA i TP i IDBPP i IDBTP i IEATP i h i DB i > PP i DB i > TP i IDBPP i > IDBTP i > 1 IEATP i > % IDBPP i IDBTP i IEATP i h i % h i = 5 2. 提高对雇主的企业所得税优惠 te IEATP i IEATP i 3 54

8 3 h i te IEATP i 雇主缴费的企业所得税免税上限 ( te) h i te IEATP i te IEATP i % % te te IEATP i h i 3. 提高雇主缴费的个人所得税优惠 tc IEATP i 4 h i tc IEATP i IEATP i % % tc tc te 5 IEATP i % % IEATP i % % tc te 55

9 tc IEATP i h i 4 tc IEATP i h i 雇主缴费计入个人账户部分的个人所得税税率 ( tc) 提高企业年金领取阶段的个人所得税优惠 tb IEATP i 5 5 tb IEATP i h i 企业年金领取阶段的个人所得税税率 ( tb)

10 5 h i 企业年金领取阶段的个人所得税税率 ( tb) h i tb IEATP i IEATP i % % tb tc IEATP i h i 5. 免征个人缴费的个人所得税 l i l i 1 l i 2 l i 3 l i 4 l i 5 l i 6 1 IEATP i 6 6 h i l i IEATP i 职工缴费意愿 ( l i ) l i 1 l i 2 l i 3 l i 4 l i 5 l i h i l i IEATP i 57

11 5 2 l i l i 6 IEATP i % % l i IEATP i h i IEATP i = EA i /TP i DC IEATP i gw R tc Pαβ i 7 7 gw R Pαβ i h i 社平工资增长率 ( gw) 工作年限 ( R)

12 h i gw R Pαβ i 5 gw tc % 0. 97% 1. 06% R % % % gw R gw R Pαβ i h i % 4. 82% % 4. 83% % % 12. 5% % %

13 k Disney R Emmerson C Wakefield M. Tax reform and retirement saving incentives take - up of stakeholder pensions in the UK. Economica Fehr H Habermann C Kindermann F. Tax - favored retirement accounts Are they efficient in increasing savings and growth. Finanzarchiv Fehr H Habermann C. Private retirement savings and mandatory annuitization. International Tax and Public Finance Kifmann M. Age - dependent taxation and the optimal retirement benefit formula. German Economic Review Leroux M L Pestieau P Ponthiere G. Optimal linear taxation under endogenous longevity. Journal of Population Economics Brunner J K Pech S. Optimum taxation of life annuities. Social Choice and Welfare

14 Simulation ofenterprise Annuity Narrowing Pension Inequality Between Employees in Enterprises and Public Institutions based on Salary Heterogeneity GUO Lei SU Taoyong Abstract The paper introduced the effect of salary inequality on employees contribution to enterprise annuity and measured to what extent enterprise annuity narrows pension inequality between employees in enterprises and public institutions with simulation. First the paper constructed the forecast model of enterprise annuity fund public pension and public institutions pension and measurement index of pension inequality. Second the paper simulated the basic situation and 4 situations of tax preferential treatment increasing enterprise income tax exemption cap for employers contribution decreasing personal income tax on employers contribution into personal account decreasing personal income tax on employees enterprise annuity benefits exemption on personal contribution and analyzed sensitivity. The simulation shows that enterprise annuity and the tax preferential treatment will narrow the pension inequality between employees in enterprises and public institutions and increasing enterprise income tax exemption cap for employers contribution makes the most. Enterprise annuity fund investment return increasing enterprise annuity fund management fee decreasing remaining lifetime decreasing social average salary growth rate increasing and working time increasing will enlarge the narrowing effect and vice versa. High salary employees get more from enterprise annuity which will widen the pension inequality employees in enterprises. Key words pension inequality salary heterogeneity simulation enterprise annuity tax preferential treatment Z 61

4 Rodrigo Acuna R. and Augusto Iglesias P ~ 2000 DC 5 Mukul G. Asher

4 Rodrigo Acuna R. and Augusto Iglesias P ~ 2000 DC 5 Mukul G. Asher 2015 9 INSURANCE STUDIES No. 9 2015 430072 F840. 61 DOI 10. 13497 /j. cnki. is. 2015. 09. 010 A 1004-3306 2015 09-0117 - 11 + 1997 26 DC Leimer 1994 1 Hurd and Shoven 1985 2 Feldstein and Samwick 2001